diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_sess.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_sess.c | 1179 |
1 files changed, 1179 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_sess.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0dea8b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -0,0 +1,1179 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <openssl/lhash.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include "ssl_locl.h" + +static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); +static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); +static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) +/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ +{ + return (ssl->session); +} + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) +/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ +{ + SSL_SESSION *sess; + /* + * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that + * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null + * and when we up the reference count. + */ + CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->lock); + sess = ssl->session; + if (sess) + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(sess); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock); + return sess; +} + +int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) +{ + return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); +} + +void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) +{ + return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); +} + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) +{ + SSL_SESSION *ss; + + ss = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ss)); + if (ss == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ + ss->references = 1; + ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */ + ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); + ss->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (ss->lock == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(ss); + return NULL; + } + + if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data)) { + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock); + OPENSSL_free(ss); + return NULL; + } + return ss; +} + +/* + * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If + * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. + */ +SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) +{ + SSL_SESSION *dest; + + dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src)); + if (dest == NULL) { + goto err; + } + memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest)); + + /* + * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in + * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + dest->psk_identity = NULL; +#endif + dest->ciphers = NULL; + dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; + dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; +#endif + dest->tlsext_tick = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + dest->srp_username = NULL; +#endif + dest->peer_chain = NULL; + dest->peer = NULL; + memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data)); + + /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */ + dest->prev = NULL; + dest->next = NULL; + + dest->references = 1; + + dest->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (dest->lock == NULL) + goto err; + + if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, dest, &dest->ex_data)) + goto err; + + if (src->peer != NULL) { + if (!X509_up_ref(src->peer)) + goto err; + dest->peer = src->peer; + } + + if (src->peer_chain != NULL) { + dest->peer_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(src->peer_chain); + if (dest->peer_chain == NULL) + goto err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (src->psk_identity_hint) { + dest->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint); + if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } + if (src->psk_identity) { + dest->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity); + if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } +#endif + + if (src->ciphers != NULL) { + dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers); + if (dest->ciphers == NULL) + goto err; + } + + if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, + &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) { + goto err; + } + + if (src->tlsext_hostname) { + dest->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname); + if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { + dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = + OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, + src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); + if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) + goto err; + } + if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { + dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = + OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, + src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); + if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) + goto err; + } +#endif + + if (ticket != 0 && src->tlsext_tick != NULL) { + dest->tlsext_tick = + OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen); + if (dest->tlsext_tick == NULL) + goto err; + } else { + dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0; + dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (src->srp_username) { + dest->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(src->srp_username); + if (dest->srp_username == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } +#endif + + return dest; + err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSL_SESSION_free(dest); + return NULL; +} + +const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) +{ + if (len) + *len = s->session_id_length; + return s->session_id; +} +const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s, + unsigned int *len) +{ + if (len != NULL) + *len = s->sid_ctx_length; + return s->sid_ctx; +} + +unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + return s->compress_meth; +} + +/* + * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling + * the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to + * complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: + * understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid + * a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the + * RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to + * 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions + * is perhaps a more interesting question ... + */ + +#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 +static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, + unsigned int *id_len) +{ + unsigned int retry = 0; + do + if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) + return 0; + while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && + (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ; + if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) + return 1; + /* else - woops a session_id match */ + /* + * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of + * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent + * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have + * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make + * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the + * internal cache as well). + */ + return 0; +} + +int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) +{ + /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ + + unsigned int tmp; + SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL; + GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; + + if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ + if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0) + ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s); + else + ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout; + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = NULL; + + if (session) { + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return (0); + } + + /*- + * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server). + * Note that: + * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the + * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket. + * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, statem_srvr.c calls + * ssl_get_new_session() in tls_process_client_hello(). + * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions, + * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows + * whether a ticket is expected or not. + * + * (b) statem_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing + * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session + * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop. + */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + ss->session_id_length = 0; + goto sess_id_done; + } + + /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ + CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->lock); + CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock); + if (s->generate_session_id) + cb = s->generate_session_id; + else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id) + cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id; + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); + /* Choose a session ID */ + memset(ss->session_id, 0, ss->session_id_length); + tmp = ss->session_id_length; + if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) { + /* The callback failed */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return (0); + } + /* + * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor + * set it higher than it was. + */ + if (tmp == 0 || tmp > ss->session_id_length) { + /* The callback set an illegal length */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return (0); + } + ss->session_id_length = tmp; + /* Finally, check for a conflict */ + if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, + ss->session_id_length)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return (0); + } + + sess_id_done: + if (s->tlsext_hostname) { + ss->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + } + } else { + ss->session_id_length = 0; + } + + if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); + ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; + s->session = ss; + ss->ssl_version = s->version; + ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; + + /* If client supports extended master secret set it in session */ + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) + ss->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; + + return (1); +} + +/*- + * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this + * connection. It is only called by servers. + * + * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix) + * session_id: ClientHello session ID. + * + * Returns: + * -1: error + * 0: a session may have been found. + * + * Side effects: + * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an + * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session. + * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1 + * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise). + */ +int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id) +{ + /* This is used only by servers. */ + + SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; + int fatal = 0; + int try_session_cache = 1; + int r; + + if (PACKET_remaining(session_id) == 0) + try_session_cache = 0; + + /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected and extended master secret flag */ + r = tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(s, ext, session_id, &ret); + switch (r) { + case -1: /* Error during processing */ + fatal = 1; + goto err; + case 0: /* No ticket found */ + case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */ + break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */ + case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */ + case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */ + try_session_cache = 0; + break; + default: + abort(); + } + + if (try_session_cache && + ret == NULL && + !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & + SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) { + SSL_SESSION data; + size_t local_len; + data.ssl_version = s->version; + memset(data.session_id, 0, sizeof(data.session_id)); + if (!PACKET_copy_all(session_id, data.session_id, + sizeof(data.session_id), &local_len)) { + goto err; + } + data.session_id_length = local_len; + CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock); + ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data); + if (ret != NULL) { + /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); + } + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock); + if (ret == NULL) + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++; + } + + if (try_session_cache && + ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) { + int copy = 1; + ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(session_id), + PACKET_remaining(session_id), + ©); + + if (ret != NULL) { + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++; + + /* + * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us + * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the + * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the + * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be + * thread-safe). + */ + if (copy) + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); + + /* + * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as + * well if and only if we are supposed to. + */ + if (! + (s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & + SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) { + /* + * Either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session should not + * interrupt the session resumption process. The return + * value is intentionally ignored. + */ + SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret); + } + } + } + + if (ret == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */ + + if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length + || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) { + /* + * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to + * use it in this context. + */ + goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ + } + + if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) { + /* + * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, + * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application + * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error + * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a + * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to + * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone + * noticing). + */ + + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, + SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } + + if (ret->cipher == NULL) { + unsigned char buf[5], *p; + unsigned long l; + + p = buf; + l = ret->cipher_id; + l2n(l, p); + if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) + ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2])); + else + ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1])); + if (ret->cipher == NULL) + goto err; + } + + if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */ + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++; + if (try_session_cache) { + /* session was from the cache, so remove it */ + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret); + } + goto err; + } + + /* Check extended master secret extension consistency */ + if (ret->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { + /* If old session includes extms, but new does not: abort handshake */ + if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } + } else if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { + /* If new session includes extms, but old does not: do not resume */ + goto err; + } + + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = ret; + s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; + return 1; + + err: + if (ret != NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_free(ret); + + if (!try_session_cache) { + /* + * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for + * the new session + */ + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + } + } + if (fatal) + return -1; + else + return 0; +} + +int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) +{ + int ret = 0; + SSL_SESSION *s; + + /* + * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though + * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and + * an lhash + */ + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c); + /* + * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later + */ + + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); + s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c); + + /* + * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this + * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify + * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. + */ + if (s != NULL && s != c) { + /* We *are* in trouble ... */ + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); + SSL_SESSION_free(s); + /* + * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot + * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the + * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently + * obtain the same session from an external cache) + */ + s = NULL; + } else if (s == NULL && + lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c) == NULL) { + /* s == NULL can also mean OOM error in lh_SSL_SESSION_insert ... */ + + /* + * ... so take back the extra reference and also don't add + * the session to the SSL_SESSION_list at this time + */ + s = c; + } + + /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */ + if (s == NULL) + SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c); + + if (s != NULL) { + /* + * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference + * count because it already takes into account the cache + */ + + SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ + ret = 0; + } else { + /* + * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large + */ + + ret = 1; + + if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) { + while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) { + if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) + break; + else + ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++; + } + } + } + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); + return ret; +} + +int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) +{ + return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1); +} + +static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck) +{ + SSL_SESSION *r; + int ret = 0; + + if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) { + if (lck) + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); + if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) { + ret = 1; + r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c); + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c); + } + c->not_resumable = 1; + + if (lck) + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); + + if (ret) + SSL_SESSION_free(r); + + if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) + ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, c); + } else + ret = 0; + return (ret); +} + +void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) +{ + int i; + + if (ss == NULL) + return; + + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ss->references, -1, &i, ss->lock); + REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss); + if (i > 0) + return; + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); + + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof(ss->master_key)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof(ss->session_id)); + X509_free(ss->peer); + sk_X509_pop_free(ss->peer_chain, X509_free); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers); + OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname); + OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; + OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); + ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; + OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint); + OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username); +#endif + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ss, sizeof(*ss)); +} + +int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ss) +{ + int i; + + if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ss->references, 1, &i, ss->lock) <= 0) + return 0; + + REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss); + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); + return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); +} + +int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) +{ + ssl_clear_bad_session(s); + if (s->ctx->method != s->method) { + if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, s->ctx->method)) + return 0; + } + + if (session != NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session); + s->verify_result = session->verify_result; + } + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = session; + + return 1; +} + +int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid, + unsigned int sid_len) +{ + if (sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + s->session_id_length = sid_len; + if (sid != s->session_id) + memcpy(s->session_id, sid, sid_len); + return 1; +} + +long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) +{ + if (s == NULL) + return (0); + s->timeout = t; + return (1); +} + +long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + if (s == NULL) + return (0); + return (s->timeout); +} + +long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + if (s == NULL) + return (0); + return (s->time); +} + +long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) +{ + if (s == NULL) + return (0); + s->time = t; + return (t); +} + +int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + return s->ssl_version; +} + +const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + return s->cipher; +} + +const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + return s->tlsext_hostname; +} + +int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + return (s->tlsext_ticklen > 0) ? 1 : 0; +} + +unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + return s->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; +} + +void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick, + size_t *len) +{ + *len = s->tlsext_ticklen; + if (tick != NULL) + *tick = s->tlsext_tick; +} + +X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + return s->peer; +} + +int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, + unsigned int sid_ctx_len) +{ + if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; + if (sid_ctx != s->sid_ctx) + memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); + + return 1; +} + +long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) +{ + long l; + if (s == NULL) + return (0); + l = s->session_timeout; + s->session_timeout = t; + return (l); +} + +long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) +{ + if (s == NULL) + return (0); + return (s->session_timeout); +} + +int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, + int (*tls_session_secret_cb) (SSL *s, + void *secret, + int *secret_len, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) + *peer_ciphers, + const SSL_CIPHER + **cipher, + void *arg), + void *arg) +{ + if (s == NULL) + return (0); + s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb; + s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg; + return (1); +} + +int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb, + void *arg) +{ + if (s == NULL) + return (0); + s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb; + s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg; + return (1); +} + +int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len) +{ + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); + s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL; + s->tlsext_session_ticket = + OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len); + if (s->tlsext_session_ticket == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + if (ext_data) { + s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len; + s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1; + memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len); + } else { + s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0; + s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL; + } + + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +typedef struct timeout_param_st { + SSL_CTX *ctx; + long time; + LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache; +} TIMEOUT_PARAM; + +static void timeout_cb(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p) +{ + if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) { /* timeout */ + /* + * The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to save on + * locking overhead + */ + (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s); + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx, s); + s->not_resumable = 1; + if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) + p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx, s); + SSL_SESSION_free(s); + } +} + +IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM); + +void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) +{ + unsigned long i; + TIMEOUT_PARAM tp; + + tp.ctx = s; + tp.cache = s->sessions; + if (tp.cache == NULL) + return; + tp.time = t; + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock); + i = lh_SSL_SESSION_get_down_load(s->sessions); + lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, 0); + lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_TIMEOUT_PARAM(tp.cache, timeout_cb, &tp); + lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, i); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); +} + +int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) +{ + if ((s->session != NULL) && + !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) && + !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) { + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + return (1); + } else + return (0); +} + +/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */ +static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) + return; + + if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) { + /* last element in list */ + if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) { + /* only one element in list */ + ctx->session_cache_head = NULL; + ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL; + } else { + ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev; + s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); + } + } else { + if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) { + /* first element in list */ + ctx->session_cache_head = s->next; + s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); + } else { + /* middle of list */ + s->next->prev = s->prev; + s->prev->next = s->next; + } + } + s->prev = s->next = NULL; +} + +static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) +{ + if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL)) + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); + + if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) { + ctx->session_cache_head = s; + ctx->session_cache_tail = s; + s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); + s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); + } else { + s->next = ctx->session_cache_head; + s->next->prev = s; + s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); + ctx->session_cache_head = s; + } +} + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) +{ + ctx->new_session_cb = cb; +} + +int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) { + return ctx->new_session_cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)) +{ + ctx->remove_session_cb = cb; +} + +void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx, + SSL_SESSION *sess) { + return ctx->remove_session_cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, + const unsigned char *data, + int len, int *copy)) +{ + ctx->get_session_cb = cb; +} + +SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, + const unsigned char + *data, int len, + int *copy) { + return ctx->get_session_cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) +{ + ctx->info_callback = cb; +} + +void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, + int val) { + return ctx->info_callback; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, + EVP_PKEY **pkey)) +{ + ctx->client_cert_cb = cb; +} + +int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, + EVP_PKEY **pkey) { + return ctx->client_cert_cb; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e) +{ + if (!ENGINE_init(e)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); + return 0; + } + if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, + SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD); + ENGINE_finish(e); + return 0; + } + ctx->client_cert_engine = e; + return 1; +} +#endif + +void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, + unsigned char *cookie, + unsigned int *cookie_len)) +{ + ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, + const unsigned char *cookie, + unsigned int cookie_len)) +{ + ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb; +} + +IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) |