gnu: wpa_supplicant: Update to 2.7.

* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2017-13082.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-fix-key-reuse.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-fix-nonce-reuse.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-fix-zeroed-keys.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-krack-followups.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal): Update to 2.7.
[source](patches): Remove.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 53 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d3d5cbc46a..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-14526:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14526
-https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt
-
-Patch downloaded from upstream:
-
-https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
-
-From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
-
-Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
-processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
-flag set, but not the MIC flag.
-
-When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
-not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
-the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
-negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
-unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
-could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
-in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
-(CVE-2018-14526)
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
---- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c	2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 +0300
-+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c	2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 +0300
-@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c
- 
- 	if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
- 	    (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
-+		 * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
-+		 * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
-+		 * which is the case in this code branch.
-+		 */
-+		if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
-+			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+				"WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
-+			goto out;
-+		}
- 		if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
- 						    &key_data_len))
- 			goto out;