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| author | Wojtek Kosior <wk@koszkonutek-tmp.pl.eu.org> | 2021-04-30 00:33:56 +0200 | 
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| committer | Wojtek Kosior <wk@koszkonutek-tmp.pl.eu.org> | 2021-04-30 00:33:56 +0200 | 
| commit | aa4d426b4d3527d7e166df1a05058c9a4a0f6683 (patch) | |
| tree | 4ff17ce8b89a2321b9d0ed4bcfc37c447bcb6820 /openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c | |
| download | smtps-and-pop3s-console-program-master.tar.gz smtps-and-pop3s-console-program-master.zip | |
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c | 248 | 
1 files changed, 248 insertions, 0 deletions
| diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..952d24f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include "internal/x509_int.h" +#include "rsa_locl.h" + +/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ +#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH  36 + +/* + * encode_pkcs1 encodes a DigestInfo prefix of hash |type| and digest |m|, as + * described in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE, RFC 3447 section 9.2 step 2. This + * encodes the DigestInfo (T and tLen) but does not add the padding. + * + * On success, it returns one and sets |*out| to a newly allocated buffer + * containing the result and |*out_len| to its length. The caller must free + * |*out| with |OPENSSL_free|. Otherwise, it returns zero. + */ +static int encode_pkcs1(unsigned char **out, int *out_len, int type, +                        const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len) +{ +    X509_SIG sig; +    X509_ALGOR algor; +    ASN1_TYPE parameter; +    ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; +    uint8_t *der = NULL; +    int len; + +    sig.algor = &algor; +    sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); +    if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) { +        RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); +        return 0; +    } +    if (OBJ_length(sig.algor->algorithm) == 0) { +        RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1, +               RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD); +        return 0; +    } +    parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; +    parameter.value.ptr = NULL; +    sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + +    sig.digest = &digest; +    sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; +    sig.digest->length = m_len; + +    len = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &der); +    if (len < 0) +        return 0; + +    *out = der; +    *out_len = len; +    return 1; +} + +int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, +             unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa) +{ +    int encrypt_len, encoded_len = 0, ret = 0; +    unsigned char *tmps = NULL; +    const unsigned char *encoded = NULL; + +    if (rsa->meth->rsa_sign) { +        return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa); +    } + +    /* Compute the encoded digest. */ +    if (type == NID_md5_sha1) { +        /* +         * NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and +         * earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is +         * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. +         */ +        if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { +            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); +            return 0; +        } +        encoded_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; +        encoded = m; +    } else { +        if (!encode_pkcs1(&tmps, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len)) +            goto err; +        encoded = tmps; +    } + +    if (encoded_len > RSA_size(rsa) - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { +        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY); +        goto err; +    } +    encrypt_len = RSA_private_encrypt(encoded_len, encoded, sigret, rsa, +                                      RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); +    if (encrypt_len <= 0) +        goto err; + +    *siglen = encrypt_len; +    ret = 1; + +err: +    OPENSSL_clear_free(tmps, (size_t)encoded_len); +    return ret; +} + +/* + * int_rsa_verify verifies an RSA signature in |sigbuf| using |rsa|. It may be + * called in two modes. If |rm| is NULL, it verifies the signature for digest + * |m|. Otherwise, it recovers the digest from the signature, writing the digest + * to |rm| and the length to |*prm_len|. |type| is the NID of the digest + * algorithm to use. It returns one on successful verification and zero + * otherwise. + */ +int int_rsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, +                   unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len, +                   const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) +{ +    int decrypt_len, ret = 0, encoded_len = 0; +    unsigned char *decrypt_buf = NULL, *encoded = NULL; + +    if (siglen != (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) { +        RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); +        return 0; +    } + +    /* Recover the encoded digest. */ +    decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); +    if (decrypt_buf == NULL) { +        RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +        goto err; +    } + +    decrypt_len = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, decrypt_buf, rsa, +                                     RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); +    if (decrypt_len <= 0) +        goto err; + +    if (type == NID_md5_sha1) { +        /* +         * NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and +         * earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is +         * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. +         */ +        if (decrypt_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { +            RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); +            goto err; +        } + +        if (rm != NULL) { +            memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf, SSL_SIG_LENGTH); +            *prm_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; +        } else { +            if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { +                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); +                goto err; +            } + +            if (memcmp(decrypt_buf, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH) != 0) { +                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); +                goto err; +            } +        } +    } else if (type == NID_mdc2 && decrypt_len == 2 + 16 +               && decrypt_buf[0] == 0x04 && decrypt_buf[1] == 0x10) { +        /* +         * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct +         * tag and length octets. +         */ +        if (rm != NULL) { +            memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf + 2, 16); +            *prm_len = 16; +        } else { +            if (m_len != 16) { +                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); +                goto err; +            } + +            if (memcmp(m, decrypt_buf + 2, 16) != 0) { +                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); +                goto err; +            } +        } +    } else { +        /* +         * If recovering the digest, extract a digest-sized output from the end +         * of |decrypt_buf| for |encode_pkcs1|, then compare the decryption +         * output as in a standard verification. +         */ +        if (rm != NULL) { +            const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(type); +            if (md == NULL) { +                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); +                goto err; +            } + +            m_len = EVP_MD_size(md); +            if (m_len > (size_t)decrypt_len) { +                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); +                goto err; +            } +            m = decrypt_buf + decrypt_len - m_len; +        } + +        /* Construct the encoded digest and ensure it matches. */ +        if (!encode_pkcs1(&encoded, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len)) +            goto err; + +        if (encoded_len != decrypt_len +            || memcmp(encoded, decrypt_buf, encoded_len) != 0) { +            RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); +            goto err; +        } + +        /* Output the recovered digest. */ +        if (rm != NULL) { +            memcpy(rm, m, m_len); +            *prm_len = m_len; +        } +    } + +    ret = 1; + +err: +    OPENSSL_clear_free(encoded, (size_t)encoded_len); +    OPENSSL_clear_free(decrypt_buf, siglen); +    return ret; +} + +int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, +               const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa) +{ + +    if (rsa->meth->rsa_verify) { +        return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa); +    } + +    return int_rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa); +} | 
