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/**
* This file is part of Haketilo.
*
* Function: Enforcing script blocking rules on a given page, working from a
* content script.
*
* Copyright (C) 2021,2022 Wojtek Kosior
* Copyright (C) 2021 jahoti
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* As additional permission under GNU GPL version 3 section 7, you
* may distribute forms of that code without the copy of the GNU
* GPL normally required by section 4, provided you include this
* license notice and, in case of non-source distribution, a URL
* through which recipients can access the Corresponding Source.
* If you modify file(s) with this exception, you may extend this
* exception to your version of the file(s), but you are not
* obligated to do so. If you do not wish to do so, delete this
* exception statement from your version.
*
* As a special exception to the GPL, any HTML file which merely
* makes function calls to this code, and for that purpose
* includes it by reference shall be deemed a separate work for
* copyright law purposes. If you modify this code, you may extend
* this exception to your version of the code, but you are not
* obligated to do so. If you do not wish to do so, delete this
* exception statement from your version.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* I, Wojtek Kosior, thereby promise not to sue for violation of this file's
* license. Although I request that you do not make use of this code in a
* proprietary program, I am not going to enforce this in court.
*/
#FROM common/misc.js IMPORT gen_nonce, csp_header_regex
const html_ns = "http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";
const svg_ns = "http://www.w3.org/2000/svg";
document.content_loaded = document.readyState === "complete";
const wait_loaded = e => e.content_loaded ? Promise.resolve() :
new Promise(c => e.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", c, {once: true}));
wait_loaded(document).then(() => document.content_loaded = true);
/*
* In the case of HTML documents:
* 1. When injecting some payload we need to sanitize <meta> CSP tags before
* they reach the document.
* 2. Only <meta> tags inside <head> are considered valid by the browser and
* need to be considered.
* 3. We want to detach <html> from document, wait until its <head> completes
* loading, sanitize it and re-attach <html>.
* 4. We shall wait for anything to appear in or after <body> and take that as
* a sign <head> has finished loading.
* 5. Otherwise, getting the `DOMContentLoaded' event on the document shall also
* be a sign that <head> is fully loaded.
*/
function make_body_start_observer(DOM_element, waiting) {
const observer = new MutationObserver(() => try_body_started(waiting));
observer.observe(DOM_element, {childList: true});
return observer;
}
function try_body_started(waiting) {
const body = waiting.detached_html.querySelector("body");
if ((body && (body.firstChild || body.nextSibling)) ||
waiting.doc.documentElement.nextSibling) {
finish_waiting(waiting);
return true;
}
if (body && waiting.observers.length < 2)
waiting.observers.push(make_body_start_observer(body, waiting));
}
function finish_waiting(waiting) {
if (waiting.finished)
return;
waiting.finished = true;
waiting.observers.forEach(observer => observer.disconnect());
setTimeout(waiting.callback, 0);
}
function _wait_for_head(doc, detached_html, callback) {
const waiting = {doc, detached_html, callback, observers: []};
if (try_body_started(waiting))
return;
waiting.observers = [make_body_start_observer(detached_html, waiting)];
wait_loaded(doc).then(() => finish_waiting(waiting));
}
function wait_for_head(doc, detached_html) {
return new Promise(cb => _wait_for_head(doc, detached_html, cb));
}
const blocked_str = "blocked";
function block_attribute(node, attr, ns=null, replace_with=null) {
const [hasa, geta, seta, rema] = ["has", "get", "set", "remove"]
.map(m => (n, ...args) => typeof ns === "string" ?
n[`${m}AttributeNS`](ns, ...args) : n[`${m}Attribute`](...args));
/*
* Disabling attributes by prepending `blocked-' allows them to still be
* relatively easily accessed in case they contain some useful data.
*/
const construct_name = [attr];
while (hasa(node, construct_name.join("-")))
construct_name.unshift(blocked_str);
while (construct_name.length > 1) {
construct_name.shift();
const name = construct_name.join("-");
seta(node, `${blocked_str}-${name}`, geta(node, name));
}
rema(node, attr);
if (replace_with !== null)
seta(node, attr, replace_with);
}
/*
* Used to disable `<script>'s and `<meta>'s that have not yet been added to
* live DOM (doesn't work for those already added).
*/
function sanitize_meta(meta) {
if (csp_header_regex.test(meta.httpEquiv) && meta.content)
block_attribute(meta, "content");
}
function sanitize_script(script) {
script.haketilo_blocked_type = script.getAttribute("type");
script.type = "text/plain";
}
/*
* Executed after `<script>' has been connected to the DOM, when it is no longer
* eligible for being executed by the browser.
*/
function desanitize_script(script) {
script.setAttribute("type", script.haketilo_blocked_type);
if ([null, undefined].includes(script.haketilo_blocked_type))
script.removeAttribute("type");
delete script.haketilo_blocked_type;
}
/*
* Blocking certain attributes that might allow 'javascript:' URLs. Some of
* these are: <iframe>'s 'src' attributes (would normally execute js in URL upon
* frame's load), <object>'s 'data' attribute (would also execute upon load) and
* <a>'s 'href' attribute (would execute upon link click).
*/
const bad_url_reg = /^data:([^,;]*ml|unknown-content-type)|^javascript:/i;
function sanitize_element_urls(element) {
if (element.haketilo_sanitized_urls)
return;
element.haketilo_sanitized_urls = true;
let some_attr_blocked = false;
const bad_attrs = [...(element.attributes || [])]
.filter(attr => /^(href|src|data)$/i.test(attr.localName))
.filter(attr => bad_url_reg.test(attr.value));
for (const attr of bad_attrs) {
/*
* Under some browsers (Mozilla) removing attributes doesn't stop their
* javascript from executing, but replacing them does. For 'src' and
* 'data' I chose to replace the attribute with a 'data:' URL and have
* it replace bad <iframe>'s/<object>'s contents with a "blocked"
* string. For 'href' (which appears on <a>'s) I chose to use a
* 'javascript:' URL to avoid having the page reloaded upon a link
* click.
*/
const replacement_value = /^href$/i.test(attr.localName) ?
"javascript:void('blocked');" : "data:text/plain,blocked";
some_attr_blocked = true;
block_attribute(element, attr.localName, attr.namespaceURI,
replacement_value);
}
/*
* Trial and error shows that under certain browsers additional element
* removal and re-addition might be necessary to prevent execution of a
* 'javascript:' URL (Parabola's Iceweasel 75 requires it for 'src' URL of
* an <iframe>).
*/
if (some_attr_blocked) {
const replacement_elem = document.createElement("a");
/* Prevent this node from being processed by our observer. */
replacement_elem.haketilo_trusted_node = true;
element.replaceWith(replacement_elem);
replacement_elem.replaceWith(element);
}
}
function sanitize_tree_urls(root) {
root.querySelectorAll("*[href], *[src], *[data]")
.forEach(sanitize_element_urls);
}
#IF MOZILLA
function sanitize_element_onevent(element) {
if (element.haketilo_sanitized_onevent)
return;
element.haketilo_sanitized_onevent = true;
for (const attribute_node of [...(element.attributes || [])]) {
const attr = attribute_node.localName, attr_lo = attr.toLowerCase();
if (!/^on/.test(attr_lo) || !(attr_lo in element))
continue;
/*
* Guard against redefined getter on DOM object property. This is a
* supplemental security measure since page's own scripts should be
* blocked and unable to redefine properties, anyway.
*/
if (Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(element.wrappedJSObject, attr)) {
console.error("Haketilo: Redefined property on a DOM object! The page might have bypassed our script blocking measures!");
continue;
}
element.wrappedJSObject[attr] = null;
block_attribute(element, attr, attribute_node.namespaceURI,
"javascript:void('blocked');");
}
}
function sanitize_tree_onevent(root) {
root.querySelectorAll("*")
.forEach(sanitize_element_onevent);
}
#ENDIF
/*
* Sanitize elements on-the-fly as they appear using MutationObserver.
*
* Under Abrowser 97 it was observed that MutationObserver does not always work
* as is should. When trying to observe nodes of an XMLDocument the behavior was
* as if the "subtree" option to MutationObserver.observe() was ignored. To work
* around this we avoid using the "subtree" option altogether and have the same
* code work in all scenarios.
*/
function MOSanitizer(root) {
this.root = root;
this.recursively_sanitize(root);
this.mo = new MutationObserver(ms => this.handle_mutations(ms));
}
MOSanitizer.prototype.observe = function() {
let elem = this.root;
while (elem && !elem.haketilo_trusted_node) {
this.mo.observe(elem, {childList: true});
elem = elem.lastElementChild;
}
}
MOSanitizer.prototype.handle_mutations = function(mutations) {
for (const mut of mutations) {
for (const new_node of mut.addedNodes)
this.recursively_sanitize(new_node);
}
this.mo.disconnect();
this.observe();
}
MOSanitizer.prototype.recursively_sanitize = function(elem) {
const to_process = [elem];
while (to_process.length > 0) {
const current_elem = to_process.pop();
if (current_elem.haketilo_trusted_node ||
current_elem.nodeType !== this.root.ELEMENT_NODE)
continue;
to_process.push(...current_elem.children);
sanitize_element_urls(current_elem);
#IF MOZILLA
sanitize_element_onevent(current_elem);
#ENDIF
}
}
MOSanitizer.prototype.start = function() {
this.recursively_sanitize(this.root);
this.observe();
}
MOSanitizer.prototype.stop = function() {
this.mo.disconnect();
}
#IF MOZILLA
/*
* Normally, we block scripts with CSP. However, Mozilla does optimizations that
* cause part of the DOM to be loaded when our content scripts get to run. Thus,
* before the CSP rules we inject (for non-HTTP pages) become effective, we need
* to somehow block the execution of `<script>'s and intrinsics that were
* already there. Additionally, some browsers (IceCat 60) seem to have problems
* applying this CSP to non-inline `<scripts>' in certain scenarios.
*/
function prevent_script_execution(event) {
event.preventDefault();
}
#ENDIF
/*
* Here we block all scripts of a document which might be either an
* HTMLDocument or an XMLDocument. Modifying an XML document might disrupt
* Mozilla's XML preview. This is an unfortunate thing we have to accept for
* now. XML documents *have to* be sanitized as well because they might
* contain `<script>' tags (or on* attributes) with namespace declared as
* "http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" or "http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" which allows
* javascript execution.
*/
async function sanitize_document(doc, policy) {
const root = doc.documentElement;
const substitute_doc =
new DOMParser().parseFromString("<!DOCTYPE html>", "text/html");
#IF MOZILLA
/*
* Blocking of scripts that are in the DOM from the beginning. Needed for
* Mozilla.
*/
const listener_args = ["beforescriptexecute", prevent_script_execution];
doc.addEventListener(...listener_args);
substitute_doc.addEventListener(...listener_args);
wait_loaded(doc).then(() => doc.removeEventListener(...listener_args));
sanitize_tree_urls(doc.documentElement);
sanitize_tree_onevent(doc.documentElement);
#ENDIF
if (!doc.content_loaded) {
const sanitizer = new MOSanitizer(doc.documentElement);
sanitizer.start();
wait_loaded(doc).then(() => sanitizer.stop());
}
/*
* Ensure our CSP rules are employed from the beginning. This CSP injection
* method is, when possible, going to be applied together with CSP rules
* injected using webRequest.
* Using elements namespaced as HTML makes this CSP injection also work for
* non-HTML documents.
*/
const source = `\
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${policy.csp}"/>
</head>
<body>
Loading...
</body>
</html>`;
const temporary_html =
new DOMParser().parseFromString(source, "text/html").documentElement;
/*
* Root node gets hijacked now, to be re-attached after <head> is loaded
* and sanitized.
*/
root.replaceWith(temporary_html);
#IF MOZILLA
/*
* To be able to handle the onbeforescriptexecute event for scripts that
* appear under detached document.
*/
substitute_doc.documentElement.replaceWith(root);
#ENDIF
/*
* When we don't inject payload, we neither block document's CSP `<meta>'
* tags nor wait for `<head>' to be parsed.
*/
if (policy.payload) {
await wait_for_head(doc, root);
root.querySelectorAll("head meta")
.forEach(m => sanitize_meta(m, policy));
}
const scripts = [...root.getElementsByTagNameNS(html_ns, "script"),
...root.getElementsByTagNameNS(svg_ns, "svg")];
scripts.forEach(s => sanitize_script(s, policy));
temporary_html.replaceWith(root);
scripts.forEach(s => desanitize_script(s, policy));
}
async function _disable_service_workers() {
if (!navigator.serviceWorker)
return;
const registrations = await navigator.serviceWorker.getRegistrations();
if (registrations.length === 0)
return;
console.warn("Haketilo: Service Workers detected on this page! Unregistering and reloading.");
try {
await Promise.all(registrations.map(r => r.unregister()));
} finally {
location.reload();
}
/* Never actually return! */
return new Promise(() => 0);
}
/*
* Trying to use service workers APIs might result in exceptions, for example
* when in a non-HTML document. Because of this, we wrap the function that does
* the actual work in a try {} block.
*/
async function disable_service_workers() {
try {
await _disable_service_workers()
} catch (e) {
console.warn("Haketilo: Exception thrown during an attempt to detect and disable service workers.", e);
}
}
function enforce_blocking(policy) {
if (policy.allow)
return;
return Promise.all([
sanitize_document(document, policy),
disable_service_workers(),
wait_loaded(document)
]);
}
#EXPORT enforce_blocking
|
