1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
|
/*
* Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
* Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "ec_lcl.h"
EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
const EC_METHOD *meth;
EC_GROUP *ret;
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
/*
* This might appear controversial, but the fact is that generic
* prime method was observed to deliver better performance even
* for NIST primes on a range of platforms, e.g.: 60%-15%
* improvement on IA-64, ~25% on ARM, 30%-90% on P4, 20%-25%
* in 32-bit build and 35%--12% in 64-bit build on Core2...
* Coefficients are relative to optimized bn_nist.c for most
* intensive ECDSA verify and ECDH operations for 192- and 521-
* bit keys respectively. Choice of these boundary values is
* arguable, because the dependency of improvement coefficient
* from key length is not a "monotone" curve. For example while
* 571-bit result is 23% on ARM, 384-bit one is -1%. But it's
* generally faster, sometimes "respectfully" faster, sometimes
* "tolerably" slower... What effectively happens is that loop
* with bn_mul_add_words is put against bn_mul_mont, and the
* latter "wins" on short vectors. Correct solution should be
* implementing dedicated NxN multiplication subroutines for
* small N. But till it materializes, let's stick to generic
* prime method...
* <appro>
*/
meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();
#else
if (BN_nist_mod_func(p))
meth = EC_GFp_nist_method();
else
meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();
#endif
ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
const EC_METHOD *meth;
EC_GROUP *ret;
meth = EC_GF2m_simple_method();
ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
#endif
|
