diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c | 393 |
1 files changed, 393 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd2cf60 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c @@ -0,0 +1,393 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT +# error "CT disabled" +#endif + +#include <openssl/ct.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/tls1.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> + +#include "ct_locl.h" + +SCT *SCT_new(void) +{ + SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct)); + + if (sct == NULL) { + CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET; + sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET; + return sct; +} + +void SCT_free(SCT *sct) +{ + if (sct == NULL) + return; + + OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id); + OPENSSL_free(sct->ext); + OPENSSL_free(sct->sig); + OPENSSL_free(sct->sct); + OPENSSL_free(sct); +} + +void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a) +{ + sk_SCT_pop_free(a, SCT_free); +} + +int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version) +{ + if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { + CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return 0; + } + sct->version = version; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; + return 1; +} + +int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type) +{ + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; + + switch (entry_type) { + case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509: + case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT: + sct->entry_type = entry_type; + return 1; + default: + CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE); + return 0; + } +} + +int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len) +{ + if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) { + CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id); + sct->log_id = log_id; + sct->log_id_len = log_id_len; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; + return 1; +} + +int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len) +{ + if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) { + CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id); + sct->log_id = NULL; + sct->log_id_len = 0; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; + + if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) { + sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len); + if (sct->log_id == NULL) { + CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + sct->log_id_len = log_id_len; + } + return 1; +} + + +void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp) +{ + sct->timestamp = timestamp; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; +} + +int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid) +{ + switch (nid) { + case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption: + sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256; + sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; + return 1; + case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256: + sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256; + sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; + return 1; + default: + CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID); + return 0; + } +} + +void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len) +{ + OPENSSL_free(sct->ext); + sct->ext = ext; + sct->ext_len = ext_len; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; +} + +int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len) +{ + OPENSSL_free(sct->ext); + sct->ext = NULL; + sct->ext_len = 0; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; + + if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) { + sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len); + if (sct->ext == NULL) { + CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + sct->ext_len = ext_len; + } + return 1; +} + +void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + OPENSSL_free(sct->sig); + sct->sig = sig; + sct->sig_len = sig_len; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; +} + +int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + OPENSSL_free(sct->sig); + sct->sig = NULL; + sct->sig_len = 0; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; + + if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) { + sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len); + if (sct->sig == NULL) { + CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + sct->sig_len = sig_len; + } + return 1; +} + +sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct) +{ + return sct->version; +} + +ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct) +{ + return sct->entry_type; +} + +size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id) +{ + *log_id = sct->log_id; + return sct->log_id_len; +} + +uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct) +{ + return sct->timestamp; +} + +int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct) +{ + if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) { + if (sct->hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { + switch (sct->sig_alg) { + case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: + return NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; + case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: + return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption; + default: + return NID_undef; + } + } + } + return NID_undef; +} + +size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext) +{ + *ext = sct->ext; + return sct->ext_len; +} + +size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig) +{ + *sig = sct->sig; + return sct->sig_len; +} + +int SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct) +{ + switch (sct->version) { + case SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET: + return 0; + case SCT_VERSION_V1: + return sct->log_id != NULL && SCT_signature_is_complete(sct); + default: + return sct->sct != NULL; /* Just need cached encoding */ + } +} + +int SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct) +{ + return SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) != NID_undef && + sct->sig != NULL && sct->sig_len > 0; +} + +sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct) +{ + return sct->source; +} + +int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source) +{ + sct->source = source; + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; + switch (source) { + case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION: + case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE: + return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509); + case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION: + return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT); + default: /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */ + return 1; + } +} + +sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct) +{ + return sct->validation_status; +} + +int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) +{ + int is_sct_valid = -1; + SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL; + X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL; + const CTLOG *log; + + /* + * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means, + * let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0). + */ + if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION; + return 0; + } + + log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store, + sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len); + + /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */ + if (log == NULL) { + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG; + return 0; + } + + sctx = SCT_CTX_new(); + if (sctx == NULL) + goto err; + + if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1) + goto err; + if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1) + goto err; + + if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) { + EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey; + + if (ctx->issuer == NULL) { + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED; + goto end; + } + + issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer); + + if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1) + goto err; + if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1) + goto err; + } + + SCT_CTX_set_time(sctx, ctx->epoch_time_in_ms); + + /* + * XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy + * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not + * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is + * processed. So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps + * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx. + * + * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an + * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of + * memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just + * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the + * validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT + * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal + * errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate + * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing + * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or + * application decide what to do. + */ + if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1) + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED; + else + sct->validation_status = SCT_CTX_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ? + SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID; + +end: + is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID; +err: + X509_PUBKEY_free(pub); + X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey); + SCT_CTX_free(sctx); + + return is_sct_valid; +} + +int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) +{ + int are_scts_valid = 1; + int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) { + int is_sct_valid = -1; + SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); + + if (sct == NULL) + continue; + + is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx); + if (is_sct_valid < 0) + return is_sct_valid; + are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid; + } + + return are_scts_valid; +} |