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-rw-r--r--openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/build.info3
-rw-r--r--openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c293
-rw-r--r--openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c46
-rw-r--r--openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c265
4 files changed, 607 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/build.info b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbe2080
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+ tls1_prf.c kdf_err.c hkdf.c
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00b95b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+ unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ unsigned char *prk, size_t *prk_len);
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+ unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
+
+typedef struct {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ unsigned char *salt;
+ size_t salt_len;
+ unsigned char *key;
+ size_t key_len;
+ unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
+ size_t info_len;
+} HKDF_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_hkdf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
+
+ kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx));
+ if (kctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->data = kctx;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_hkdf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->key, kctx->key_len);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->info, kctx->info_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(kctx);
+}
+
+static int pkey_hkdf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+ HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_MD:
+ if (p2 == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ kctx->md = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT:
+ if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (p1 < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (kctx->salt != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len);
+
+ kctx->salt = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
+ if (kctx->salt == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ kctx->salt_len = p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY:
+ if (p1 < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (kctx->key != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->key, kctx->key_len);
+
+ kctx->key = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
+ if (kctx->key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ kctx->key_len = p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO:
+ if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(HKDF_MAXBUF - kctx->info_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(kctx->info + kctx->info_len, p2, p1);
+ kctx->info_len += p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return -2;
+
+ }
+}
+
+static int pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type,
+ const char *value)
+{
+ if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(ctx, EVP_get_digestbyname(value));
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, value);
+
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static int pkey_hkdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t *keylen)
+{
+ HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+
+ if (kctx->md == NULL || kctx->key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (HKDF(kctx->md, kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len, kctx->key, kctx->key_len,
+ kctx->info, kctx->info_len, key, *keylen) == NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hkdf_pkey_meth = {
+ EVP_PKEY_HKDF,
+ 0,
+ pkey_hkdf_init,
+ 0,
+ pkey_hkdf_cleanup,
+
+ 0, 0,
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0,
+ 0,
+
+ 0,
+ 0,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_hkdf_derive,
+ pkey_hkdf_ctrl,
+ pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str
+};
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+ unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
+{
+ unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t prk_len;
+
+ if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, key, key_len, prk, &prk_len))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
+}
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ unsigned char *prk, size_t *prk_len)
+{
+ unsigned int tmp_len;
+
+ if (!HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, key, key_len, prk, &tmp_len))
+ return NULL;
+
+ *prk_len = tmp_len;
+ return prk;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+ unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
+{
+ HMAC_CTX *hmac;
+
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ size_t done_len = 0, dig_len = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
+
+ size_t n = okm_len / dig_len;
+ if (okm_len % dig_len)
+ n++;
+
+ if (n > 255)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
+ size_t copy_len;
+ const unsigned char ctr = i;
+
+ if (i > 1) {
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
+ okm_len - done_len :
+ dig_len;
+
+ memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
+
+ done_len += copy_len;
+ }
+
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+ return okm;
+
+ err:
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7d71b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_functs[] = {
+ {ERR_FUNC(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR), "pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE), "pkey_tls1_prf_derive"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_reasons[] = {
+ {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
+ {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER), "missing parameter"},
+ {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+ if (ERR_func_error_string(KDF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+ ERR_load_strings(0, KDF_str_functs);
+ ERR_load_strings(0, KDF_str_reasons);
+ }
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa13732
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+
+static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
+ const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
+
+#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
+
+/* TLS KDF pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+ /* Digest to use for PRF */
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ /* Secret value to use for PRF */
+ unsigned char *sec;
+ size_t seclen;
+ /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
+ unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
+ size_t seedlen;
+} TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_tls1_prf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
+
+ kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx));
+ if (kctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->data = kctx;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(kctx);
+}
+
+static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+ TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD:
+ kctx->md = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET:
+ if (p1 < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (kctx->sec != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
+ kctx->seedlen = 0;
+ kctx->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
+ if (kctx->sec == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ kctx->seclen = p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED:
+ if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - kctx->seedlen))
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(kctx->seed + kctx->seedlen, p2, p1);
+ kctx->seedlen += p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return -2;
+
+ }
+}
+
+static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+ if (value == NULL) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0) {
+ TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+
+ const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ kctx->md = md;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
+ if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static int pkey_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t *keylen)
+{
+ TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
+ if (kctx->md == NULL || kctx->sec == NULL || kctx->seedlen == 0) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return tls1_prf_alg(kctx->md, kctx->sec, kctx->seclen,
+ kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen,
+ key, *keylen);
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD tls1_prf_pkey_meth = {
+ EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ pkey_tls1_prf_init,
+ 0,
+ pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup,
+
+ 0, 0,
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0,
+ 0,
+
+ 0,
+ 0,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_tls1_prf_derive,
+ pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl,
+ pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str
+};
+
+static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len,
+ const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
+{
+ int chunk;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL;
+ unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t A1_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
+
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ ctx_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+ if (mac_key == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed != NULL && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Reinit mac contexts */
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, A1, A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (olen > (size_t)chunk) {
+ size_t mac_len;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &mac_len))
+ goto err;
+ out += mac_len;
+ olen -= mac_len;
+ /* calc the next A1 value */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ } else { /* last one */
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(out, A1, olen);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
+ const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
+{
+
+ if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+ if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
+ seed, seed_len, out, olen))
+ return 0;
+
+ tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen/2, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
+ seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
+ out[i] ^= tmp[i];
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
generated by cgit