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authorMark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>2016-05-03 09:33:47 -0400
committerMark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>2016-05-03 09:39:59 -0400
commit0a17fd7c0b82ac315b68c88e6f206e0051dcd661 (patch)
tree7419f559b6ffaa284e478c153542e2ccaf8883c1 /gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch
parent4c6aa73b8f9a16130ae9546efd8fdcb99fc034d9 (diff)
downloadguix-0a17fd7c0b82ac315b68c88e6f206e0051dcd661.tar.gz
guix-0a17fd7c0b82ac315b68c88e6f206e0051dcd661.zip
gnu: wpa-supplicant: Add fixes for CVE-2016-{4476,4477}.
* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch: New files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it. * gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal)[source]: Add patches.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch50
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5f42aa9219
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the
+ string values
+
+Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
+without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
+value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.
+
+This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
+configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
+interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
+accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
+an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
+does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
+wpa_supplicant.
+
+This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
+into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
+wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
+pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
+controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
+library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ if (has_newline(pos)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline",
++ line, data->name);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ tmp = os_strdup(pos);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return -1;
+--
+1.9.1
+