aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorWojtek Kosior <wk@koszkonutek-tmp.pl.eu.org>2021-04-30 00:33:56 +0200
committerWojtek Kosior <wk@koszkonutek-tmp.pl.eu.org>2021-04-30 00:33:56 +0200
commitaa4d426b4d3527d7e166df1a05058c9a4a0f6683 (patch)
tree4ff17ce8b89a2321b9d0ed4bcfc37c447bcb6820 /openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
downloadsmtps-and-pop3s-console-program-master.tar.gz
smtps-and-pop3s-console-program-master.zip
initial/final commitHEADmaster
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c476
1 files changed, 476 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72e2f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+int ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen,
+ const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *s;
+ RAND_seed(dgst, dlen);
+ s = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst, dlen, kinv, r, eckey);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ *siglen = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *siglen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &sig);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+ BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
+ const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen)
+{
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *X = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order;
+ EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int order_bits;
+
+ if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx_in == NULL) {
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else
+ ctx = ctx_in;
+
+ k = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
+ r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */
+ X = BN_new();
+ if (k == NULL || r == NULL || X == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+ if (order == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Preallocate space */
+ order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
+ if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits)
+ || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits)
+ || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits))
+ goto err;
+
+ do {
+ /* get random k */
+ do
+ if (dgst != NULL) {
+ if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce
+ (k, order, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey), dgst, dlen,
+ ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,
+ EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,
+ EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ while (BN_is_zero(k));
+
+ /*
+ * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
+ * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+ *
+ * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+ * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is
+ * one bit longer than the order. This guarantees the code
+ * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere.
+ *
+ * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+ * conditional copy.
+ */
+ if (!BN_add(r, k, order)
+ || !BN_add(X, r, order)
+ || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
+ NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp
+ (group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group,
+ tmp_point, X, NULL,
+ ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ while (BN_is_zero(r));
+
+ /* compute the inverse of k */
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group) != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact
+ * order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead.
+ */
+ if (!BN_set_word(X, 2)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod_sub(X, order, X, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_set_flags(X, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime
+ (k, k, X, order, ctx, EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group))) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* clear old values if necessary */
+ BN_clear_free(*rp);
+ BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
+ /* save the pre-computed values */
+ *rp = r;
+ *kinvp = k;
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (!ret) {
+ BN_clear_free(k);
+ BN_clear_free(r);
+ }
+ if (ctx != ctx_in)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
+ BN_clear_free(X);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+ BIGNUM **rp)
+{
+ return ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx_in, kinvp, rp, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+ const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r,
+ EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ok = 0, i;
+ BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order, *ckinv;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ ECDSA_SIG *ret;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
+
+ if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret->r = BN_new();
+ ret->s = BN_new();
+ if (ret->r == NULL || ret->s == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s = ret->s;
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
+ (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+ if (order == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = BN_num_bits(order);
+ /*
+ * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
+ */
+ if (8 * dgst_len > i)
+ dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8;
+ if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
+ if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ do {
+ if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) {
+ if (!ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dgst_len)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ckinv = kinv;
+ } else {
+ ckinv = in_kinv;
+ if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
+ /*
+ * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
+ * generate new kinv and r values
+ */
+ if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */
+ break;
+ }
+ while (1);
+
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (!ok) {
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(m);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ BN_clear_free(kinv);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * returns
+ * 1: correct signature
+ * 0: incorrect signature
+ * -1: error
+ */
+int ossl_ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *s;
+ const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+ unsigned char *der = NULL;
+ int derlen = -1;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (ret);
+ if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+ derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
+ if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen) != 0)
+ goto err;
+ ret = ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(der, derlen);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+ const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ret = -1, i;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ const BIGNUM *order;
+ BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const EC_POINT *pub_key;
+
+ /* check input values */
+ if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
+ (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (X == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+ if (order == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
+ BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
+ BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* digest -> m */
+ i = BN_num_bits(order);
+ /*
+ * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
+ */
+ if (8 * dgst_len > i)
+ dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8;
+ if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
+ if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* u2 = r * w mod q */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
+ NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
+ ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0);
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ret;
+}