diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c | 1549 |
1 files changed, 1549 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ffc120 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c @@ -0,0 +1,1549 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <errno.h> +#define USE_SOCKETS +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include "record_locl.h" + +#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ + !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ + defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ + ) +# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK +# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 +#endif + +void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) +{ + rl->s = s; + RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); + SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); +} + +void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + + /* + * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not + * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is + * that right? + */ + + rl->packet = NULL; + rl->packet_length = 0; + rl->wnum = 0; + memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment)); + rl->alert_fragment_len = 0; + memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); + rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; + rl->wpend_tot = 0; + rl->wpend_type = 0; + rl->wpend_ret = 0; + rl->wpend_buf = NULL; + + SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); + ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); + rl->numrpipes = 0; + SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); + + RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); + RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); + + if (rl->d) + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); +} + +void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) + ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); + if (rl->numwpipes > 0) + ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); + SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); +} + +/* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ +int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; +} + +/* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ +int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); + const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; + + while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) + curr_rec++; + + return curr_rec < num_recs; +} + +int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return (rl->numwpipes > 0) + && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; +} + +int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + rl->packet_length = len; + if (len != 0) { + rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) + if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s)) + return 0; + } + + rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf); + SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len); + + return 1; +} + +void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); +} + +void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); +} + +int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) +{ + unsigned int i; + int num = 0; + + if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) + != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) + return 0; + num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); + } + + return num; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) +{ + ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; +} + +void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) +{ + SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); +} + +const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) +{ + switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { + case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: + return "read header"; + case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: + return "read body"; + case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: + return "read done"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) +{ + switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { + case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: + return "RH"; + case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: + return "RB"; + case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: + return "RD"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +/* + * Return values are as per SSL_read() + */ +int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold) +{ + /* + * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase + * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of + * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If + * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus + * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) + * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if + * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were + */ + int i, len, left; + size_t align = 0; + unsigned char *pkt; + SSL3_BUFFER *rb; + + if (n <= 0) + return n; + + rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; + if (rb->buf == NULL) + if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) + return -1; + + left = rb->left; +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 + align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); +#endif + + if (!extend) { + /* start with empty packet ... */ + if (left == 0) + rb->offset = align; + else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + /* + * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload + * alignment... + */ + pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; + if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { + /* + * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field + * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about + * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no + * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer + * overrun can be triggered. + */ + memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); + rb->offset = align; + } + } + s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; + s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; + /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ + } + + len = s->rlayer.packet_length; + pkt = rb->buf + align; + /* + * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already + * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end + */ + if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { + memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); + s->rlayer.packet = pkt; + rb->offset = len + align; + } + + /* + * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read + * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into + * the buffer). + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (left == 0 && extend) + return 0; + if (left > 0 && n > left) + n = left; + } + + /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ + if (left >= n) { + s->rlayer.packet_length += n; + rb->left = left - n; + rb->offset += n; + return (n); + } + + /* else we need to read more data */ + + if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ + if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + /* ignore max parameter */ + max = n; + else { + if (max < n) + max = n; + if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) + max = rb->len - rb->offset; + } + + while (left < n) { + /* + * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and + * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if + * possible) + */ + + clear_sys_error(); + if (s->rbio != NULL) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); + i = -1; + } + + if (i <= 0) { + rb->left = left; + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + if (len + left == 0) + ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); + return i; + } + left += i; + /* + * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the + * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to + * byte oriented as in the TLS case. + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (n > left) + n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ + } + } + + /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ + rb->offset += n; + rb->left = left - n; + s->rlayer.packet_length += n; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (n); +} + +/* + * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if + * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. + */ +int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) +{ + const unsigned char *buf = buf_; + int tot; + unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK + unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw; + unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len; +#endif + SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; + int i; + + if (len < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + tot = s->rlayer.wnum; + /* + * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out + * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for + * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for + * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be + * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then + * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and + * report the error in a way the user will notice + */ + if (((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) + || ((wb->left != 0) && ((unsigned int)len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + + s->rlayer.wnum = 0; + + if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + } + + /* + * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This + * will happen with non blocking IO + */ + if (wb->left != 0) { + i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot); + if (i <= 0) { + /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */ + } +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK + /* + * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* + * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate + * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the + * compromise is considered worthy. + */ + if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && + u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) && + s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && + !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && + EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { + unsigned char aad[13]; + EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; + int packlen; + + /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ + if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) + max_send_fragment -= 512; + + if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + + packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, + EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, + max_send_fragment, NULL); + + if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) + packlen *= 8; + else + packlen *= 4; + + if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + return tot; + } + + n = (len - tot); + for (;;) { + if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + break; + } + + if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + if (i <= 0) { + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + } + + if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) + nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); + else + nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); + + memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); + aad[8] = type; + aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); + aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); + aad[11] = 0; + aad[12] = 0; + mb_param.out = NULL; + mb_param.inp = aad; + mb_param.len = nw; + + packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, + EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, + sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); + + if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */ + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + break; + } + + mb_param.out = wb->buf; + mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; + mb_param.len = nw; + + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, + EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, + sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) + return -1; + + s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; + if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { + int j = 6; + while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; + } + + wb->offset = 0; + wb->left = packlen; + + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; + s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; + s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; + s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; + + i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); + if (i <= 0) { + if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + } + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + if (i == (int)n) { + /* free jumbo buffer */ + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + return tot + i; + } + n -= i; + tot += i; + } + } else +#endif + if (tot == len) { /* done? */ + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + + return tot; + } + + n = (len - tot); + + split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment; + /* + * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to + * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined + * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using + * explicit IVs + */ + maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; + if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { + /* + * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we + * shouldn't get here + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + if (maxpipes == 0 + || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL + || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) + || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) + maxpipes = 1; + if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment + || split_send_fragment == 0) { + /* + * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send + * fragments so we shouldn't get here + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + for (;;) { + unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; + unsigned int numpipes, j; + + if (n == 0) + numpipes = 1; + else + numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; + if (numpipes > maxpipes) + numpipes = maxpipes; + + if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) { + /* + * We have enough data to completely fill all available + * pipelines + */ + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment; + } + } else { + /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ + tmppipelen = n / numpipes; + remain = n % numpipes; + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; + if (j < remain) + pipelens[j]++; + } + } + + i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0); + if (i <= 0) { + /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + + if ((i == (int)n) || + (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && + (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { + /* + * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment + * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: + */ + s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; + + if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && + !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); + + return tot + i; + } + + n -= i; + tot += i; + } +} + +int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes, + int create_empty_fragment) +{ + unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + int i, mac_size, clear = 0; + int prefix_len = 0; + int eivlen; + size_t align = 0; + SSL3_BUFFER *wb; + SSL_SESSION *sess; + unsigned int totlen = 0; + unsigned int j; + + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) + totlen += pipelens[j]; + /* + * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This + * will happen with non blocking IO + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) + return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen)); + + /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ + if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + if (i <= 0) + return (i); + /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ + } + + if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) + if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) + return -1; + + if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) + return 0; + + sess = s->session; + + if ((sess == NULL) || + (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { + clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ + mac_size = 0; + } else { + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); + if (mac_size < 0) + goto err; + } + + /* + * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself + */ + if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { + /* + * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see + * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) + */ + + if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + /* + * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this + * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these + * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual + * payload) + */ + unsigned int tmppipelen = 0; + + prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1); + if (prefix_len <= 0) + goto err; + + if (prefix_len > + (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { + /* insufficient space */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; + } + + if (create_empty_fragment) { + wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 + /* + * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be + * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real + * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. + */ + align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); +#endif + outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align; + SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); + } else if (prefix_len) { + wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; + outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) + + prefix_len; + } else { + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 + align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); +#endif + outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align; + SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); + } + } + + /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ + if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { + int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { + eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); + if (eivlen <= 1) + eivlen = 0; + } + /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ + else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) + eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) + eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + else + eivlen = 0; + } else + eivlen = 0; + + totlen = 0; + /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ + memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + /* write the header */ + *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff; + SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); + + *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8); + /* + * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes + * and record version number > TLS 1.0 + */ + if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO + && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) + *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1; + else + *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff; + + /* field where we are to write out packet length */ + plen[j] = outbuf[j]; + outbuf[j] += 2; + + /* lets setup the record stuff. */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen); + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]); + SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); + totlen += pipelens[j]; + + /* + * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data + */ + + /* first we compress */ + if (s->compress != NULL) { + if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } else { + memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length); + SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); + } + + /* + * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from + * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the + * wb->buf + */ + + if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], + &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]), + 1) < 0) + goto err; + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size); + } + + SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]); + SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); + + if (eivlen) { + /* + * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; + */ + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen); + } + } + + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) + goto err; + + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { + if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], + outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0) + goto err; + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size); + } + + /* record length after mac and block padding */ + s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]); + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* + * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is + * wr->length long + */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for + * debugging */ + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); + + if (create_empty_fragment) { + /* + * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write + * out anything here + */ + if (j > 0) { + /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr); + } + + /* now let's set up wb */ + SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], + prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j])); + } + + /* + * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write + * retries later + */ + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; + s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; + s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; + s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; + + /* we now just need to write the buffer */ + return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen); + err: + return -1; +} + +/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this + * + * Return values are as per SSL_write() + */ +int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int len) +{ + int i; + SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; + unsigned int currbuf = 0; + + if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len) + || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) + && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) + || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); + return (-1); + } + + for (;;) { + /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 + && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { + currbuf++; + continue; + } + clear_sys_error(); + if (s->wbio != NULL) { + s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; + i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) + &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) + [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), + (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); + i = -1; + } + if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { + SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); + SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i); + if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) + continue; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret); + } else if (i <= 0) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* + * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in + * using a datagram service + */ + SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); + } + return i; + } + SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i); + SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb[currbuf], -i); + } +} + +/*- + * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. + * 'type' is one of the following: + * + * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) + * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) + * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) + * + * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first + * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). + * + * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as + * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec + * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| + * argument is non NULL. + * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store + * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol + * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): + * Change cipher spec protocol + * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored + * Alert protocol + * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) + * Handshake protocol + * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have + * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages + * here, anything else is handled by higher layers + * Application data protocol + * none of our business + */ +int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, + int len, int peek) +{ + int al, i, j, ret; + unsigned int n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes; + SSL3_RECORD *rr; + SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; + + rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; + + if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { + /* Not initialized yet */ + if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) + return (-1); + } + + if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) + && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek + && (type != + SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) + /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ + { + unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; + unsigned char *dst = buf; + unsigned int k; + + /* peek == 0 */ + n = 0; + while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { + *dst++ = *src++; + len--; + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; + n++; + } + /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ + for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; + + if (recvd_type != NULL) + *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + + return n; + } + + /* + * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. + */ + + if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { + /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + } + start: + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + + /*- + * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] + * rr[i].type - is the type of record + * rr[i].data, - data + * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read + * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. + */ + rr = s->rlayer.rrec; + num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); + + do { + /* get new records if necessary */ + if (num_recs == 0) { + ret = ssl3_get_record(s); + if (ret <= 0) + return (ret); + num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); + if (num_recs == 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + } + /* Skip over any records we have already read */ + for (curr_rec = 0; + curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); + curr_rec++) ; + if (curr_rec == num_recs) { + RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); + num_recs = 0; + curr_rec = 0; + } + } while (num_recs == 0); + rr = &rr[curr_rec]; + + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT + && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) + s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; + + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ + + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, + * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ + && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in + * 'peek' mode) + */ + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (0); + } + + if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) + || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { + /* + * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or + * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + */ + /* + * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are + * doing a handshake for the first time + */ + if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE + && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + goto f_err; + } + + if (recvd_type != NULL) + *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); + + if (len <= 0) { + /* + * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to + * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause + * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + return len; + } + + read_bytes = 0; + do { + if ((unsigned int)len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) + n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); + else + n = (unsigned int)len - read_bytes; + + memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); + buf += n; + if (peek) { + /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + } else { + SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); + SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { + s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + } + } + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 + || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { + curr_rec++; + rr++; + } + read_bytes += n; + } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs + && read_bytes < (unsigned int)len); + if (read_bytes == 0) { + /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ + goto start; + } + if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs + && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) + && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) + ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); + return read_bytes; + } + + /* + * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, + * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we + * were actually expecting a CCS). + */ + + /* + * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record + */ + if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { + /* + * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 + * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an + * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to + * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong + */ + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION + && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { + /* + * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version + * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with + * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything + * other than a ClientHello if we are a server. + */ + s->version = rr->rec_version; + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill + * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. + */ + { + unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; + unsigned char *dest = NULL; + unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; + + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); + dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; + dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; + } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.alert_fragment); + dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment; + dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len; + } + + if (dest_maxlen > 0) { + n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) + n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ + + /* now move 'n' bytes: */ + while (n-- > 0) { + dest[(*dest_len)++] = + SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]; + SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1); + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1); + } + + if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + goto start; /* fragment was too small */ + } + } + } + + /*- + * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. + * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) + */ + + /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ + if ((!s->server) && + (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && + (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && + (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0; + + if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || + (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || + (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && + !s->s3->renegotiate) { + ssl3_renegotiate(s); + if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, + * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with + * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may + * cause nasty problems in the blocking world + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + } + } else { + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + } + } else { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + } + /* + * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try + * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for + */ + goto start; + } + /* + * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't + * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. + */ + if (s->server + && SSL_is_init_finished(s) + && s->version > SSL3_VERSION + && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO + && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0 + && ((!s->s3->send_connection_binding + && (s->options + & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0) + || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto start; + } + if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) { + int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0]; + int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1]; + + s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, + s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + if (cb != NULL) { + j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; + cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); + } + + if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { + s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + + s->rlayer.alert_count++; + if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + goto f_err; + } + + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return (0); + } + /* + * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested + * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal + * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it + * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In + * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if + * the peer refused it where we carry on. + */ + else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto f_err; + } +#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME + else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) + return (0); +#endif + } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { + char tmp[16]; + + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); + BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + return (0); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + goto start; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a + * shutdown */ + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); + return (0); + } + + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) + */ + if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) + && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + s->renegotiate = 1; + s->new_session = 1; + } + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, but we + * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry + * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty + * problems in the blocking world + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + } + goto start; + } + + switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { + default: + /* + * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but + * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the + * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where + * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised + * record types, using up resources processing them. + */ + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + case SSL3_RT_ALERT: + case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: + /* + * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but + * that should not happen when type != rr->type + */ + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: + /* + * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have + * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() + * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read + * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet + * started), we will indulge it. + */ + if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { + s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; + return (-1); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + } + } + /* not reached */ + + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return (-1); +} + +void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { + ++seq[i]; + if (seq[i] != 0) + break; + } +} + +/* + * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible + * format and false otherwise. + */ +int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); +} + +/* + * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec + */ +unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); +} |