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-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/xorg-server-CVE-2017-10971.patch153
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/xorg-server-CVE-2017-10972.patch35
2 files changed, 188 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/xorg-server-CVE-2017-10971.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/xorg-server-CVE-2017-10971.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2696033e58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/xorg-server-CVE-2017-10971.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+From 215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 15:54:40 +0300
+Subject: dix: Disallow GenericEvent in SendEvent request.
+
+The SendEvent request holds xEvent which is exactly 32 bytes long, no more,
+no less. Both ProcSendEvent and SProcSendEvent verify that the received data
+exactly match the request size. However nothing stops the client from passing
+in event with xEvent::type = GenericEvent and any value of
+xGenericEvent::length.
+
+In the case of ProcSendEvent, the event will be eventually passed to
+WriteEventsToClient which will see that it is Generic event and copy the
+arbitrary length from the receive buffer (and possibly past it) and send it to
+the other client. This allows clients to copy unitialized heap memory out of X
+server or to crash it.
+
+In case of SProcSendEvent, it will attempt to swap the incoming event by
+calling a swapping function from the EventSwapVector array. The swapped event
+is written to target buffer, which in this case is local xEvent variable. The
+xEvent variable is 32 bytes long, but the swapping functions for GenericEvents
+expect that the target buffer has size matching the size of the source
+GenericEvent. This allows clients to cause stack buffer overflows.
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+diff --git a/dix/events.c b/dix/events.c
+index 3e3a01e..d3a33ea 100644
+--- a/dix/events.c
++++ b/dix/events.c
+@@ -5366,6 +5366,12 @@ ProcSendEvent(ClientPtr client)
+ client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type;
+ return BadValue;
+ }
++ /* Generic events can have variable size, but SendEvent request holds
++ exactly 32B of event data. */
++ if (stuff->event.u.u.type == GenericEvent) {
++ client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type;
++ return BadValue;
++ }
+ if (stuff->event.u.u.type == ClientMessage &&
+ stuff->event.u.u.detail != 8 &&
+ stuff->event.u.u.detail != 16 && stuff->event.u.u.detail != 32) {
+diff --git a/dix/swapreq.c b/dix/swapreq.c
+index 719e9b8..6785059 100644
+--- a/dix/swapreq.c
++++ b/dix/swapreq.c
+@@ -292,6 +292,13 @@ SProcSendEvent(ClientPtr client)
+ swapl(&stuff->destination);
+ swapl(&stuff->eventMask);
+
++ /* Generic events can have variable size, but SendEvent request holds
++ exactly 32B of event data. */
++ if (stuff->event.u.u.type == GenericEvent) {
++ client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type;
++ return BadValue;
++ }
++
+ /* Swap event */
+ proc = EventSwapVector[stuff->event.u.u.type & 0177];
+ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
+--
+cgit v0.10.2
+
+From 8caed4df36b1f802b4992edcfd282cbeeec35d9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 15:54:41 +0300
+Subject: Xi: Verify all events in ProcXSendExtensionEvent.
+
+The requirement is that events have type in range
+EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE..lastEvent, but it was tested
+only for first event of all.
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+diff --git a/Xi/sendexev.c b/Xi/sendexev.c
+index 1cf118a..5e63bfc 100644
+--- a/Xi/sendexev.c
++++ b/Xi/sendexev.c
+@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ SProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
+ int
+ ProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
+ {
+- int ret;
++ int ret, i;
+ DeviceIntPtr dev;
+ xEvent *first;
+ XEventClass *list;
+@@ -141,10 +141,12 @@ ProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
+ /* The client's event type must be one defined by an extension. */
+
+ first = ((xEvent *) &stuff[1]);
+- if (!((EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE <= first->u.u.type) &&
+- (first->u.u.type < lastEvent))) {
+- client->errorValue = first->u.u.type;
+- return BadValue;
++ for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_events; i++) {
++ if (!((EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE <= first[i].u.u.type) &&
++ (first[i].u.u.type < lastEvent))) {
++ client->errorValue = first[i].u.u.type;
++ return BadValue;
++ }
+ }
+
+ list = (XEventClass *) (first + stuff->num_events);
+--
+cgit v0.10.2
+
+From ba336b24052122b136486961c82deac76bbde455 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 15:54:42 +0300
+Subject: Xi: Do not try to swap GenericEvent.
+
+The SProcXSendExtensionEvent must not attempt to swap GenericEvent because
+it is assuming that the event has fixed size and gives the swapping function
+xEvent-sized buffer.
+
+A GenericEvent would be later rejected by ProcXSendExtensionEvent anyway.
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+diff --git a/Xi/sendexev.c b/Xi/sendexev.c
+index 5e63bfc..5c2e0fc 100644
+--- a/Xi/sendexev.c
++++ b/Xi/sendexev.c
+@@ -95,9 +95,17 @@ SProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
+
+ eventP = (xEvent *) &stuff[1];
+ for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_events; i++, eventP++) {
++ if (eventP->u.u.type == GenericEvent) {
++ client->errorValue = eventP->u.u.type;
++ return BadValue;
++ }
++
+ proc = EventSwapVector[eventP->u.u.type & 0177];
+- if (proc == NotImplemented) /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
++ /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
++ if (proc == NotImplemented) {
++ client->errorValue = eventP->u.u.type;
+ return BadValue;
++ }
+ (*proc) (eventP, &eventT);
+ *eventP = eventT;
+ }
+--
+cgit v0.10.2
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/xorg-server-CVE-2017-10972.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/xorg-server-CVE-2017-10972.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f24e9c0ae6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/xorg-server-CVE-2017-10972.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 05442de962d3dc624f79fc1a00eca3ffc5489ced Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 15:54:39 +0300
+Subject: Xi: Zero target buffer in SProcXSendExtensionEvent.
+
+Make sure that the xEvent eventT is initialized with zeros, the same way as
+in SProcSendEvent.
+
+Some event swapping functions do not overwrite all 32 bytes of xEvent
+structure, for example XSecurityAuthorizationRevoked. Two cooperating
+clients, one swapped and the other not, can send
+XSecurityAuthorizationRevoked event to each other to retrieve old stack data
+from X server. This can be potentialy misused to go around ASLR or
+stack-protector.
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+diff --git a/Xi/sendexev.c b/Xi/sendexev.c
+index 11d8202..1cf118a 100644
+--- a/Xi/sendexev.c
++++ b/Xi/sendexev.c
+@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ SProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
+ {
+ CARD32 *p;
+ int i;
+- xEvent eventT;
++ xEvent eventT = { .u.u.type = 0 };
+ xEvent *eventP;
+ EventSwapPtr proc;
+
+--
+cgit v0.10.2
+
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