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author | Efraim Flashner <efraim@flashner.co.il> | 2016-07-06 07:28:09 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Efraim Flashner <efraim@flashner.co.il> | 2016-07-06 07:28:09 +0300 |
commit | 6baa83d2838d11808ad0f317fbbd276f7c5904cb (patch) | |
tree | 4ffde3157e8e808b3528a54a5d20631c21893688 | |
parent | fda746b19803dadd6e7c097f41513b4c6784c8d1 (diff) | |
download | guix-6baa83d2838d11808ad0f317fbbd276f7c5904cb.tar.gz guix-6baa83d2838d11808ad0f317fbbd276f7c5904cb.zip |
gnu: sudo: Update to 1.8.17p1.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (sudo): Update to 1.8.17p1.
[source]: Remove patch.
* gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch: Remove file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it.
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/local.mk | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/admin.scm | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch | 372 |
3 files changed, 4 insertions, 378 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index 3a0d5c2557..947d1b0efc 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -774,7 +774,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/slim-sigusr1.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/slurm-configure-remove-nonfree-contribs.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/soprano-find-clucene.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/superlu-dist-scotchmetis.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/synfig-build-fix.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/t1lib-CVE-2010-2642.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm index 9afe1f8ee0..7ece6bdcb5 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm @@ -789,18 +789,17 @@ system administrator.") (define-public sudo (package (name "sudo") - (version "1.8.15") + (version "1.8.17p1") (source (origin (method url-fetch) (uri - (list (string-append "http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/sudo-" + (list (string-append "https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/sudo-" version ".tar.gz") (string-append "ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/OLD/sudo-" version ".tar.gz"))) (sha256 (base32 - "0263gi6i19fyzzc488n0qw3m518i39f6a7qmrfvahk9j10bkh5j3")) - (patches (search-patches "sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch")))) + "1k2mn65l1kmsxm8wh0gjxy496xhbpiimbpm6yv6kw6snzc3xg466")))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (arguments `(#:configure-flags @@ -849,7 +848,7 @@ system administrator.") `(("groff" ,groff) ("linux-pam" ,linux-pam) ("coreutils" ,coreutils))) - (home-page "http://www.sudo.ws/") + (home-page "https://www.sudo.ws/") (synopsis "Run commands as root") (description "Sudo (su \"do\") allows a system administrator to delegate authority to diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 36c90fbee7..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,372 +0,0 @@ -Based on the patch from https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/raw-rev/c2e36a80a279 -Backported to 1.8.15 by Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> - -# HG changeset patch -# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com> -# Date 1452475889 25200 -# Node ID c2e36a80a27927c32cba55afae78b8dc830cddc3 -# Parent 94ffd6b18431fa4b9ed0a0c3f0b7b9582a4f6bde -Rewritten sudoedit_checkdir support that checks all the dirs in the -path and refuses to follow symlinks in writable directories. -This is a better fix for CVE-2015-5602. -Adapted from a diff by Ben Hutchings. Bug #707 - -diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/CONTRIBUTORS ---- a/doc/CONTRIBUTORS Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700 -+++ b/doc/CONTRIBUTORS Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700 -@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ - Holloway, Nick - Hoover, Adam - Hunter, Michael T. -+ Hutchings, Ben - Irrgang, Eric - Jackson, Brian - Jackson, John R. -diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/UPGRADE ---- a/doc/UPGRADE Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700 -+++ b/doc/UPGRADE Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700 -@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@ - Notes on upgrading from an older release - ======================================== - -+o Upgrading from a version prior to the post-1.8.15 fix for CVE-2015-5602. -+ -+ The meaning of the sudoedit_checkdir sudoers option has changed. -+ Previously, it would only check the parent directory -+ of the file to be edited. After the CVE fix, all directories -+ in the path to be edited are checked and sudoedit will refuse -+ to follow a symbolic link in a directory that is writable by -+ the invoking user. -+ - o Upgrading from a version prior to 1.8.15: - - Prior to version 1.8.15, when env_reset was enabled (the default) -diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/sudoers.cat ---- a/doc/sudoers.cat Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700 -+++ b/doc/sudoers.cat Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700 -@@ -1275,12 +1275,15 @@ - system call. This flag is _o_f_f by default. - - sudoedit_checkdir -- If set, ssuuddooeeddiitt will refuse to edit files located in a -- directory that is writable by the invoking user unless -- it is run by root. On many systems, this option -- requires that the parent directory of the file to be -- edited be readable by the target user. This flag is -- _o_f_f by default. -+ If set, ssuuddooeeddiitt will check directories in the path to -+ be edited for writability by the invoking user. -+ Symbolic links will not be followed in writable -+ directories and ssuuddooeeddiitt will also refuse to edit a -+ file located in a writable directory. Theses -+ restrictions are not enforced when ssuuddooeeddiitt is invoked -+ as root. On many systems, this option requires that -+ all directories in the path to be edited be readable by -+ the target user. This flag is _o_f_f by default. - - sudoedit_follow By default, ssuuddooeeddiitt will not follow symbolic links - when opening files. The _s_u_d_o_e_d_i_t___f_o_l_l_o_w option can be -diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/sudoers.man.in ---- a/doc/sudoers.man.in Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700 -+++ b/doc/sudoers.man.in Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700 -@@ -2715,10 +2715,16 @@ - .br - If set, - \fBsudoedit\fR --will refuse to edit files located in a directory that is writable --by the invoking user unless it is run by root. --On many systems, this option requires that the parent directory --of the file to be edited be readable by the target user. -+will check directories in the path to be edited for writability -+by the invoking user. -+Symbolic links will not be followed in writable directories and -+\fBsudoedit\fR -+will also refuse to edit a file located in a writable directory. -+Theses restrictions are not enforced when -+\fBsudoedit\fR -+is invoked as root. -+On many systems, this option requires that all directories -+in the path to be edited be readable by the target user. - This flag is - \fIoff\fR - by default. -diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/sudoers.mdoc.in ---- a/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700 -+++ b/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700 -@@ -2549,10 +2549,16 @@ - .It sudoedit_checkdir - If set, - .Nm sudoedit --will refuse to edit files located in a directory that is writable --by the invoking user unless it is run by root. --On many systems, this option requires that the parent directory --of the file to be edited be readable by the target user. -+will check directories in the path to be edited for writability -+by the invoking user. -+Symbolic links will not be followed in writable directories and -+.Nm sudoedit -+will also refuse to edit a file located in a writable directory. -+Theses restrictions are not enforced when -+.Nm sudoedit -+is invoked as root. -+On many systems, this option requires that all directories -+in the path to be edited be readable by the target user. - This flag is - .Em off - by default. -diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 include/sudo_compat.h ---- a/include/sudo_compat.h Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700 -+++ b/include/sudo_compat.h Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700 -@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ - # ifndef UTIME_NOW - # define UTIME_NOW -2L - # endif -+#endif -+#if !defined(HAVE_OPENAT) || (!defined(HAVE_FUTIMENS) && !defined(HAVE_UTIMENSAT)) - # ifndef AT_FDCWD - # define AT_FDCWD -100 - # endif -diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 src/sudo_edit.c ---- a/src/sudo_edit.c Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700 -+++ b/src/sudo_edit.c Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700 -@@ -179,13 +179,15 @@ - } - - #ifndef HAVE_OPENAT --/* This does not support AT_FDCWD... */ - static int - sudo_openat(int dfd, const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) - { - int fd, odfd; - debug_decl(sudo_openat, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT) - -+ if (dfd == AT_FDCWD) -+ debug_return_int(open(path, flags, mode)); -+ - /* Save cwd */ - if ((odfd = open(".", O_RDONLY)) == -1) - debug_return_int(-1); -@@ -207,6 +209,64 @@ - #define openat sudo_openat - #endif /* HAVE_OPENAT */ - -+#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW -+static int -+sudo_edit_openat_nofollow(int dfd, char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode) -+{ -+ debug_decl(sudo_edit_open_nofollow, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT) -+ -+ debug_return_int(openat(dfd, path, oflags|O_NOFOLLOW, mode)); -+} -+#else -+/* -+ * Returns true if fd and path don't match or path is a symlink. -+ * Used on older systems without O_NOFOLLOW. -+ */ -+static bool -+sudo_edit_is_symlink(int fd, char *path) -+{ -+ struct stat sb1, sb2; -+ debug_decl(sudo_edit_is_symlink, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT) -+ -+ /* -+ * Treat [fl]stat() failure like there was a symlink. -+ */ -+ if (fstat(fd, &sb1) == -1 || lstat(path, &sb2) == -1) -+ debug_return_bool(true); -+ -+ /* -+ * Make sure we did not open a link and that what we opened -+ * matches what is currently on the file system. -+ */ -+ if (S_ISLNK(sb2.st_mode) || -+ sb1.st_dev != sb2.st_dev || sb1.st_ino != sb2.st_ino) { -+ debug_return_bool(true); -+ } -+ -+ debug_return_bool(false); -+} -+ -+static int -+sudo_edit_openat_nofollow(char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode) -+{ -+ struct stat sb1, sb2; -+ int fd; -+ debug_decl(sudo_edit_openat_nofollow, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT) -+ -+ fd = openat(dfd, path, oflags, mode); -+ if (fd == -1) -+ debug_return_int(-1); -+ -+ if (sudo_edit_is_symlink(fd, path)) { -+ close(fd); -+ fd = -1; -+ errno = ELOOP; -+ } -+ -+ debug_return_int(fd); -+} -+#endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */ -+ - /* - * Returns true if the directory described by sb is writable - * by the user. We treat directories with the sticky bit as -@@ -245,49 +305,94 @@ - debug_return_bool(false); - } - -+/* -+ * Directory open flags for use with openat(2) and fstat(2). -+ * Use O_PATH and O_DIRECTORY where possible. -+ */ -+#if defined(O_PATH) && defined(O_DIRECTORY) -+# define DIR_OPEN_FLAGS (O_PATH|O_DIRECTORY) -+#elif defined(O_PATH) && !defined(O_DIRECTORY) -+# define DIR_OPEN_FLAGS O_PATH -+#elif !defined(O_PATH) && defined(O_DIRECTORY) -+# define DIR_OPEN_FLAGS (O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY) -+#else -+# define DIR_OPEN_FLAGS (O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK) -+#endif -+ - static int - sudo_edit_open_nonwritable(char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode) - { -- char *base, *dir; -+ int dfd, fd, dflags = DIR_OPEN_FLAGS; -+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(O_PATH) -+ char *opath = path; -+#endif -+ bool is_writable; - struct stat sb; -- int dfd, fd; - debug_decl(sudo_edit_open_nonwritable, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT) - -- base = strrchr(path, '/'); -- if (base != NULL) { -- *base++ = '\0'; -- dir = path; -+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(O_PATH) -+restart: -+#endif -+ if (path[0] == '/') { -+ dfd = open("/", dflags); -+ path++; - } else { -- base = path; -- dir = "."; -+ dfd = open(".", dflags); -+ if (path[0] == '.' && path[1] == '/') -+ path += 2; - } --#ifdef O_PATH -- if ((dfd = open(dir, O_PATH)) != -1) { -- /* Linux kernels < 3.6 can't do fstat on O_PATH fds. */ -- if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) { -- close(dfd); -- dfd = open(dir, O_RDONLY); -- if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) { -- close(dfd); -- dfd = -1; -- } -- } -- } --#else -- if ((dfd = open(dir, O_RDONLY)) != -1) { -- if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) { -- close(dfd); -- dfd = -1; -- } -- } --#endif -- if (base != path) -- base[-1] = '/'; /* restore path */ - if (dfd == -1) - debug_return_int(-1); - -- if (dir_is_writable(&sb, user_details.uid, user_details.gid, -- user_details.ngroups, user_details.groups)) { -+ for (;;) { -+ char *slash; -+ int subdfd; -+ -+ /* -+ * Look up one component at a time, avoiding symbolic links in -+ * writable directories. -+ */ -+ if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) { -+ close(dfd); -+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(O_PATH) -+ /* Linux prior to 3.6 can't fstat an O_PATH fd */ -+ if (ISSET(dflags, O_PATH)) { -+ CLR(dflags, O_PATH); -+ path = opath; -+ goto restart; -+ } -+#endif -+ debug_return_int(-1); -+ } -+#ifndef O_DIRECTORY -+ if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { -+ close(dfd); -+ errno = ENOTDIR; -+ debug_return_int(-1); -+ } -+#endif -+ is_writable = dir_is_writable(&sb, user_details.uid, user_details.gid, -+ user_details.ngroups, user_details.groups); -+ -+ while (path[0] == '/') -+ path++; -+ slash = strchr(path, '/'); -+ if (slash == NULL) -+ break; -+ *slash = '\0'; -+ if (is_writable) -+ subdfd = sudo_edit_openat_nofollow(dfd, path, dflags, 0); -+ else -+ subdfd = openat(dfd, path, dflags, 0); -+ *slash = '/'; /* restore path */ -+ close(dfd); -+ if (subdfd == -1) -+ debug_return_int(-1); -+ path = slash + 1; -+ dfd = subdfd; -+ } -+ -+ if (is_writable) { - close(dfd); - errno = EISDIR; - debug_return_int(-1); -@@ -332,27 +437,10 @@ - if (!ISSET(oflags, O_NONBLOCK)) - (void) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK); - -- /* -- * Treat [fl]stat() failure like an open() failure. -- */ -- if (fstat(fd, &sb1) == -1 || lstat(path, &sb2) == -1) { -- const int serrno = errno; -+ if (!ISSET(sflags, CD_SUDOEDIT_FOLLOW) && sudo_edit_is_symlink(fd, path)) { - close(fd); -- errno = serrno; -- debug_return_int(-1); -- } -- -- /* -- * Make sure we did not open a link and that what we opened -- * matches what is currently on the file system. -- */ -- if (!ISSET(sflags, CD_SUDOEDIT_FOLLOW)) { -- if (S_ISLNK(sb2.st_mode) || -- sb1.st_dev != sb2.st_dev || sb1.st_ino != sb2.st_ino) { -- close(fd); -- errno = ELOOP; -- debug_return_int(-1); -- } -+ fd = -1; -+ errno = ELOOP; - } - - debug_return_int(fd); - |