From aa4d426b4d3527d7e166df1a05058c9a4a0f6683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wojtek Kosior Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 00:33:56 +0200 Subject: initial/final commit --- openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 1962 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 1962 insertions(+) create mode 100644 openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_ciph.c (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_ciph.c') diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_ciph.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a393cb --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -0,0 +1,1962 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#include "internal/thread_once.h" + +#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 +#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 +#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 +#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 +#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 +#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 +#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 +#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 +#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 +#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 +#define SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 +#define SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 +#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX 20 + +/* NB: make sure indices in these tables match values above */ + +typedef struct { + uint32_t mask; + int nid; +} ssl_cipher_table; + +/* Table of NIDs for each cipher */ +static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_cipher[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { + {SSL_DES, NID_des_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 */ + {SSL_3DES, NID_des_ede3_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 */ + {SSL_RC4, NID_rc4}, /* SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 */ + {SSL_RC2, NID_rc2_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 */ + {SSL_IDEA, NID_idea_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 */ + {SSL_eNULL, NID_undef}, /* SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 */ + {SSL_AES128, NID_aes_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 */ + {SSL_AES256, NID_aes_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 */ + {SSL_CAMELLIA128, NID_camellia_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 */ + {SSL_CAMELLIA256, NID_camellia_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 */ + {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, NID_gost89_cnt}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 */ + {SSL_SEED, NID_seed_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 */ + {SSL_AES128GCM, NID_aes_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 */ + {SSL_AES256GCM, NID_aes_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 */ + {SSL_AES128CCM, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 */ + {SSL_AES256CCM, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 */ + {SSL_AES128CCM8, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 */ + {SSL_AES256CCM8, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 */ + {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, NID_gost89_cnt_12}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX */ + {SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, NID_chacha20_poly1305}, +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL +}; + +#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0 +#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1 +#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2 + +static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_load_builtin_comp_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +#endif + +/* + * Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be defined + * in the ssl_locl.h + */ + +#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX SSL_MAX_DIGEST + +/* NB: make sure indices in this table matches values above */ +static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + {SSL_MD5, NID_md5}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 */ + {SSL_SHA1, NID_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 */ + {SSL_GOST94, NID_id_GostR3411_94}, /* SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 */ + {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */ + {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256}, /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */ + {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384}, /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */ + {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */ + {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */ + {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */ + {0, NID_md5_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */ + {0, NID_sha224}, /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */ + {0, NID_sha512} /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */ +}; + +static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL +}; + +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ +static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = { + {SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa}, + {SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe}, + {SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe}, + {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, + {SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk}, + {SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk}, + {SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk}, + {SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp}, + {SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost} +}; + +static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = { + {SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa}, + {SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa}, + {SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk}, + {SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss}, + {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01}, + {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12}, + {SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp}, + {SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null} +}; +/* *INDENT-ON* */ + +/* Utility function for table lookup */ +static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table * table, + size_t table_cnt, uint32_t mask) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < table_cnt; i++, table++) { + if (table->mask == mask) + return i; + } + return -1; +} + +#define ssl_cipher_info_lookup(table, x) \ + ssl_cipher_info_find(table, OSSL_NELEM(table), x) + +/* + * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation + * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is + * found + */ +static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + /* MD5, SHA, GOST94, MAC89 */ + EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, + /* SHA256, SHA384, GOST2012_256, MAC89-12 */ + EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, + /* GOST2012_512 */ + EVP_PKEY_HMAC, +}; + +static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]; + +#define CIPHER_ADD 1 +#define CIPHER_KILL 2 +#define CIPHER_DEL 3 +#define CIPHER_ORD 4 +#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5 +/* + * Bump the ciphers to the top of the list. + * This rule isn't currently supported by the public cipherstring API. + */ +#define CIPHER_BUMP 6 + +typedef struct cipher_order_st { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; + int active; + int dead; + struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev; +} CIPHER_ORDER; + +static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { + /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */ + {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL}, + /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */ + {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, + + /* + * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in + * ALL!) + */ + {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT}, + + /* + * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here + * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kDHE + * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) + */ + {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, 0, SSL_kRSA}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kDHE}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, 0, SSL_kDHE}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kDHE}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, 0, SSL_kPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, 0, SSL_kSRP}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, 0, SSL_kGOST}, + + /* server authentication aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST12, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST12}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP}, + + /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ + {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_PSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, 0, SSL_kSRP}, + + /* symmetric encryption aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2}, + {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED}, + {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0, + SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0, + SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM, 0, 0, 0, + SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20}, + + /* MAC aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC | SSL_GOST89MAC12}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST12, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST12_256}, + + /* protocol version aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL3_VERSION}, + {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, + {0, "TLSv1.0", 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, + {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION}, + + /* strength classes */ + {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW}, + {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM}, + {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH}, + /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */ + {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS}, + + /* "EDH-" aliases to "DHE-" labels (for backward compatibility) */ + {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, + {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, + +}; + +/* + * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if + * it is available. Otherwise return 0 + */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + +static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) +{ + const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; + int pkey_id = 0; + ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); + if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) > 0) { + return pkey_id; + } + return 0; +} + +#else + +static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) +{ + const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; + ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL; + int pkey_id = 0; + ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); + if (ameth) { + if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) <= 0) + pkey_id = 0; + } + ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); + return pkey_id; +} + +#endif + +/* masks of disabled algorithms */ +static uint32_t disabled_enc_mask; +static uint32_t disabled_mac_mask; +static uint32_t disabled_mkey_mask; +static uint32_t disabled_auth_mask; + +void ssl_load_ciphers(void) +{ + size_t i; + const ssl_cipher_table *t; + + disabled_enc_mask = 0; + ssl_sort_cipher_list(); + for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_cipher; i < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { + if (t->nid == NID_undef) { + ssl_cipher_methods[i] = NULL; + } else { + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(t->nid); + ssl_cipher_methods[i] = cipher; + if (cipher == NULL) + disabled_enc_mask |= t->mask; + } + } +#ifdef SSL_FORBID_ENULL + disabled_enc_mask |= SSL_eNULL; +#endif + disabled_mac_mask = 0; + for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_mac; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { + const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(t->nid); + ssl_digest_methods[i] = md; + if (md == NULL) { + disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask; + } else { + ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = EVP_MD_size(md); + OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[i] >= 0); + } + } + /* Make sure we can access MD5 and SHA1 */ + OPENSSL_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] != NULL); + OPENSSL_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] != NULL); + + disabled_mkey_mask = 0; + disabled_auth_mask = 0; + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK; + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aRSA; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHEPSK; + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK; + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kSRP; +#endif + + /* + * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they are not + * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange + */ + ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac"); + if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) { + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32; + } else { + disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC; + } + + ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = + get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac-12"); + if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX]) { + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32; + } else { + disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC12; + } + + if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12; + if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_256")) + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; + if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_512")) + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; + /* + * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * + */ + if ((disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) == + (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + +static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b) +{ + return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id); +} + +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_load_builtin_compressions) +{ + SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; + COMP_METHOD *method = COMP_zlib(); + + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); + ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp); + + if (COMP_get_type(method) != NID_undef && ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { + comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); + if (comp != NULL) { + comp->method = method; + comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX; + comp->name = COMP_get_name(method); + sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp); + sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods); + } + } + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + return 1; +} + +static int load_builtin_compressions(void) +{ + return RUN_ONCE(&ssl_load_builtin_comp_once, do_load_builtin_compressions); +} +#endif + +int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, + const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, + int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm) +{ + int i; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + + c = s->cipher; + if (c == NULL) + return (0); + if (comp != NULL) { + SSL_COMP ctmp; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (!load_builtin_compressions()) { + /* + * Currently don't care, since a failure only means that + * ssl_comp_methods is NULL, which is perfectly OK + */ + } +#endif + *comp = NULL; + ctmp.id = s->compress_meth; + if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { + i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp); + if (i >= 0) + *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i); + else + *comp = NULL; + } + /* If were only interested in comp then return success */ + if ((enc == NULL) && (md == NULL)) + return 1; + } + + if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) + return 0; + + i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); + + if (i == -1) + *enc = NULL; + else { + if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX) + *enc = EVP_enc_null(); + else + *enc = ssl_cipher_methods[i]; + } + + i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); + if (i == -1) { + *md = NULL; + if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) + *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; + if (mac_secret_size != NULL) + *mac_secret_size = 0; + if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) + mac_pkey_type = NULL; + } else { + *md = ssl_digest_methods[i]; + if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) + *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i]; + if (mac_secret_size != NULL) + *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i]; + } + + if ((*enc != NULL) && + (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) + && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) { + const EVP_CIPHER *evp; + + if (use_etm) + return 1; + + if (s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR || + s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION) + return 1; + + if (FIPS_mode()) + return 1; + + if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + return (1); + } else + return (0); +} + +const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx) +{ + idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; + if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) + return NULL; + return ssl_digest_methods[idx]; +} + +const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s) +{ + return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s)); +} + +const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s) +{ + return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s) >> TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT); +} + +#define ITEM_SEP(a) \ + (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ',')) + +static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail) +{ + if (curr == *tail) + return; + if (curr == *head) + *head = curr->next; + if (curr->prev != NULL) + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + if (curr->next != NULL) + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + (*tail)->next = curr; + curr->prev = *tail; + curr->next = NULL; + *tail = curr; +} + +static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail) +{ + if (curr == *head) + return; + if (curr == *tail) + *tail = curr->prev; + if (curr->next != NULL) + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + if (curr->prev != NULL) + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + (*head)->prev = curr; + curr->next = *head; + curr->prev = NULL; + *head = curr; +} + +static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, + int num_of_ciphers, + uint32_t disabled_mkey, + uint32_t disabled_auth, + uint32_t disabled_enc, + uint32_t disabled_mac, + CIPHER_ORDER *co_list, + CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) +{ + int i, co_list_num; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + + /* + * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the + * method selected (SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). + * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num + * entries. + */ + + /* Get the initial list of ciphers */ + co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) { + c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i); + /* drop those that use any of that is not available */ + if (c == NULL || !c->valid) + continue; + if (FIPS_mode() && (c->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) + continue; + if ((c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) || + (c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) || + (c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) || + (c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac)) + continue; + if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) == 0) && + c->min_tls == 0) + continue; + if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) != 0) && + c->min_dtls == 0) + continue; + + co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c; + co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL; + co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL; + co_list[co_list_num].active = 0; + co_list_num++; + /* + * if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err; + */ + } + + /* + * Prepare linked list from list entries + */ + if (co_list_num > 0) { + co_list[0].prev = NULL; + + if (co_list_num > 1) { + co_list[0].next = &co_list[1]; + + for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) { + co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1]; + co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1]; + } + + co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2]; + } + + co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL; + + *head_p = &co_list[0]; + *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1]; + } +} + +static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, + int num_of_group_aliases, + uint32_t disabled_mkey, + uint32_t disabled_auth, + uint32_t disabled_enc, + uint32_t disabled_mac, + CIPHER_ORDER *head) +{ + CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr; + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr; + int i; + uint32_t mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey; + uint32_t mask_auth = ~disabled_auth; + uint32_t mask_enc = ~disabled_enc; + uint32_t mask_mac = ~disabled_mac; + + /* + * First, add the real ciphers as already collected + */ + ciph_curr = head; + ca_curr = ca_list; + while (ciph_curr != NULL) { + *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher; + ca_curr++; + ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next; + } + + /* + * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. + * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which + * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), + * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). + */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) { + uint32_t algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey; + uint32_t algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth; + uint32_t algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc; + uint32_t algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac; + + if (algorithm_mkey) + if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_auth) + if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_enc) + if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_mac) + if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0) + continue; + + *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i); + ca_curr++; + } + + *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */ +} + +static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, + uint32_t alg_auth, uint32_t alg_enc, + uint32_t alg_mac, int min_tls, + uint32_t algo_strength, int rule, + int32_t strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) +{ + CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last; + const SSL_CIPHER *cp; + int reverse = 0; + +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, + "Applying rule %d with %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x %08x (%d)\n", + rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, min_tls, + algo_strength, strength_bits); +#endif + + if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP) + reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently + * deleted ciphers */ + + head = *head_p; + tail = *tail_p; + + if (reverse) { + next = tail; + last = head; + } else { + next = head; + last = tail; + } + + curr = NULL; + for (;;) { + if (curr == last) + break; + + curr = next; + + if (curr == NULL) + break; + + next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next; + + cp = curr->cipher; + + /* + * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits + * or the algorithms used. + */ + if (strength_bits >= 0) { + if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) + continue; + } else { +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, + "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x Algo_strength = %08x\n", + cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, + cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->min_tls, + cp->algo_strength); +#endif + if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) + continue; + if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) + continue; + if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) + continue; + if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) + continue; + if (min_tls && (min_tls != cp->min_tls)) + continue; + if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) + && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) + continue; + if ((algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) + && !(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) + continue; + } + +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule); +#endif + + /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */ + if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (!curr->active) { + ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); + curr->active = 1; + } + } + /* Move the added cipher to this location */ + else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (curr->active) { + ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); + } + } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { + /* reverse == 1 */ + if (curr->active) { + /* + * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for + * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works + * in reverse to maintain the order) + */ + ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); + curr->active = 0; + } + } else if (rule == CIPHER_BUMP) { + if (curr->active) + ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); + } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (head == curr) + head = curr->next; + else + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + if (tail == curr) + tail = curr->prev; + curr->active = 0; + if (curr->next != NULL) + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + if (curr->prev != NULL) + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + curr->next = NULL; + curr->prev = NULL; + } + } + + *head_p = head; + *tail_p = tail; +} + +static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) +{ + int32_t max_strength_bits; + int i, *number_uses; + CIPHER_ORDER *curr; + + /* + * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting + * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting + * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list. + */ + max_strength_bits = 0; + curr = *head_p; + while (curr != NULL) { + if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits)) + max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits; + curr = curr->next; + } + + number_uses = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(int) * (max_strength_bits + 1)); + if (number_uses == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + + /* + * Now find the strength_bits values actually used + */ + curr = *head_p; + while (curr != NULL) { + if (curr->active) + number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++; + curr = curr->next; + } + /* + * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending + * order. + */ + for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) + if (number_uses[i] > 0) + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, + tail_p); + + OPENSSL_free(number_uses); + return (1); +} + +static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, + CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, CERT *c) +{ + uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, algo_strength; + int min_tls; + const char *l, *buf; + int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen; + uint32_t cipher_id = 0; + char ch; + + retval = 1; + l = rule_str; + for (;;) { + ch = *l; + + if (ch == '\0') + break; /* done */ + if (ch == '-') { + rule = CIPHER_DEL; + l++; + } else if (ch == '+') { + rule = CIPHER_ORD; + l++; + } else if (ch == '!') { + rule = CIPHER_KILL; + l++; + } else if (ch == '@') { + rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; + l++; + } else { + rule = CIPHER_ADD; + } + + if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) { + l++; + continue; + } + + alg_mkey = 0; + alg_auth = 0; + alg_enc = 0; + alg_mac = 0; + min_tls = 0; + algo_strength = 0; + + for (;;) { + ch = *l; + buf = l; + buflen = 0; +#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC + while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || + ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) || + ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || + (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '=')) +#else + while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') + || (ch == '=')) +#endif + { + ch = *(++l); + buflen++; + } + + if (buflen == 0) { + /* + * We hit something we cannot deal with, + * it is no command or separator nor + * alphanumeric, so we call this an error. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + retval = found = 0; + l++; + break; + } + + if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { + found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */ + break; /* special treatment */ + } + + /* check for multi-part specification */ + if (ch == '+') { + multi = 1; + l++; + } else + multi = 0; + + /* + * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful + * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation + * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher + * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. + * So additionally check whether the cipher name found + * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call: + * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is + * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot + * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) + */ + j = found = 0; + cipher_id = 0; + while (ca_list[j]) { + if (strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) == 0 + && (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) { + found = 1; + break; + } else + j++; + } + + if (!found) + break; /* ignore this entry */ + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) { + if (alg_mkey) { + alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; + if (!alg_mkey) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) { + if (alg_auth) { + alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; + if (!alg_auth) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) { + if (alg_enc) { + alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; + if (!alg_enc) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) { + if (alg_mac) { + alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; + if (!alg_mac) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { + if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { + algo_strength &= + (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | + ~SSL_STRONG_MASK; + if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + algo_strength = ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { + if (algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { + algo_strength &= + (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) | + ~SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; + if (!(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + algo_strength |= + ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->valid) { + /* + * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not + * become part of the search pattern! + */ + + cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id; + } else { + /* + * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the + * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern + */ + + if (ca_list[j]->min_tls) { + if (min_tls != 0 && min_tls != ca_list[j]->min_tls) { + found = 0; + break; + } else { + min_tls = ca_list[j]->min_tls; + } + } + } + + if (!multi) + break; + } + + /* + * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it + */ + if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */ + ok = 0; + if ((buflen == 8) && strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) == 0) + ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p); + else if (buflen == 10 && strncmp(buf, "SECLEVEL=", 9) == 0) { + int level = buf[9] - '0'; + if (level < 0 || level > 5) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + } else { + c->sec_level = level; + ok = 1; + } + } else + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + if (ok == 0) + retval = 0; + /* + * We do not support any "multi" options + * together with "@", so throw away the + * rest of the command, if any left, until + * end or ':' is found. + */ + while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) + l++; + } else if (found) { + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, + alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, + min_tls, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p, + tail_p); + } else { + while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) + l++; + } + if (*l == '\0') + break; /* done */ + } + + return (retval); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c, + const char **prule_str) +{ + unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0; + if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) { + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; + } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) { + suiteb_comb2 = 1; + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) { + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) { + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS; + } + + if (suiteb_flags) { + c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags; + } else + suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + + if (!suiteb_flags) + return 1; + /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */ + + if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, + SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); + return 0; + } +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + switch (suiteb_flags) { + case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: + if (suiteb_comb2) + *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + else + *prule_str = + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + break; + case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: + *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; + break; + case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: + *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + break; + } + return 1; +# else + SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE); + return 0; +# endif +} +#endif + +STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) + **cipher_list, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) + **cipher_list_by_id, + const char *rule_str, CERT *c) +{ + int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases; + uint32_t disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack, *tmp_cipher_list; + const char *rule_p; + CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr; + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL; + + /* + * Return with error if nothing to do. + */ + if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL) + return NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str)) + return NULL; +#endif + + /* + * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled + * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers. + */ + + disabled_mkey = disabled_mkey_mask; + disabled_auth = disabled_auth_mask; + disabled_enc = disabled_enc_mask; + disabled_mac = disabled_mac_mask; + + /* + * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled + * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so + * it is used for allocation. + */ + num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers(); + + co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers); + if (co_list == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (NULL); /* Failure */ + } + + ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, + disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, + disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail); + + /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */ + + /* + * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key + * exchange mechanisms. + * For consistency, prefer ECDSA over RSA (though this only matters if the + * server has both certificates, and is using the DEFAULT, or a client + * preference). + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, + -1, &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, + &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, + &head, &tail); + + /* + * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES. + * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by + * strength. + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, + -1, &head, &tail); + + /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); + + /* Low priority for MD5 */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* + * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain + * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but + * we prefer authenticated ciphers.) + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move the the end */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* + * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains + * in force within each class + */ + if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Partially overrule strength sort to prefer TLS 1.2 ciphers/PRFs. + * TODO(openssl-team): is there an easier way to accomplish all this? + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, + &head, &tail); + + /* + * Irrespective of strength, enforce the following order: + * (EC)DHE + AEAD > (EC)DHE > rest of AEAD > rest. + * Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous + * preference, i.e., + * 1) ECDHE > DHE + * 2) GCM > CHACHA + * 3) AES > rest + * 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy + * + * Because we now bump ciphers to the top of the list, we proceed in + * reverse order of preference. + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, + &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, + CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); + + /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); + + /* + * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. + * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names + * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. + * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher + * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise + * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table). + */ + num_of_group_aliases = OSSL_NELEM(cipher_aliases); + num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1; + ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max); + if (ca_list == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (NULL); /* Failure */ + } + ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, + disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, + disabled_mac, head); + + /* + * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule + * before using the (possibly available) additional rules. + */ + ok = 1; + rule_p = rule_str; + if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) { + ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, + &head, &tail, ca_list, c); + rule_p += 7; + if (*rule_p == ':') + rule_p++; + } + + if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0)) + ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); + + OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ + + if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */ + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + return (NULL); + } + + /* + * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error + * if we cannot get one. + */ + if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + return (NULL); + } + + /* + * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added + * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). + */ + for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) { + if (curr->active + && (!FIPS_mode() || curr->cipher->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) { + if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); + return NULL; + } +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name); +#endif + } + } + OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */ + + tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack); + if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); + return NULL; + } + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); + *cipher_list = cipherstack; + if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); + *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; + (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); + + sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); + return (cipherstack); +} + +char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len) +{ + const char *ver; + const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; + uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac; + static const char *format = "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n"; + + if (buf == NULL) { + len = 128; + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if (buf == NULL) + return NULL; + } else if (len < 128) + return NULL; + + alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth; + alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc; + alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac; + + ver = ssl_protocol_to_string(cipher->min_tls); + + switch (alg_mkey) { + case SSL_kRSA: + kx = "RSA"; + break; + case SSL_kDHE: + kx = "DH"; + break; + case SSL_kECDHE: + kx = "ECDH"; + break; + case SSL_kPSK: + kx = "PSK"; + break; + case SSL_kRSAPSK: + kx = "RSAPSK"; + break; + case SSL_kECDHEPSK: + kx = "ECDHEPSK"; + break; + case SSL_kDHEPSK: + kx = "DHEPSK"; + break; + case SSL_kSRP: + kx = "SRP"; + break; + case SSL_kGOST: + kx = "GOST"; + break; + default: + kx = "unknown"; + } + + switch (alg_auth) { + case SSL_aRSA: + au = "RSA"; + break; + case SSL_aDSS: + au = "DSS"; + break; + case SSL_aNULL: + au = "None"; + break; + case SSL_aECDSA: + au = "ECDSA"; + break; + case SSL_aPSK: + au = "PSK"; + break; + case SSL_aSRP: + au = "SRP"; + break; + case SSL_aGOST01: + au = "GOST01"; + break; + /* New GOST ciphersuites have both SSL_aGOST12 and SSL_aGOST01 bits */ + case (SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01): + au = "GOST12"; + break; + default: + au = "unknown"; + break; + } + + switch (alg_enc) { + case SSL_DES: + enc = "DES(56)"; + break; + case SSL_3DES: + enc = "3DES(168)"; + break; + case SSL_RC4: + enc = "RC4(128)"; + break; + case SSL_RC2: + enc = "RC2(128)"; + break; + case SSL_IDEA: + enc = "IDEA(128)"; + break; + case SSL_eNULL: + enc = "None"; + break; + case SSL_AES128: + enc = "AES(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256: + enc = "AES(256)"; + break; + case SSL_AES128GCM: + enc = "AESGCM(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256GCM: + enc = "AESGCM(256)"; + break; + case SSL_AES128CCM: + enc = "AESCCM(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256CCM: + enc = "AESCCM(256)"; + break; + case SSL_AES128CCM8: + enc = "AESCCM8(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256CCM8: + enc = "AESCCM8(256)"; + break; + case SSL_CAMELLIA128: + enc = "Camellia(128)"; + break; + case SSL_CAMELLIA256: + enc = "Camellia(256)"; + break; + case SSL_SEED: + enc = "SEED(128)"; + break; + case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT: + case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12: + enc = "GOST89(256)"; + break; + case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305: + enc = "CHACHA20/POLY1305(256)"; + break; + default: + enc = "unknown"; + break; + } + + switch (alg_mac) { + case SSL_MD5: + mac = "MD5"; + break; + case SSL_SHA1: + mac = "SHA1"; + break; + case SSL_SHA256: + mac = "SHA256"; + break; + case SSL_SHA384: + mac = "SHA384"; + break; + case SSL_AEAD: + mac = "AEAD"; + break; + case SSL_GOST89MAC: + case SSL_GOST89MAC12: + mac = "GOST89"; + break; + case SSL_GOST94: + mac = "GOST94"; + break; + case SSL_GOST12_256: + case SSL_GOST12_512: + mac = "GOST2012"; + break; + default: + mac = "unknown"; + break; + } + + BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac); + + return (buf); +} + +const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + if (c == NULL) + return "(NONE)"; + + /* + * Backwards-compatibility crutch. In almost all contexts we report TLS + * 1.0 as "TLSv1", but for ciphers we report "TLSv1.0". + */ + if (c->min_tls == TLS1_VERSION) + return "TLSv1.0"; + return ssl_protocol_to_string(c->min_tls); +} + +/* return the actual cipher being used */ +const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + if (c != NULL) + return (c->name); + return ("(NONE)"); +} + +/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ +int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (c != NULL) { + if (alg_bits != NULL) + *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits; + ret = (int)c->strength_bits; + } + return ret; +} + +uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + return c->id; +} + +SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n) +{ + SSL_COMP *ctmp; + int i, nn; + + if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) + return (NULL); + nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk); + for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) { + ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i); + if (ctmp->id == n) + return (ctmp); + } + return (NULL); +} + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) + *meths) +{ + return meths; +} + +int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) +{ + return 1; +} + +#else +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) +{ + load_builtin_compressions(); + return (ssl_comp_methods); +} + +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) + *meths) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; + ssl_comp_methods = meths; + return old_meths; +} + +static void cmeth_free(SSL_COMP *cm) +{ + OPENSSL_free(cm); +} + +void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; + ssl_comp_methods = NULL; + sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(old_meths, cmeth_free); +} + +int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) +{ + SSL_COMP *comp; + + if (cm == NULL || COMP_get_type(cm) == NID_undef) + return 1; + + /*- + * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the + * compression number ranges should be the following: + * + * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF + * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA + * 193 to 255: reserved for private use + */ + if (id < 193 || id > 255) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, + SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE); + return 1; + } + + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); + comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); + if (comp == NULL) { + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (1); + } + + comp->id = id; + comp->method = cm; + load_builtin_compressions(); + if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) { + OPENSSL_free(comp); + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, + SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID); + return (1); + } + if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) { + OPENSSL_free(comp); + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (1); + } + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + return (0); +} +#endif + +const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + return comp ? COMP_get_name(comp) : NULL; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + return comp->name; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + return comp->id; +#else + return -1; +#endif +} + +/* For a cipher return the index corresponding to the certificate type */ +int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + uint32_t alg_a; + + alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; + + if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) + return SSL_PKEY_ECC; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) + return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) + return SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) + return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; + + return -1; +} + +const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) +{ + const SSL_CIPHER *c = ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); + + if (c == NULL || c->valid == 0) + return NULL; + return c; +} + +const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) +{ + return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int i; + if (c == NULL) + return NID_undef; + i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); + if (i == -1) + return NID_undef; + return ssl_cipher_table_cipher[i].nid; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); + + if (i == -1) + return NID_undef; + return ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_kx, c->algorithm_mkey); + + if (i == -1) + return NID_undef; + return ssl_cipher_table_kx[i].nid; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_auth, c->algorithm_auth); + + if (i == -1) + return NID_undef; + return ssl_cipher_table_auth[i].nid; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) ? 1 : 0; +} -- cgit v1.2.3