From aa4d426b4d3527d7e166df1a05058c9a4a0f6683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wojtek Kosior Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 00:33:56 +0200 Subject: initial/final commit --- openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_cert.c | 1087 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 1087 insertions(+) create mode 100644 openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_cert.c (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_cert.c') diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_cert.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..deaaeb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -0,0 +1,1087 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "e_os.h" +#include "internal/o_dir.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#include "internal/thread_once.h" + +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, + void *ex); + +static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; + +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ssl_x509_store_ctx_init) +{ + ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, + "SSL for verify callback", + NULL, NULL, NULL); + return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx >= 0; +} + +int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) +{ + + if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init)) + return -1; + return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; +} + +CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) +{ + CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); + + if (ret == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); + ret->references = 1; + ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback; + ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL; + ret->sec_ex = NULL; + ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (ret->lock == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + + return ret; +} + +CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) +{ + CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); + int i; + + if (ret == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + ret->references = 1; + ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys]; + ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (ret->lock == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { + ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp; + EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp); + } + ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; + ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto; +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i; + CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i; + if (cpk->x509 != NULL) { + rpk->x509 = cpk->x509; + X509_up_ref(rpk->x509); + } + + if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) { + rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey; + EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey); + } + + if (cpk->chain) { + rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain); + if (!rpk->chain) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) { + /* Just copy everything. */ + ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo = + OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); + if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; + memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo, + cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); + } + } + + /* Configured sigalgs copied across */ + if (cert->conf_sigalgs) { + ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen); + if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL) + goto err; + memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen); + ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen; + } else + ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL; + + if (cert->client_sigalgs) { + ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen); + if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL) + goto err; + memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs, + cert->client_sigalgslen); + ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen; + } else + ret->client_sigalgs = NULL; + /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */ + ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL; + /* Copy any custom client certificate types */ + if (cert->ctypes) { + ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num); + if (ret->ctypes == NULL) + goto err; + memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num); + ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num; + } + + ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags; + + ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; + ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; + + if (cert->verify_store) { + X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store); + ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; + } + + if (cert->chain_store) { + X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store); + ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store; + } + + ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb; + ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level; + ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex; + + if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext)) + goto err; + if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext)) + goto err; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (cert->psk_identity_hint) { + ret->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(cert->psk_identity_hint); + if (ret->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + goto err; + } +#endif + return ret; + + err: + ssl_cert_free(ret); + + return NULL; +} + +/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ + +void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c) +{ + int i; + if (c == NULL) + return; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; + X509_free(cpk->x509); + cpk->x509 = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey); + cpk->privatekey = NULL; + sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); + cpk->chain = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo); + cpk->serverinfo = NULL; + cpk->serverinfo_length = 0; + } +} + +void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) +{ + int i; + + if (c == NULL) + return; + + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock); + REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c); + if (i > 0) + return; + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp); +#endif + + ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); + OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); + OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); + OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); + OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes); + X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); + X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store); + custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext); + custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint); +#endif + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock); + OPENSSL_free(c); +} + +int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) +{ + int i, r; + CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; + if (!cpk) + return 0; + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { + r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0); + if (r != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN, r); + return 0; + } + } + sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); + cpk->chain = chain; + return 1; +} + +int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) +{ + STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; + if (!chain) + return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL); + dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); + if (!dchain) + return 0; + if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain)) { + sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) +{ + int r; + CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; + if (!cpk) + return 0; + r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0); + if (r != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT, r); + return 0; + } + if (!cpk->chain) + cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); + if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) +{ + if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x)) + return 0; + X509_up_ref(x); + return 1; +} + +int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) +{ + int i; + if (x == NULL) + return 0; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; + if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) { + c->key = cpk; + return 1; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; + if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) { + c->key = cpk; + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op) +{ + int i, idx; + if (!c) + return 0; + if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST) + idx = 0; + else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) { + idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1); + if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM) + return 0; + } else + return 0; + for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; + if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) { + c->key = cpk; + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) +{ + c->cert_cb = cb; + c->cert_cb_arg = arg; +} + +int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) +{ + X509 *x; + int i = 0; + X509_STORE *verify_store; + X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; + + if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) + return 0; + + if (s->cert->verify_store) + verify_store = s->cert->verify_store; + else + verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store; + + ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto end; + } + param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx); + /* + * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some + * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto + * and PKI authentication. + */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s)); + + /* Set suite B flags if needed */ + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data + (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) { + goto end; + } + + /* Verify via DANE if enabled */ + if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane)) + X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane); + + /* + * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by + * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or + * vice versa. + */ + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); + /* + * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. + */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param); + + if (s->verify_callback) + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback); + + if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) + i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); + else + i = X509_verify_cert(ctx); + + s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); + sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free); + s->verified_chain = NULL; + if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) { + s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx); + if (s->verified_chain == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + i = 0; + } + } + + /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param); + + end: + X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); + return i; +} + +static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) +{ + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); + *ca_list = name_list; +} + +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) +{ + int i; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret; + X509_NAME *name; + + ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); + if (ret == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { + name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i)); + if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); + X509_NAME_free(name); + return NULL; + } + } + return (ret); +} + +void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) +{ + set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list); +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) +{ + set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list); +} + +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + return (ctx->client_CA); +} + +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) +{ + if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */ + if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL)) + return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names); + else + return (NULL); + } else { + if (s->client_CA != NULL) + return (s->client_CA); + else + return (s->ctx->client_CA); + } +} + +static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x) +{ + X509_NAME *name; + + if (x == NULL) + return (0); + if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)) + return (0); + + if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL) + return (0); + + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) { + X509_NAME_free(name); + return (0); + } + return (1); +} + +int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) +{ + return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x)); +} + +int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) +{ + return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x)); +} + +static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +{ + return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); +} + +static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) +{ + return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b); +} + +static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a) +{ + return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a); +} + +/** + * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed; + * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use + * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have + * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert. + * \param file the file containing one or more certs. + * \return a ::STACK containing the certs. + */ +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) +{ + BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); + X509 *x = NULL; + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL; + LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp); + + if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) + goto err; + + for (;;) { + if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) + break; + if (ret == NULL) { + ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); + if (ret == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) + goto err; + /* check for duplicates */ + xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); + if (xn == NULL) + goto err; + if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) { + /* Duplicate. */ + X509_NAME_free(xn); + xn = NULL; + } else { + lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn); + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn)) + goto err; + } + } + goto done; + + err: + X509_NAME_free(xn); + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); + ret = NULL; + done: + BIO_free(in); + X509_free(x); + lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash); + if (ret != NULL) + ERR_clear_error(); + return (ret); +} + +/** + * Add a file of certs to a stack. + * \param stack the stack to add to. + * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not + * already in the stack will be added. + * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some + * certs may have been added to \c stack. + */ + +int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, + const char *file) +{ + BIO *in; + X509 *x = NULL; + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + int ret = 1; + int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); + + oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp); + + in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); + + if (in == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) + goto err; + + for (;;) { + if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) + break; + if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) + goto err; + xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); + if (xn == NULL) + goto err; + if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) { + /* Duplicate. */ + X509_NAME_free(xn); + } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) { + X509_NAME_free(xn); + goto err; + } + } + + ERR_clear_error(); + goto done; + + err: + ret = 0; + done: + BIO_free(in); + X509_free(x); + (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp); + return ret; +} + +/** + * Add a directory of certs to a stack. + * \param stack the stack to append to. + * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be + * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to + * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be + * included. + * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some + * certs may have been added to \c stack. + */ + +int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, + const char *dir) +{ + OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL; + const char *filename; + int ret = 0; + + /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ + + while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) { + char buf[1024]; + int r; + + if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof(buf)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, + SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS + r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s", dir, filename); +#else + r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", dir, filename); +#endif + if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf)) + goto err; + if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf)) + goto err; + } + + if (errno) { + SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error()); + ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')"); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + + err: + if (d) + OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); + + return ret; +} + +/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */ + +static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) +{ + int n; + unsigned char *p; + + n = i2d_X509(x, NULL); + if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return 0; + } + p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); + l2n3(n, p); + n = i2d_X509(x, &p); + if (n < 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return 0; + } + *l += n + 3; + + return 1; +} + +/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */ +int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) +{ + BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf; + int i, chain_count; + X509 *x; + STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + X509_STORE *chain_store; + + /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return 0; + } + + if (!cpk || !cpk->x509) + return 1; + + x = cpk->x509; + + /* + * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. + */ + if (cpk->chain) + extra_certs = cpk->chain; + else + extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) + chain_store = NULL; + else if (s->cert->chain_store) + chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; + else + chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; + + if (chain_store) { + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return (0); + } + /* + * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we + * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately + * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying + * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can + */ + (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); + /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ + ERR_clear_error(); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); + if (i != 1) { +#if 0 + /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); +#endif + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; + } + chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); + for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + return 0; + } + } + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + } else { + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); + if (i != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; + } + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) + return 0; + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */ +int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) +{ + CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert; + CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; + X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL; + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL; + X509 *x; + int i, rv = 0; + unsigned long error; + + if (!cpk->x509) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); + goto err; + } + /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */ + if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) { + chain_store = X509_STORE_new(); + if (chain_store == NULL) + goto err; + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i); + if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) { + error = ERR_peek_last_error(); + if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 || + ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) + goto err; + ERR_clear_error(); + } + } + /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */ + if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) { + error = ERR_peek_last_error(); + if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 || + ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) + goto err; + ERR_clear_error(); + } + } else { + if (c->chain_store) + chain_store = c->chain_store; + else if (s) + chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; + else + chain_store = ctx->cert_store; + + if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED) + untrusted = cpk->chain; + } + + xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto err; + } + /* Set suite B flags if needed */ + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx, + c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS); + + i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); + if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) { + if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR) + ERR_clear_error(); + i = 1; + rv = 2; + } + if (i > 0) + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx); + if (i <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); + i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", + X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); + + goto err; + } + /* Remove EE certificate from chain */ + x = sk_X509_shift(chain); + X509_free(x); + if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) { + if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) { + /* See if last cert is self signed */ + x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); + if (X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) { + x = sk_X509_pop(chain); + X509_free(x); + } + } + } + /* + * Check security level of all CA certificates: EE will have been checked + * already. + */ + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0); + if (rv != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, rv); + sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); + rv = 0; + goto err; + } + } + sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); + cpk->chain = chain; + if (rv == 0) + rv = 1; + err: + if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) + X509_STORE_free(chain_store); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + + return rv; +} + +int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) +{ + X509_STORE **pstore; + if (chain) + pstore = &c->chain_store; + else + pstore = &c->verify_store; + X509_STORE_free(*pstore); + *pstore = store; + if (ref && store) + X509_STORE_up_ref(store); + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, + void *ex) +{ + int level, minbits; + static const int minbits_table[5] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; + if (ctx) + level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx); + else + level = SSL_get_security_level(s); + + if (level <= 0) { + /* + * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise, + * anything goes. + */ + if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80) + return 0; + return 1; + } + if (level > 5) + level = 5; + minbits = minbits_table[level - 1]; + switch (op) { + case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED: + case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED: + case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK: + { + const SSL_CIPHER *c = other; + /* No ciphers below security level */ + if (bits < minbits) + return 0; + /* No unauthenticated ciphersuites */ + if (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) + return 0; + /* No MD5 mac ciphersuites */ + if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5) + return 0; + /* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */ + if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1) + return 0; + /* Level 2: no RC4 */ + if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) + return 0; + /* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */ + if (level >= 3 && !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH))) + return 0; + break; + } + case SSL_SECOP_VERSION: + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */ + if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2) + return 0; + /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */ + if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3) + return 0; + /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ + if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4) + return 0; + } else { + /* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ + if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4) + return 0; + } + break; + + case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION: + if (level >= 2) + return 0; + break; + case SSL_SECOP_TICKET: + if (level >= 3) + return 0; + break; + default: + if (bits < minbits) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) +{ + return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex); +} + +int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) +{ + return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, + ctx->cert->sec_ex); +} -- cgit v1.2.3