diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/README | 74 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/dtls1_bitmap.c | 78 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c | 1229 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c | 1549 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record.h | 243 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record_locl.h | 116 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c | 163 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c | 1641 |
8 files changed, 5093 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/README b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..987e9fd --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/README @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +Record Layer Design +=================== + +This file provides some guidance on the thinking behind the design of the +record layer code to aid future maintenance. + +The record layer is divided into a number of components. At the time of writing +there are four: SSL3_RECORD, SSL3_BUFFER, DLTS1_BITMAP and RECORD_LAYER. Each +of these components is defined by: +1) A struct definition of the same name as the component +2) A set of source files that define the functions for that component +3) A set of accessor macros + +All struct definitions are in record.h. The functions and macros are either +defined in record.h or record_locl.h dependent on whether they are intended to +be private to the record layer, or whether they form part of the API to the rest +of libssl. + +The source files map to components as follows: + +dtls1_bitmap.c -> DTLS1_BITMAP component +ssl3_buffer.c -> SSL3_BUFFER component +ssl3_record.c -> SSL3_RECORD component +rec_layer_s3.c, rec_layer_d1.c -> RECORD_LAYER component + +The RECORD_LAYER component is a facade pattern, i.e. it provides a simplified +interface to the record layer for the rest of libssl. The other 3 components are +entirely private to the record layer and therefore should never be accessed +directly by libssl. + +Any component can directly access its own members - they are private to that +component, e.g. ssl3_buffer.c can access members of the SSL3_BUFFER struct +without using a macro. No component can directly access the members of another +component, e.g. ssl3_buffer cannot reach inside the RECORD_LAYER component to +directly access its members. Instead components use accessor macros, so if code +in ssl3_buffer.c wants to access the members of the RECORD_LAYER it uses the +RECORD_LAYER_* macros. + +Conceptually it looks like this: + + libssl + | +---------------------------|-----record.h-------------------------------------- + | + _______V______________ + | | + | RECORD_LAYER | + | | + | rec_layer_s3.c | + | ^ | + | _________|__________ | + || || + || DTLS1_RECORD_LAYER || + || || + || rec_layer_d1.c || + ||____________________|| + |______________________| + record_locl.h ^ ^ ^ + _________________| | |_________________ + | | | + _____V_________ ______V________ _______V________ + | | | | | | + | SSL3_BUFFER | | SSL3_RECORD | | DTLS1_BITMAP | + | |--->| | | | + | ssl3_buffer.c | | ssl3_record.c | | dtls1_bitmap.c | + |_______________| |_______________| |________________| + + +The two RECORD_LAYER source files build on each other, i.e. +the main one is rec_layer_s3.c which provides the core SSL/TLS layer. The second +one is rec_layer_d1.c which builds off of the SSL/TLS code to provide DTLS +specific capabilities. It uses some DTLS specific RECORD_LAYER component members +which should only be accessed from rec_layer_d1.c. These are held in the +DTLS1_RECORD_LAYER struct. diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/dtls1_bitmap.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/dtls1_bitmap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5923c53 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/dtls1_bitmap.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include "record_locl.h" + +/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */ +static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2) +{ + int64_t ret; + uint64_t l1, l2; + + n2l8(v1, l1); + n2l8(v2, l2); + + ret = l1 - l2; + + /* We do not permit wrap-around */ + if (l1 > l2 && ret < 0) + return 128; + else if (l2 > l1 && ret > 0) + return -128; + + if (ret > 128) + return 128; + else if (ret < -128) + return -128; + else + return (int)ret; +} + +int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) +{ + int cmp; + unsigned int shift; + const unsigned char *seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence; + + cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); + if (cmp > 0) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq); + return 1; /* this record in new */ + } + shift = -cmp; + if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) + return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ + else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift)) + return 0; /* record previously received */ + + SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq); + return 1; +} + +void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) +{ + int cmp; + unsigned int shift; + const unsigned char *seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); + + cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); + if (cmp > 0) { + shift = cmp; + if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) + bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL; + else + bitmap->map = 1UL; + memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); + } else { + shift = -cmp; + if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) + bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift; + } +} diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3ff5f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c @@ -0,0 +1,1229 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <errno.h> +#define USE_SOCKETS +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include "record_locl.h" + +int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; + + if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL) + return (0); + + rl->d = d; + + d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); + d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); + d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new(); + + if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL + || d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) { + pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q); + pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q); + pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q); + OPENSSL_free(d); + rl->d = NULL; + return (0); + } + + return 1; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); + pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q); + pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q); + pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q); + OPENSSL_free(rl->d); + rl->d = NULL; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; + pitem *item = NULL; + DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; + pqueue *unprocessed_rcds; + pqueue *processed_rcds; + pqueue *buffered_app_data; + + d = rl->d; + + while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { + rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + + while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { + rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + + while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) { + rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + + unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q; + processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q; + buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q; + memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); + d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds; + d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds; + d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e) +{ + if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) { + memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence, + rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); + memcpy(rl->write_sequence, + rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); + } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) { + memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence, + rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8])); + memcpy(rl->write_sequence, + rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); + } + rl->d->w_epoch = e; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq) +{ + memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); +} + +static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, + int len); + +/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ +static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) +{ + DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; + + rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + + SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf); + + s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet; + s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length; + memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); + memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); + + /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ + memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); + + return (1); +} + +int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) +{ + DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; + pitem *item; + + /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ + if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) + return 0; + + rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata)); + item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); + if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet; + rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length; + memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); + memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); + + item->data = rdata; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && + (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED + || SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) { + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, + sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); + } +#endif + + s->rlayer.packet = NULL; + s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; + memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf)); + memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec)); + + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + return (-1); + } + + /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ + if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + return (-1); + } + + return (1); +} + +int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) +{ + pitem *item; + + item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); + if (item) { + dtls1_copy_record(s, item); + + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + + return (1); + } + + return (0); +} + +/* + * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not + * processed yet + */ +#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ + dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ + &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds)) + +int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) +{ + pitem *item; + SSL3_BUFFER *rb; + SSL3_RECORD *rr; + DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; + unsigned int is_next_epoch; + int replayok = 1; + + item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q); + if (item) { + /* Check if epoch is current. */ + if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) + return 1; /* Nothing to do. */ + + rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); + + rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); + + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rb) > 0) { + /* + * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could + * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it + * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've + * finished reading the current packet). + */ + return 1; + } + + /* Process all the records. */ + while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) { + dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); + bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); + if (bitmap == NULL) { + /* + * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the + * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot + * be the case because we already checked the epoch above + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ + if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) +#endif + { + /* + * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this + * check once already when we first received the record - but + * we might have updated the window since then due to + * records we subsequently processed. + */ + replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap); + } + + if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { + /* dump this record */ + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + continue; + } + + if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds), + SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0) + return 0; + } + } + + /* + * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been + * processed + */ + s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch; + s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1; + + return 1; +} + +/*- + * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. + * 'type' is one of the following: + * + * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) + * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) + * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) + * + * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first + * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). + * + * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as + * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec + * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| + * argument is non NULL. + * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store + * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol + * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): + * Change cipher spec protocol + * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored + * Alert protocol + * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) + * Handshake protocol + * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have + * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages + * here, anything else is handled by higher layers + * Application data protocol + * none of our business + */ +int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, + int len, int peek) +{ + int al, i, j, ret; + unsigned int n; + SSL3_RECORD *rr; + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; + + if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) { + /* Not initialized yet */ + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) + return (-1); + } + + if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || + (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* + * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting + */ + if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len))) { + *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + return ret; + } + + /* + * Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if + * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. + */ + + if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) + { + /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + } + + start: + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + + /*- + * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record + * s->s3->rrec.data, - data + * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read + * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. + */ + rr = s->rlayer.rrec; + + /* + * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered + * during the last handshake in advance, if any. + */ + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { + pitem *item; + item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q); + if (item) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, + sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); + } +#endif + + dtls1_copy_record(s, item); + + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + } + + /* Check for timeout */ + if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) + goto start; + + /* get new packet if necessary */ + if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) + || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { + ret = dtls1_get_record(s); + if (ret <= 0) { + ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); + /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ + if (ret <= 0) + return (ret); + else + goto start; + } + } + + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT + && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) + s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; + + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ + + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, + * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ + && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { + /* + * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely + * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application + * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. + */ + if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data), + SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + /* + * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in + * 'peek' mode) + */ + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (0); + } + + if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) + || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { + /* + * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or + * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + */ + /* + * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are + * doing a handshake for the first time + */ + if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (recvd_type != NULL) + *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); + + if (len <= 0) + return (len); + + if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) + n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); + else + n = (unsigned int)len; + + memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n); + if (!peek) { + SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); + SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { + s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); + } + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* + * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered + * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read + * anymore, finally set shutdown. + */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && + s->d1->shutdown_received + && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return (0); + } +#endif + return (n); + } + + /* + * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, + * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). + */ + + /* + * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill + * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. + */ + { + unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; + unsigned char *dest = NULL; + unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; + + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment); + dest = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment; + dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; + } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment); + dest = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment; + dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { + /* We allow a 0 return */ + if (dtls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr), + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) { + return -1; + } + /* Exit and notify application to read again */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + return (-1); + } +#endif + /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ + else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* + * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again + * reading. + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + BIO *bio; + s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + + /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + } + + if (dest_maxlen > 0) { + /* + * XDTLS: In a pathological case, the Client Hello may be + * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) { +#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE + /* + * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while + * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this + * non-existing alert... + */ + FIX ME; +#endif + s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + /* now move 'n' bytes: */ + for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) { + dest[k] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]; + SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1); + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1); + } + *dest_len = dest_maxlen; + } + } + + /*- + * s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + * s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. + * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) + */ + + /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ + if ((!s->server) && + (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && + (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && + (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0; + + if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || + (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || + (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages + */ + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment, 4, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && + !s->s3->renegotiate) { + s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; + s->new_session = 1; + ssl3_renegotiate(s); + if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, + * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with + * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may + * cause nasty problems in the blocking world + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + } + } + } else { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + } + /* + * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try + * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for + */ + goto start; + } + + /* + * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't + * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. + */ + if (s->server + && SSL_is_init_finished(s) + && s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + && s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO + && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0 + && ((!s->s3->send_connection_binding + && (s->options + & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0) + || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)) { + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0; + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto start; + } + + if (s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) { + int alert_level = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[0]; + int alert_descr = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[1]; + + s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len = 0; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, + s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment, 2, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + if (cb != NULL) { + j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; + cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); + } + + if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { + s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; + + s->rlayer.alert_count++; + if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + goto f_err; + } + + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* + * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data + * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so + * that nothing gets discarded. + */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && + BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + s->d1->shutdown_received = 1; + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + return -1; + } +#endif + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return (0); + } +#if 0 + /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ + /* now check if it's a missing record */ + if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { + unsigned short seq; + unsigned int frag_off; + unsigned char *p = &(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[2]); + + n2s(p, seq); + n2l3(p, frag_off); + + dtls1_retransmit_message(s, + dtls1_get_queue_priority + (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off, + &found); + if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) { + /* + * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); + */ + /* + * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert + * ourselves + */ + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, + DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); + } + } +#endif + } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { + char tmp[16]; + + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); + BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + return (0); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + goto start; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a + * shutdown */ + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + return (0); + } + + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* + * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages + * are still missing, so just drop it. + */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + /* + * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) + */ + if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && + !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; + + /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ + dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + /* + * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client + * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. + */ + if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) + return -1; + + dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + s->renegotiate = 1; + s->new_session = 1; + } + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, but we + * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry + * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty + * problems in the blocking world + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + } + goto start; + } + + switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { + default: + /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ + if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + case SSL3_RT_ALERT: + case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: + /* + * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but + * that should not happen when type != rr->type + */ + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: + /* + * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have + * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() + * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read + * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet + * started), we will indulge it. + */ + if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && + (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && + ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { + s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; + return (-1); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + } + } + /* not reached */ + + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return (-1); +} + + /* + * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake + * is started. + */ +static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, + int len) +{ + + if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) + && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) + /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ + { + unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment; + unsigned char *dst = buf; + unsigned int k, n; + + /* peek == 0 */ + n = 0; + while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { + *dst++ = *src++; + len--; + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len--; + n++; + } + /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ + for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; k++) + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; + return n; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if + * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. + */ +int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) +{ + int i; + + OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); + return i; +} + +int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) +{ + unsigned char *p, *pseq; + int i, mac_size, clear = 0; + int prefix_len = 0; + int eivlen; + SSL3_RECORD wr; + SSL3_BUFFER *wb; + SSL_SESSION *sess; + + wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; + + /* + * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This + * will happen with non blocking IO + */ + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) { + OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ + return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); + } + + /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ + if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + if (i <= 0) + return (i); + /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ + } + + if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) + return 0; + + if (len > s->max_send_fragment) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + sess = s->session; + + if ((sess == NULL) || + (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) + clear = 1; + + if (clear) + mac_size = 0; + else { + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); + if (mac_size < 0) + goto err; + } + + p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len; + + /* write the header */ + + *(p++) = type & 0xff; + SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); + /* + * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we + * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0 + * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. + */ + if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION && + s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; + *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; + } else { + *(p++) = s->version >> 8; + *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; + } + + /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ + pseq = p; + p += 10; + + /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ + if (s->enc_write_ctx) { + int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { + eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); + if (eivlen <= 1) + eivlen = 0; + } + /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ + else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) + eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) + eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + else + eivlen = 0; + } else + eivlen = 0; + + /* lets setup the record stuff. */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr, (int)len); + SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr, (unsigned char *)buf); + + /* + * we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data + */ + + /* first we compress */ + if (s->compress != NULL) { + if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } else { + memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr), + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)); + SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr); + } + + /* + * we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from + * wr.input. Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the + * wb->buf + */ + + if (mac_size != 0) { + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr, + &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]), + 1) < 0) + goto err; + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size); + } + + /* this is true regardless of mac size */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p); + SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr); + + if (eivlen) + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, eivlen); + + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, &wr, 1, 1) < 1) + goto err; + + /* record length after mac and block padding */ + /* + * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! + * SSL_in_init(s))) + */ + + /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ + + s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq); + + /* XDTLS: ?? */ + /* + * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); + */ + + memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6); + pseq += 6; + s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr), pseq); + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* + * we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is + * wr->length long + */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */ + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); + + ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0])); + + if (create_empty_fragment) { + /* + * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write + * out anything here + */ + return wr.length; + } + + /* now let's set up wb */ + SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)); + SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0); + + /* + * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write + * retries later + */ + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len; + s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; + s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; + s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len; + + /* we now just need to write the buffer */ + return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); + err: + return -1; +} + +DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, + unsigned int *is_next_epoch) +{ + + *is_next_epoch = 0; + + /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ + if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) + return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap; + + /* + * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we + * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last + * epoch + */ + else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) && + s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch && + (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { + *is_next_epoch = 1; + return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap; + } + + return NULL; +} + +void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) +{ + unsigned char *seq; + unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence); + + if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { + seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence; + s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++; + memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, + sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap)); + memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap)); + + /* + * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous + * epoch + */ + dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); + } else { + seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence; + memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq, + sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence)); + s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++; + } + + memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes); +} diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ffc120 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c @@ -0,0 +1,1549 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <errno.h> +#define USE_SOCKETS +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include "record_locl.h" + +#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ + !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ + defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ + ) +# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK +# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 +#endif + +void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) +{ + rl->s = s; + RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); + SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); +} + +void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + + /* + * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not + * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is + * that right? + */ + + rl->packet = NULL; + rl->packet_length = 0; + rl->wnum = 0; + memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment)); + rl->alert_fragment_len = 0; + memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); + rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; + rl->wpend_tot = 0; + rl->wpend_type = 0; + rl->wpend_ret = 0; + rl->wpend_buf = NULL; + + SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); + ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); + rl->numrpipes = 0; + SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); + + RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); + RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); + + if (rl->d) + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); +} + +void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) + ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); + if (rl->numwpipes > 0) + ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); + SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); +} + +/* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ +int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; +} + +/* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ +int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); + const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; + + while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) + curr_rec++; + + return curr_rec < num_recs; +} + +int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return (rl->numwpipes > 0) + && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; +} + +int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + rl->packet_length = len; + if (len != 0) { + rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) + if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s)) + return 0; + } + + rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf); + SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len); + + return 1; +} + +void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); +} + +void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); +} + +int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) +{ + unsigned int i; + int num = 0; + + if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) + != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) + return 0; + num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); + } + + return num; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) +{ + ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; +} + +void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) +{ + SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); +} + +const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) +{ + switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { + case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: + return "read header"; + case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: + return "read body"; + case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: + return "read done"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) +{ + switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { + case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: + return "RH"; + case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: + return "RB"; + case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: + return "RD"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +/* + * Return values are as per SSL_read() + */ +int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold) +{ + /* + * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase + * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of + * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If + * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus + * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) + * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if + * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were + */ + int i, len, left; + size_t align = 0; + unsigned char *pkt; + SSL3_BUFFER *rb; + + if (n <= 0) + return n; + + rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; + if (rb->buf == NULL) + if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) + return -1; + + left = rb->left; +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 + align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); +#endif + + if (!extend) { + /* start with empty packet ... */ + if (left == 0) + rb->offset = align; + else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + /* + * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload + * alignment... + */ + pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; + if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { + /* + * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field + * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about + * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no + * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer + * overrun can be triggered. + */ + memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); + rb->offset = align; + } + } + s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; + s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; + /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ + } + + len = s->rlayer.packet_length; + pkt = rb->buf + align; + /* + * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already + * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end + */ + if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { + memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); + s->rlayer.packet = pkt; + rb->offset = len + align; + } + + /* + * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read + * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into + * the buffer). + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (left == 0 && extend) + return 0; + if (left > 0 && n > left) + n = left; + } + + /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ + if (left >= n) { + s->rlayer.packet_length += n; + rb->left = left - n; + rb->offset += n; + return (n); + } + + /* else we need to read more data */ + + if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ + if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + /* ignore max parameter */ + max = n; + else { + if (max < n) + max = n; + if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) + max = rb->len - rb->offset; + } + + while (left < n) { + /* + * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and + * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if + * possible) + */ + + clear_sys_error(); + if (s->rbio != NULL) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); + i = -1; + } + + if (i <= 0) { + rb->left = left; + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + if (len + left == 0) + ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); + return i; + } + left += i; + /* + * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the + * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to + * byte oriented as in the TLS case. + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (n > left) + n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ + } + } + + /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ + rb->offset += n; + rb->left = left - n; + s->rlayer.packet_length += n; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (n); +} + +/* + * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if + * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. + */ +int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) +{ + const unsigned char *buf = buf_; + int tot; + unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK + unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw; + unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len; +#endif + SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; + int i; + + if (len < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + tot = s->rlayer.wnum; + /* + * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out + * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for + * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for + * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be + * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then + * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and + * report the error in a way the user will notice + */ + if (((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) + || ((wb->left != 0) && ((unsigned int)len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + + s->rlayer.wnum = 0; + + if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + } + + /* + * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This + * will happen with non blocking IO + */ + if (wb->left != 0) { + i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot); + if (i <= 0) { + /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */ + } +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK + /* + * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* + * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate + * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the + * compromise is considered worthy. + */ + if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && + u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) && + s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && + !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && + EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { + unsigned char aad[13]; + EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; + int packlen; + + /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ + if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) + max_send_fragment -= 512; + + if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + + packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, + EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, + max_send_fragment, NULL); + + if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) + packlen *= 8; + else + packlen *= 4; + + if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + return tot; + } + + n = (len - tot); + for (;;) { + if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + break; + } + + if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + if (i <= 0) { + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + } + + if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) + nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); + else + nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); + + memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); + aad[8] = type; + aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); + aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); + aad[11] = 0; + aad[12] = 0; + mb_param.out = NULL; + mb_param.inp = aad; + mb_param.len = nw; + + packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, + EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, + sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); + + if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */ + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + break; + } + + mb_param.out = wb->buf; + mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; + mb_param.len = nw; + + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, + EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, + sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) + return -1; + + s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; + if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { + int j = 6; + while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; + } + + wb->offset = 0; + wb->left = packlen; + + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; + s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; + s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; + s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; + + i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); + if (i <= 0) { + if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + } + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + if (i == (int)n) { + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + return tot + i; + } + n -= i; + tot += i; + } + } else +#endif + if (tot == len) { /* done? */ + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + + return tot; + } + + n = (len - tot); + + split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment; + /* + * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to + * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined + * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using + * explicit IVs + */ + maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; + if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { + /* + * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we + * shouldn't get here + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + if (maxpipes == 0 + || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL + || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) + || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) + maxpipes = 1; + if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment + || split_send_fragment == 0) { + /* + * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send + * fragments so we shouldn't get here + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + for (;;) { + unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; + unsigned int numpipes, j; + + if (n == 0) + numpipes = 1; + else + numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; + if (numpipes > maxpipes) + numpipes = maxpipes; + + if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) { + /* + * We have enough data to completely fill all available + * pipelines + */ + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment; + } + } else { + /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ + tmppipelen = n / numpipes; + remain = n % numpipes; + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; + if (j < remain) + pipelens[j]++; + } + } + + i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0); + if (i <= 0) { + /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + + if ((i == (int)n) || + (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && + (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { + /* + * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment + * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: + */ + s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; + + if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && + !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + + return tot + i; + } + + n -= i; + tot += i; + } +} + +int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes, + int create_empty_fragment) +{ + unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + int i, mac_size, clear = 0; + int prefix_len = 0; + int eivlen; + size_t align = 0; + SSL3_BUFFER *wb; + SSL_SESSION *sess; + unsigned int totlen = 0; + unsigned int j; + + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) + totlen += pipelens[j]; + /* + * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This + * will happen with non blocking IO + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) + return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen)); + + /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ + if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + if (i <= 0) + return (i); + /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ + } + + if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) + if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) + return -1; + + if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) + return 0; + + sess = s->session; + + if ((sess == NULL) || + (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { + clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ + mac_size = 0; + } else { + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); + if (mac_size < 0) + goto err; + } + + /* + * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself + */ + if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { + /* + * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see + * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) + */ + + if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + /* + * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this + * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these + * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual + * payload) + */ + unsigned int tmppipelen = 0; + + prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1); + if (prefix_len <= 0) + goto err; + + if (prefix_len > + (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { + /* insufficient space */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; + } + + if (create_empty_fragment) { + wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 + /* + * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be + * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real + * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. + */ + align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); +#endif + outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align; + SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); + } else if (prefix_len) { + wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; + outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) + + prefix_len; + } else { + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 + align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); +#endif + outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align; + SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); + } + } + + /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ + if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { + int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { + eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); + if (eivlen <= 1) + eivlen = 0; + } + /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ + else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) + eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) + eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + else + eivlen = 0; + } else + eivlen = 0; + + totlen = 0; + /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ + memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + /* write the header */ + *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff; + SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); + + *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8); + /* + * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes + * and record version number > TLS 1.0 + */ + if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO + && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) + *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1; + else + *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff; + + /* field where we are to write out packet length */ + plen[j] = outbuf[j]; + outbuf[j] += 2; + + /* lets setup the record stuff. */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen); + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]); + SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); + totlen += pipelens[j]; + + /* + * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data + */ + + /* first we compress */ + if (s->compress != NULL) { + if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } else { + memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length); + SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); + } + + /* + * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from + * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the + * wb->buf + */ + + if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], + &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]), + 1) < 0) + goto err; + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size); + } + + SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]); + SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); + + if (eivlen) { + /* + * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; + */ + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen); + } + } + + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) + goto err; + + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], + outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0) + goto err; + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size); + } + + /* record length after mac and block padding */ + s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]); + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* + * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is + * wr->length long + */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for + * debugging */ + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); + + if (create_empty_fragment) { + /* + * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write + * out anything here + */ + if (j > 0) { + /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr); + } + + /* now let's set up wb */ + SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], + prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j])); + } + + /* + * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write + * retries later + */ + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; + s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; + s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; + s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; + + /* we now just need to write the buffer */ + return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen); + err: + return -1; +} + +/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this + * + * Return values are as per SSL_write() + */ +int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int len) +{ + int i; + SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; + unsigned int currbuf = 0; + + if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len) + || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) + && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) + || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); + return (-1); + } + + for (;;) { + /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 + && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { + currbuf++; + continue; + } + clear_sys_error(); + if (s->wbio != NULL) { + s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; + i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) + &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) + [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), + (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); + i = -1; + } + if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { + SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); + SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i); + if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) + continue; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret); + } else if (i <= 0) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* + * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in + * using a datagram service + */ + SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); + } + return i; + } + SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i); + SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb[currbuf], -i); + } +} + +/*- + * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. + * 'type' is one of the following: + * + * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) + * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) + * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) + * + * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first + * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). + * + * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as + * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec + * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| + * argument is non NULL. + * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store + * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol + * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): + * Change cipher spec protocol + * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored + * Alert protocol + * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) + * Handshake protocol + * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have + * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages + * here, anything else is handled by higher layers + * Application data protocol + * none of our business + */ +int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, + int len, int peek) +{ + int al, i, j, ret; + unsigned int n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes; + SSL3_RECORD *rr; + SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; + + rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; + + if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { + /* Not initialized yet */ + if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) + return (-1); + } + + if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) + && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek + && (type != + SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) + /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ + { + unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; + unsigned char *dst = buf; + unsigned int k; + + /* peek == 0 */ + n = 0; + while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { + *dst++ = *src++; + len--; + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; + n++; + } + /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ + for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; + + if (recvd_type != NULL) + *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + + return n; + } + + /* + * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. + */ + + if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { + /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + } + start: + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + + /*- + * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] + * rr[i].type - is the type of record + * rr[i].data, - data + * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read + * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. + */ + rr = s->rlayer.rrec; + num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); + + do { + /* get new records if necessary */ + if (num_recs == 0) { + ret = ssl3_get_record(s); + if (ret <= 0) + return (ret); + num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); + if (num_recs == 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + } + /* Skip over any records we have already read */ + for (curr_rec = 0; + curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); + curr_rec++) ; + if (curr_rec == num_recs) { + RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); + num_recs = 0; + curr_rec = 0; + } + } while (num_recs == 0); + rr = &rr[curr_rec]; + + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT + && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) + s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; + + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ + + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, + * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ + && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in + * 'peek' mode) + */ + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (0); + } + + if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) + || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { + /* + * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or + * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + */ + /* + * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are + * doing a handshake for the first time + */ + if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE + && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + goto f_err; + } + + if (recvd_type != NULL) + *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); + + if (len <= 0) { + /* + * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to + * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause + * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + return len; + } + + read_bytes = 0; + do { + if ((unsigned int)len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) + n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); + else + n = (unsigned int)len - read_bytes; + + memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); + buf += n; + if (peek) { + /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + } else { + SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); + SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { + s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + } + } + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 + || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { + curr_rec++; + rr++; + } + read_bytes += n; + } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs + && read_bytes < (unsigned int)len); + if (read_bytes == 0) { + /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ + goto start; + } + if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs + && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) + && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) + ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); + return read_bytes; + } + + /* + * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, + * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we + * were actually expecting a CCS). + */ + + /* + * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record + */ + if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { + /* + * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 + * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an + * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to + * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong + */ + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION + && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { + /* + * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version + * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with + * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything + * other than a ClientHello if we are a server. + */ + s->version = rr->rec_version; + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill + * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. + */ + { + unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; + unsigned char *dest = NULL; + unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; + + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); + dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; + dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; + } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.alert_fragment); + dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment; + dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len; + } + + if (dest_maxlen > 0) { + n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) + n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ + + /* now move 'n' bytes: */ + while (n-- > 0) { + dest[(*dest_len)++] = + SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]; + SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1); + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1); + } + + if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + goto start; /* fragment was too small */ + } + } + } + + /*- + * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. + * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) + */ + + /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ + if ((!s->server) && + (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && + (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && + (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0; + + if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || + (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || + (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && + !s->s3->renegotiate) { + ssl3_renegotiate(s); + if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, + * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with + * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may + * cause nasty problems in the blocking world + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + } + } else { + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + } + } else { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + } + /* + * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try + * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for + */ + goto start; + } + /* + * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't + * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. + */ + if (s->server + && SSL_is_init_finished(s) + && s->version > SSL3_VERSION + && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO + && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0 + && ((!s->s3->send_connection_binding + && (s->options + & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0) + || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto start; + } + if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) { + int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0]; + int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1]; + + s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, + s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + if (cb != NULL) { + j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; + cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); + } + + if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { + s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + + s->rlayer.alert_count++; + if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + goto f_err; + } + + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return (0); + } + /* + * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested + * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal + * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it + * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In + * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if + * the peer refused it where we carry on. + */ + else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto f_err; + } +#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME + else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) + return (0); +#endif + } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { + char tmp[16]; + + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); + BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + return (0); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + goto start; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a + * shutdown */ + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + return (0); + } + + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) + */ + if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) + && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + s->renegotiate = 1; + s->new_session = 1; + } + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, but we + * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry + * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty + * problems in the blocking world + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + } + goto start; + } + + switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { + default: + /* + * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but + * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the + * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where + * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised + * record types, using up resources processing them. + */ + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + case SSL3_RT_ALERT: + case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: + /* + * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but + * that should not happen when type != rr->type + */ + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: + /* + * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have + * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() + * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read + * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet + * started), we will indulge it. + */ + if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { + s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; + return (-1); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + } + } + /* not reached */ + + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return (-1); +} + +void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { + ++seq[i]; + if (seq[i] != 0) + break; + } +} + +/* + * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible + * format and false otherwise. + */ +int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); +} + +/* + * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec + */ +unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); +} diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9bb2431 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record.h @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/***************************************************************************** + * * + * These structures should be considered PRIVATE to the record layer. No * + * non-record layer code should be using these structures in any way. * + * * + *****************************************************************************/ + +typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st { + /* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes, see ssl3_setup_buffers() */ + unsigned char *buf; + /* default buffer size (or 0 if no default set) */ + size_t default_len; + /* buffer size */ + size_t len; + /* where to 'copy from' */ + int offset; + /* how many bytes left */ + int left; +} SSL3_BUFFER; + +#define SEQ_NUM_SIZE 8 + +typedef struct ssl3_record_st { + /* Record layer version */ + /* r */ + int rec_version; + /* type of record */ + /* r */ + int type; + /* How many bytes available */ + /* rw */ + unsigned int length; + /* + * How many bytes were available before padding was removed? This is used + * to implement the MAC check in constant time for CBC records. + */ + /* rw */ + unsigned int orig_len; + /* read/write offset into 'buf' */ + /* r */ + unsigned int off; + /* pointer to the record data */ + /* rw */ + unsigned char *data; + /* where the decode bytes are */ + /* rw */ + unsigned char *input; + /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */ + /* r */ + unsigned char *comp; + /* Whether the data from this record has already been read or not */ + /* r */ + unsigned int read; + /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */ + /* r */ + unsigned long epoch; + /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */ + /* r */ + unsigned char seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; +} SSL3_RECORD; + +typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st { + /* Track 32 packets on 32-bit systems and 64 - on 64-bit systems */ + unsigned long map; + /* Max record number seen so far, 64-bit value in big-endian encoding */ + unsigned char max_seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; +} DTLS1_BITMAP; + +typedef struct record_pqueue_st { + unsigned short epoch; + struct pqueue_st *q; +} record_pqueue; + +typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st { + unsigned char *packet; + unsigned int packet_length; + SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; + SSL3_RECORD rrec; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo recordinfo; +#endif +} DTLS1_RECORD_DATA; + +typedef struct dtls_record_layer_st { + /* + * The current data and handshake epoch. This is initially + * undefined, and starts at zero once the initial handshake is + * completed + */ + unsigned short r_epoch; + unsigned short w_epoch; + /* records being received in the current epoch */ + DTLS1_BITMAP bitmap; + /* renegotiation starts a new set of sequence numbers */ + DTLS1_BITMAP next_bitmap; + /* Received handshake records (processed and unprocessed) */ + record_pqueue unprocessed_rcds; + record_pqueue processed_rcds; + /* + * Buffered application records. Only for records between CCS and + * Finished to prevent either protocol violation or unnecessary message + * loss. + */ + record_pqueue buffered_app_data; + /* + * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet + * processed by ssl3_read_bytes: + */ + unsigned char alert_fragment[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; + unsigned int alert_fragment_len; + unsigned char handshake_fragment[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; + unsigned int handshake_fragment_len; + /* save last and current sequence numbers for retransmissions */ + unsigned char last_write_sequence[8]; + unsigned char curr_write_sequence[8]; +} DTLS_RECORD_LAYER; + +/***************************************************************************** + * * + * This structure should be considered "opaque" to anything outside of the * + * record layer. No non-record layer code should be accessing the members of * + * this structure. * + * * + *****************************************************************************/ + +typedef struct record_layer_st { + /* The parent SSL structure */ + SSL *s; + /* + * Read as many input bytes as possible (for + * non-blocking reads) + */ + int read_ahead; + /* where we are when reading */ + int rstate; + /* How many pipelines can be used to read data */ + unsigned int numrpipes; + /* How many pipelines can be used to write data */ + unsigned int numwpipes; + /* read IO goes into here */ + SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; + /* write IO goes into here */ + SSL3_BUFFER wbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + /* each decoded record goes in here */ + SSL3_RECORD rrec[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + /* used internally to point at a raw packet */ + unsigned char *packet; + unsigned int packet_length; + /* number of bytes sent so far */ + unsigned int wnum; + /* + * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet + * processed by ssl3_read_bytes: + */ + unsigned char alert_fragment[2]; + unsigned int alert_fragment_len; + unsigned char handshake_fragment[4]; + unsigned int handshake_fragment_len; + /* The number of consecutive empty records we have received */ + unsigned int empty_record_count; + /* partial write - check the numbers match */ + /* number bytes written */ + int wpend_tot; + int wpend_type; + /* number of bytes submitted */ + int wpend_ret; + const unsigned char *wpend_buf; + unsigned char read_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; + unsigned char write_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; + /* Set to true if this is the first record in a connection */ + unsigned int is_first_record; + /* Count of the number of consecutive warning alerts received */ + unsigned int alert_count; + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; +} RECORD_LAYER; + +/***************************************************************************** + * * + * The following macros/functions represent the libssl internal API to the * + * record layer. Any libssl code may call these functions/macros * + * * + *****************************************************************************/ + +#define MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN 9 + +#define RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(rl, ra) ((rl)->read_ahead = (ra)) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(rl) ((rl)->read_ahead) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(rl) ((rl)->packet) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(rl) ((rl)->packet_length) +#define RECORD_LAYER_add_packet_length(rl, inc) ((rl)->packet_length += (inc)) +#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(rl) ((rl)->d->w_epoch) +#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(rl) \ + ((rl)->d->processed_rcds) +#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(rl) \ + ((rl)->d->unprocessed_rcds) + +void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s); +void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl); +int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl); +int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl); +int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len); +void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +__owur int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s); +__owur int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); +__owur int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes, + int create_empty_fragment); +__owur int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, + unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); +__owur int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s); +__owur int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send); +__owur int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send); +__owur int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int len); +__owur int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send); +__owur int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send); +int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e); +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl); +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq); +__owur int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, + unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); +__owur int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); +__owur int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement); +void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw); diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record_locl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b69afd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/record_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/***************************************************************************** + * * + * The following macros/functions are PRIVATE to the record layer. They * + * should NOT be used outside of the record layer. * + * * + *****************************************************************************/ + +#define MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT 5 + +/* Functions/macros provided by the RECORD_LAYER component */ + +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(rl) (&(rl)->rbuf) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(rl) ((rl)->wbuf) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(rl) ((rl)->rrec) +#define RECORD_LAYER_set_packet(rl, p) ((rl)->packet = (p)) +#define RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(rl) ((rl)->packet_length = 0) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(rl) ((rl)->rstate) +#define RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(rl, st) ((rl)->rstate = (st)) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(rl) ((rl)->read_sequence) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(rl) ((rl)->write_sequence) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl) ((rl)->numrpipes) +#define RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(rl, n) ((rl)->numrpipes = (n)) +#define RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(rl) ((rl)->empty_record_count++) +#define RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(rl) \ + ((rl)->empty_record_count = 0) +#define RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(rl) ((rl)->empty_record_count) +#define RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(rl) ((rl)->is_first_record) +#define RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(rl) ((rl)->is_first_record = 1) +#define RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(rl) ((rl)->is_first_record = 0) +#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(rl) ((rl)->d->r_epoch) + +__owur int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold); + +void RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *ws); +DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, + unsigned int *is_next_epoch); +int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s); +int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue); +int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, unsigned char *priority); +void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq); + +/* Functions provided by the DTLS1_BITMAP component */ + +int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); +void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); + +/* Macros/functions provided by the SSL3_BUFFER component */ + +#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(b) ((b)->buf) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(b, n) ((b)->buf = (n)) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(b) ((b)->len) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(b, l) ((b)->len = (l)) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(b) ((b)->left) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(b, l) ((b)->left = (l)) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(b, l) ((b)->left += (l)) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(b) ((b)->offset) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(b, o) ((b)->offset = (o)) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(b, o) ((b)->offset += (o)) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(b) ((b)->buf != NULL) +#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(b, l) ((b)->default_len = (l)) + +void SSL3_BUFFER_clear(SSL3_BUFFER *b); +void SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(SSL3_BUFFER *b, const unsigned char *d, int n); +void SSL3_BUFFER_release(SSL3_BUFFER *b); +__owur int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s); +__owur int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s, unsigned int numwpipes, size_t len); +int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s); +int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s); + +/* Macros/functions provided by the SSL3_RECORD component */ + +#define SSL3_RECORD_get_type(r) ((r)->type) +#define SSL3_RECORD_set_type(r, t) ((r)->type = (t)) +#define SSL3_RECORD_get_length(r) ((r)->length) +#define SSL3_RECORD_set_length(r, l) ((r)->length = (l)) +#define SSL3_RECORD_add_length(r, l) ((r)->length += (l)) +#define SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(r, l) ((r)->length -= (l)) +#define SSL3_RECORD_get_data(r) ((r)->data) +#define SSL3_RECORD_set_data(r, d) ((r)->data = (d)) +#define SSL3_RECORD_get_input(r) ((r)->input) +#define SSL3_RECORD_set_input(r, i) ((r)->input = (i)) +#define SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(r) ((r)->input = (r)->data) +#define SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(r) ((r)->seq_num) +#define SSL3_RECORD_get_off(r) ((r)->off) +#define SSL3_RECORD_set_off(r, o) ((r)->off = (o)) +#define SSL3_RECORD_add_off(r, o) ((r)->off += (o)) +#define SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(r) ((r)->epoch) +#define SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(r) \ + ((r)->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) +#define SSL3_RECORD_is_read(r) ((r)->read) +#define SSL3_RECORD_set_read(r) ((r)->read = 1) + +void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs); +void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs); +void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num); +int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); +__owur int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr); +__owur int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr); +void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, + const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size); +__owur int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, + unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); +__owur int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, + SSL3_RECORD *rec, + unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); +int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); +__owur int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s); diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6ed771 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include "record_locl.h" + +void SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(SSL3_BUFFER *b, const unsigned char *d, int n) +{ + if (d != NULL) + memcpy(b->buf, d, n); + b->left = n; + b->offset = 0; +} + +/* + * Clear the contents of an SSL3_BUFFER but retain any memory allocated. Also + * retains the default_len setting + */ +void SSL3_BUFFER_clear(SSL3_BUFFER *b) +{ + b->offset = 0; + b->left = 0; +} + +void SSL3_BUFFER_release(SSL3_BUFFER *b) +{ + OPENSSL_free(b->buf); + b->buf = NULL; +} + +int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *p; + size_t len, align = 0, headerlen; + SSL3_BUFFER *b; + + b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + else + headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 + align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); +#endif + + if (b->buf == NULL) { + len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (ssl_allow_compression(s)) + len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; +#endif + if (b->default_len > len) + len = b->default_len; + if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) + goto err; + b->buf = p; + b->len = len; + } + + RECORD_LAYER_set_packet(&s->rlayer, &(b->buf[0])); + return 1; + + err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; +} + +int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s, unsigned int numwpipes, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *p; + size_t align = 0, headerlen; + SSL3_BUFFER *wb; + unsigned int currpipe; + + s->rlayer.numwpipes = numwpipes; + + if (len == 0) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; + else + headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 + align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); +#endif + + len = s->max_send_fragment + + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (ssl_allow_compression(s)) + len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; +#endif + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) + len += headerlen + align + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD; + } + + wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer); + for (currpipe = 0; currpipe < numwpipes; currpipe++) { + SSL3_BUFFER *thiswb = &wb[currpipe]; + + if (thiswb->buf == NULL) { + p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if (p == NULL) { + s->rlayer.numwpipes = currpipe; + goto err; + } + memset(thiswb, 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); + thiswb->buf = p; + thiswb->len = len; + } + } + + return 1; + + err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; +} + +int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s) +{ + if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) + return 0; + if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, 0)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s) +{ + SSL3_BUFFER *wb; + unsigned int pipes; + + pipes = s->rlayer.numwpipes; + while (pipes > 0) { + wb = &RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer)[pipes - 1]; + + OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); + wb->buf = NULL; + pipes--; + } + s->rlayer.numwpipes = 0; + return 1; +} + +int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s) +{ + SSL3_BUFFER *b; + + b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); + OPENSSL_free(b->buf); + b->buf = NULL; + return 1; +} diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c7a54fe --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c @@ -0,0 +1,1641 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include "record_locl.h" + +static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = { + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 +}; + +static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c +}; + +/* + * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated + */ +void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs) +{ + unsigned char *comp; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { + comp = r[i].comp; + + memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r)); + r[i].comp = comp; + } +} + +void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { + OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); + r[i].comp = NULL; + } +} + +void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) +{ + memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); +} + +/* + * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting + * for us in the buffer. + */ +static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) +{ + SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; + int left, len; + unsigned char *p; + + rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); + + p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); + if (p == NULL) + return 0; + + left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); + + if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) + return 0; + + p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); + + /* + * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version + * etc later + */ + if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) + return 0; + + p += 3; + n2s(p, len); + + if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that + * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an + * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and + * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. + */ +#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 + +#define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 +/*- + * Call this to get new input records. + * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error + * or non-blocking IO. + * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i': + * rr[i].type - is the type of record + * rr[i].data, - data + * rr[i].length, - number of bytes + * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all + * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= + * |max_pipelines| + */ +/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ +int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) +{ + int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; + int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; + SSL3_RECORD *rr; + SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; + SSL_SESSION *sess; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + short version; + unsigned mac_size; + int imac_size; + unsigned int num_recs = 0; + unsigned int max_recs; + unsigned int j; + + rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); + rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); + max_recs = s->max_pipelines; + if (max_recs == 0) + max_recs = 1; + sess = s->session; + + do { + /* check if we have the header */ + if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || + (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) + < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, + num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0); + if (n <= 0) + return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ + RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); + + p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); + + /* + * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. + */ + if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) + && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { + /* + * SSLv2 style record + * + * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because + * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing + * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here + * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using + * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency + */ + rr[num_recs].type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + rr[num_recs].rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; + + rr[num_recs].length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; + + if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) + - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + + if (rr[num_recs].length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + /* SSLv3+ style record */ + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ + rr[num_recs].type = *(p++); + ssl_major = *(p++); + ssl_minor = *(p++); + version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; + rr[num_recs].rec_version = version; + n2s(p, rr[num_recs].length); + + /* Lets check version */ + if (!s->first_packet && version != s->version) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) + && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + /* + * The record is using an incorrect version number, + * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We + * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a + * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably + * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just + * end. + */ + goto err; + } + /* + * Send back error using their minor version number :-) + */ + s->version = (unsigned short)version; + } + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + + if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { + if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) { + /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes + * that we have. */ + p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); + if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 || + strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 || + strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 || + strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); + goto err; + } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); + goto err; + } + + /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + goto err; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (rr[num_recs].length > + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + } + + /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ + } + + /* + * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. + * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the + * record + */ + if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { + i = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + } else { + i = rr[num_recs].length; + } + if (i > 0) { + /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ + + n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 0); + if (n <= 0) + return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ + } + + /* set state for later operations */ + RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); + + /* + * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length, + * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length + * and we have that many bytes in s->packet + */ + if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { + rr[num_recs].input = + &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); + } else { + rr[num_recs].input = + &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); + } + + /* + * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points + * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either + * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into + * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer + */ + + /* + * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length + * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. + */ + + /* check is not needed I believe */ + if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + + /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ + rr[num_recs].data = rr[num_recs].input; + rr[num_recs].orig_len = rr[num_recs].length; + + /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ + rr[num_recs].read = 0; + + num_recs++; + + /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); + } while (num_recs < max_recs + && rr[num_recs - 1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) + && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL + && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) + && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); + + /* + * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All + * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. + */ + if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { + unsigned char *mac; + + imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + if (imac_size < 0 || imac_size > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); + goto f_err; + } + mac_size = (unsigned)imac_size; + + for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { + if (rr[j].length < mac_size) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + rr[j].length -= mac_size; + mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length; + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); + if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + goto f_err; + } + } + } + + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); + /*- + * enc_err is: + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. + * 1: if the padding is valid + * -1: if the padding is invalid + */ + if (enc_err == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); + goto f_err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); + { + unsigned int z; + for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) + printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); + } + printf("\n"); +#endif + + /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ + if ((sess != NULL) && + (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && + (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { + /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ + unsigned char *mac = NULL; + unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + + for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { + /* + * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was + * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, + * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount + * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. + */ + if (rr[j].orig_len < mac_size || + /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ + (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && + rr[j].orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { + /* + * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be + * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in + * constant time from within the record, without leaking the + * contents of the padding bytes. + */ + mac = mac_tmp; + ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, &rr[j], mac_size); + rr[j].length -= mac_size; + } else { + /* + * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals + * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for + * |mac_size| above. + */ + rr[j].length -= mac_size; + mac = &rr[j].data[rr[j].length]; + } + + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); + if (i < 0 || mac == NULL + || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) + enc_err = -1; + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) + enc_err = -1; + } + } + + if (enc_err < 0) { + /* + * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, + * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption + * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should + * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become + * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) + */ + al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + goto f_err; + } + + for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { + /* rr[j].length is now just compressed */ + if (s->expand != NULL) { + if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, &rr[j])) { + al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + + rr[j].off = 0; + /*- + * So at this point the following is true + * rr[j].type is the type of record + * rr[j].length == number of bytes in record + * rr[j].off == offset to first valid byte + * rr[j].data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). + */ + + /* just read a 0 length packet */ + if (rr[j].length == 0) { + RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); + if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) + > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); + } + } + + RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); + return 1; + + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + return ret; +} + +int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + int i; + + if (rr->comp == NULL) { + rr->comp = (unsigned char *) + OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); + } + if (rr->comp == NULL) + return 0; + + i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); + if (i < 0) + return 0; + else + rr->length = i; + rr->data = rr->comp; +#endif + return 1; +} + +int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + int i; + + i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, + wr->input, (int)wr->length); + if (i < 0) + return (0); + else + wr->length = i; + + wr->input = wr->data; +#endif + return (1); +} + +/*- + * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs| + * + * Returns: + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too + * short etc). + * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. + * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error + * occurred. + */ +int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int sending) +{ + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; + unsigned long l; + int bs, i, mac_size = 0; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc; + + rec = inrecs; + /* + * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case + */ + if (n_recs != 1) + return 0; + if (sending) { + ds = s->enc_write_ctx; + if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) + enc = NULL; + else + enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); + } else { + ds = s->enc_read_ctx; + if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) + enc = NULL; + else + enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); + } + + if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { + memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); + rec->input = rec->data; + } else { + l = rec->length; + bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); + + /* COMPRESS */ + + if ((bs != 1) && sending) { + i = bs - ((int)l % bs); + + /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ + l += i; + /* + * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the + * padding length. + */ + memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); + rec->length += i; + rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1); + } + + if (!sending) { + if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) + return 0; + /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ + } + + if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1) + return -1; + + if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if ((bs != 1) && !sending) + return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); + } + return (1); +} + +/*- + * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. + * + * Returns: + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too + * short etc). + * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. + * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, + * an internal error occurred. + */ +int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int sending) +{ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; + size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; + int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc; + unsigned int ctr; + + if (n_recs == 0) + return 0; + + if (sending) { + if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { + int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); + OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); + } + ds = s->enc_write_ctx; + if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) + enc = NULL; + else { + int ivlen; + enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); + /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ + if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) + && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) + ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); + else + ivlen = 0; + if (ivlen > 1) { + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { + /* + * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever + * happen?? (steve) + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + } + } + } + } else { + if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { + int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); + } + ds = s->enc_read_ctx; + if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) + enc = NULL; + else + enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); + } + + if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length); + recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data; + } + ret = 1; + } else { + bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)); + + if (n_recs > 1) { + if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { + /* + * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the + * cipher doesn't support pipelining + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + } + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; + + if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { + unsigned char *seq; + + seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) + : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ + unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; + + s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); + memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); + memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); + } else { + memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); + for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ + ++seq[i]; + if (seq[i] != 0) + break; + } + } + + buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; + buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); + buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); + buf[ctr][11] = recs[ctr].length >> 8; + buf[ctr][12] = recs[ctr].length & 0xff; + pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, + EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); + if (pad <= 0) + return -1; + + if (sending) { + reclen[ctr] += pad; + recs[ctr].length += pad; + } + + } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { + i = bs - ((int)reclen[ctr] % bs); + + /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ + + /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ + j = i - 1; + for (k = (int)reclen[ctr]; k < (int)(reclen[ctr] + i); k++) + recs[ctr].input[k] = j; + reclen[ctr] += i; + recs[ctr].length += i; + } + + if (!sending) { + if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) + return 0; + } + } + if (n_recs > 1) { + unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + + /* Set the output buffers */ + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; + } + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, + n_recs, data) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); + } + /* Set the input buffers */ + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; + } + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, + n_recs, data) <= 0 + || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, + n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + } + + i = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]); + if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) + ? (i < 0) + : (i == 0)) + return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ + if (sending == 0) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + } + } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + } + } + } + + ret = 1; + if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if ((bs != 1) && !sending) { + int tmpret; + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); + /* + * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can + * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant + * time behaviour. + */ + if (tmpret == 0) + return 0; + ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1), + ret, -1); + } + } + if (pad && !sending) { + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + recs[ctr].length -= pad; + } + } + } + return ret; +} + +int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) +{ + unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; + const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; + unsigned char *p, rec_char; + size_t md_size; + int npad; + int t; + + if (sending) { + mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); + seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); + hash = ssl->write_hash; + } else { + mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); + seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); + hash = ssl->read_hash; + } + + t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); + if (t < 0) + return -1; + md_size = t; + npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; + + if (!sending && + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && + ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { + /* + * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any + * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we + * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. + */ + + /*- + * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: + * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. + * + * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size + * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller + * total size. + */ + unsigned char header[75]; + unsigned j = 0; + memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); + j += md_size; + memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); + j += npad; + memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); + j += 8; + header[j++] = rec->type; + header[j++] = rec->length >> 8; + header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; + + /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ + if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, + md, &md_size, + header, rec->input, + rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, + mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) + return -1; + } else { + unsigned int md_size_u; + /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + + if (md_ctx == NULL) + return -1; + + rec_char = rec->type; + p = md; + s2n(rec->length, p); + if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + return -1; + } + md_size = md_size_u; + + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + } + + ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); + return (md_size); +} + +int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) +{ + unsigned char *seq; + EVP_MD_CTX *hash; + size_t md_size; + int i; + EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; + unsigned char header[13]; + int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) + : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); + int t; + + if (sending) { + seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); + hash = ssl->write_hash; + } else { + seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); + hash = ssl->read_hash; + } + + t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); + OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); + md_size = t; + + /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ + if (stream_mac) { + mac_ctx = hash; + } else { + hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); + return -1; + } + mac_ctx = hmac; + } + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { + unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; + + s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); + memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); + + memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); + } else + memcpy(header, seq, 8); + + header[8] = rec->type; + header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); + header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); + header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; + header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; + + if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && + ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { + /* + * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any + * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we + * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. + */ + /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ + if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, + md, &md_size, + header, rec->input, + rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); + return -1; + } + } else { + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); + return -1; + } + if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode()) + if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, + mac_ctx, rec->input, + rec->length, rec->orig_len)) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); + return -1; + } + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); + +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "seq="); + { + int z; + for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) + fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } + fprintf(stderr, "rec="); + { + unsigned int z; + for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) + fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } +#endif + + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { + for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { + ++seq[i]; + if (seq[i] != 0) + break; + } + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + { + unsigned int z; + for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) + fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } +#endif + return (md_size); +} + +/*- + * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC + * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. + * + * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. + * returns: + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. + * 1: if the padding was valid + * -1: otherwise. + */ +int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, + unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) +{ + unsigned padding_length, good; + const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; + + /* + * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. + */ + if (overhead > rec->length) + return 0; + + padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; + good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); + /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ + good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1); + rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); + return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); +} + +/*- + * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC + * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and + * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record + * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the + * padding was removed. + * + * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. + * returns: + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. + * 1: if the padding was valid + * -1: otherwise. + */ +int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, + SSL3_RECORD *rec, + unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) +{ + unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i; + const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; + /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ + if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { + /* + * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant + * time. + */ + if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) + return 0; + /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ + rec->data += block_size; + rec->input += block_size; + rec->length -= block_size; + rec->orig_len -= block_size; + } else if (overhead > rec->length) + return 0; + + padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; + + if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { + /* padding is already verified */ + rec->length -= padding_length + 1; + return 1; + } + + good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); + /* + * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and + * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length + * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of + * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that + * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the + * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record + * is public information so we can use it.) + */ + to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */ + if (to_check > rec->length) + to_check = rec->length; + + for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { + unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i); + unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; + /* + * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value + * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. + */ + good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b)); + } + + /* + * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one + * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. + */ + good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff); + rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); + + return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); +} + +/*- + * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in + * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may + * vary within a 256-byte window). + * + * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to + * this function. + * + * On entry: + * rec->orig_len >= md_size + * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + * + * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with + * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into + * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't + * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are + * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. + */ +#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE + +void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, + const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size) +{ +#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) + unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char *rotated_mac; +#else + unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; +#endif + + /* + * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. + */ + unsigned mac_end = rec->length; + unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size; + unsigned in_mac; + /* + * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the + * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. + */ + unsigned scan_start = 0; + unsigned i, j; + unsigned rotate_offset; + + OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size); + OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + +#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) + rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63); +#endif + + /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ + if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) + scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); + + in_mac = 0; + rotate_offset = 0; + memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); + for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { + unsigned mac_started = constant_time_eq(i, mac_start); + unsigned mac_ended = constant_time_lt(i, mac_end); + unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; + + in_mac |= mac_started; + in_mac &= mac_ended; + rotate_offset |= j & mac_started; + rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac; + j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size); + } + + /* Now rotate the MAC */ +#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) + j = 0; + for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { + /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ + ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; + out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + } +#else + memset(out, 0, md_size); + rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) + out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset); + rotate_offset++; + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + } +#endif +} + +int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) +{ + int i, al; + int enc_err; + SSL_SESSION *sess; + SSL3_RECORD *rr; + unsigned int mac_size; + unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + + rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); + sess = s->session; + + /* + * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, + * and we have that many bytes in s->packet + */ + rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); + + /* + * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points + * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either + * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into + * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer + */ + + /* + * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length + * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. + */ + + /* check is not needed I believe */ + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + + /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ + rr->data = rr->input; + rr->orig_len = rr->length; + + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); + /*- + * enc_err is: + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. + * 1: if the padding is valid + * -1: if the padding is invalid + */ + if (enc_err == 0) { + /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + goto err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); + { + unsigned int z; + for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) + printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); + } + printf("\n"); +#endif + + /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ + if ((sess != NULL) && + (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { + /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ + unsigned char *mac = NULL; + unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + + /* + * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was + * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, + * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount + * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. + */ + if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || + /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ + (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && + rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { + /* + * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be + * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in + * constant time from within the record, without leaking the + * contents of the padding bytes. + */ + mac = mac_tmp; + ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size); + rr->length -= mac_size; + } else { + /* + * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals + * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for + * |mac_size| above. + */ + rr->length -= mac_size; + mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; + } + + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); + if (i < 0 || mac == NULL + || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) + enc_err = -1; + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) + enc_err = -1; + } + + if (enc_err < 0) { + /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + goto err; + } + + /* r->length is now just compressed */ + if (s->expand != NULL) { + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, + SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + + rr->off = 0; + /*- + * So at this point the following is true + * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record + * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record + * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte + * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment + * after use :-). + */ + + /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + + /* Mark receipt of record. */ + dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); + + return (1); + + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + return (0); +} + +/* + * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed + */ +#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ + dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ + &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer))) + +/*- + * Call this to get a new input record. + * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error + * or non-blocking IO. + * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in + * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record + * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data + * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes + */ +/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ +int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) +{ + int ssl_major, ssl_minor; + int i, n; + SSL3_RECORD *rr; + unsigned char *p = NULL; + unsigned short version; + DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; + unsigned int is_next_epoch; + + rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); + + again: + /* + * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. + * This is a non-blocking operation. + */ + if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) + return -1; + + /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ + if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) + return 1; + + /* get something from the wire */ + + /* check if we have the header */ + if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || + (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1); + /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ + if (n <= 0) + return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ + + /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + goto again; + } + + RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); + + p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, + s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ + rr->type = *(p++); + ssl_major = *(p++); + ssl_minor = *(p++); + version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; + + /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ + n2s(p, rr->epoch); + + memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6); + p += 6; + + n2s(p, rr->length); + + /* + * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact + * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors) + */ + if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + if (version != s->version) { + /* unexpected version, silently discard */ + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + goto again; + } + } + + if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { + /* wrong version, silently discard record */ + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + goto again; + } + + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { + /* record too long, silently discard it */ + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + goto again; + } + + /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ + } + + /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ + + if (rr->length > + RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ + i = rr->length; + n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 1); + /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ + if (n != i) { + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + goto again; + } + + /* + * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == + * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length + */ + } + /* set state for later operations */ + RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); + + /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ + bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); + if (bitmap == NULL) { + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ + goto again; /* get another record */ + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ + if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { +#endif + /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ + /* + * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where + * we have no integrity negotiated yet? + */ + if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ + goto again; /* get another record */ + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + } +#endif + + /* just read a 0 length packet */ + if (rr->length == 0) + goto again; + + /* + * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a + * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be + * processed at this time. + */ + if (is_next_epoch) { + if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { + if (dtls1_buffer_record + (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), + rr->seq_num) < 0) + return -1; + } + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + goto again; + } + + if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ + goto again; /* get another record */ + } + + return (1); + +} |