From aa4d426b4d3527d7e166df1a05058c9a4a0f6683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wojtek Kosior Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 00:33:56 +0200 Subject: initial/final commit --- openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c | 1229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 1229 insertions(+) create mode 100644 openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c') diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3ff5f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c @@ -0,0 +1,1229 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include +#include +#define USE_SOCKETS +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include +#include +#include "record_locl.h" + +int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; + + if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL) + return (0); + + rl->d = d; + + d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); + d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); + d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new(); + + if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL + || d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) { + pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q); + pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q); + pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q); + OPENSSL_free(d); + rl->d = NULL; + return (0); + } + + return 1; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); + pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q); + pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q); + pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q); + OPENSSL_free(rl->d); + rl->d = NULL; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; + pitem *item = NULL; + DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; + pqueue *unprocessed_rcds; + pqueue *processed_rcds; + pqueue *buffered_app_data; + + d = rl->d; + + while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { + rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + + while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { + rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + + while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) { + rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + + unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q; + processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q; + buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q; + memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); + d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds; + d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds; + d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e) +{ + if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) { + memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence, + rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); + memcpy(rl->write_sequence, + rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); + } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) { + memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence, + rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8])); + memcpy(rl->write_sequence, + rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); + } + rl->d->w_epoch = e; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq) +{ + memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); +} + +static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, + int len); + +/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ +static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) +{ + DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; + + rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + + SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf); + + s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet; + s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length; + memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); + memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); + + /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ + memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); + + return (1); +} + +int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) +{ + DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; + pitem *item; + + /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ + if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) + return 0; + + rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata)); + item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); + if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet; + rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length; + memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); + memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); + + item->data = rdata; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && + (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED + || SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) { + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, + sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); + } +#endif + + s->rlayer.packet = NULL; + s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; + memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf)); + memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec)); + + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + return (-1); + } + + /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ + if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + return (-1); + } + + return (1); +} + +int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) +{ + pitem *item; + + item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); + if (item) { + dtls1_copy_record(s, item); + + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + + return (1); + } + + return (0); +} + +/* + * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not + * processed yet + */ +#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ + dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ + &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds)) + +int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) +{ + pitem *item; + SSL3_BUFFER *rb; + SSL3_RECORD *rr; + DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; + unsigned int is_next_epoch; + int replayok = 1; + + item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q); + if (item) { + /* Check if epoch is current. */ + if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) + return 1; /* Nothing to do. */ + + rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); + + rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); + + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rb) > 0) { + /* + * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could + * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it + * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've + * finished reading the current packet). + */ + return 1; + } + + /* Process all the records. */ + while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) { + dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); + bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); + if (bitmap == NULL) { + /* + * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the + * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot + * be the case because we already checked the epoch above + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ + if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) +#endif + { + /* + * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this + * check once already when we first received the record - but + * we might have updated the window since then due to + * records we subsequently processed. + */ + replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap); + } + + if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { + /* dump this record */ + rr->length = 0; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + continue; + } + + if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds), + SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0) + return 0; + } + } + + /* + * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been + * processed + */ + s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch; + s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1; + + return 1; +} + +/*- + * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. + * 'type' is one of the following: + * + * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) + * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) + * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) + * + * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first + * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). + * + * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as + * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec + * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| + * argument is non NULL. + * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store + * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol + * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): + * Change cipher spec protocol + * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored + * Alert protocol + * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) + * Handshake protocol + * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have + * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages + * here, anything else is handled by higher layers + * Application data protocol + * none of our business + */ +int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, + int len, int peek) +{ + int al, i, j, ret; + unsigned int n; + SSL3_RECORD *rr; + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; + + if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) { + /* Not initialized yet */ + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) + return (-1); + } + + if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || + (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* + * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting + */ + if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len))) { + *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + return ret; + } + + /* + * Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if + * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. + */ + + if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) + { + /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + } + + start: + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + + /*- + * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record + * s->s3->rrec.data, - data + * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read + * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. + */ + rr = s->rlayer.rrec; + + /* + * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered + * during the last handshake in advance, if any. + */ + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { + pitem *item; + item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q); + if (item) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, + sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); + } +#endif + + dtls1_copy_record(s, item); + + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + } + + /* Check for timeout */ + if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) + goto start; + + /* get new packet if necessary */ + if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) + || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { + ret = dtls1_get_record(s); + if (ret <= 0) { + ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); + /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ + if (ret <= 0) + return (ret); + else + goto start; + } + } + + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT + && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) + s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; + + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ + + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, + * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ + && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { + /* + * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely + * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application + * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. + */ + if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data), + SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + /* + * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in + * 'peek' mode) + */ + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (0); + } + + if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) + || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { + /* + * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or + * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + */ + /* + * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are + * doing a handshake for the first time + */ + if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (recvd_type != NULL) + *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); + + if (len <= 0) + return (len); + + if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) + n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); + else + n = (unsigned int)len; + + memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n); + if (!peek) { + SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); + SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { + s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); + } + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* + * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered + * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read + * anymore, finally set shutdown. + */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && + s->d1->shutdown_received + && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return (0); + } +#endif + return (n); + } + + /* + * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, + * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). + */ + + /* + * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill + * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. + */ + { + unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; + unsigned char *dest = NULL; + unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; + + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment); + dest = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment; + dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; + } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment); + dest = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment; + dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { + /* We allow a 0 return */ + if (dtls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr), + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) { + return -1; + } + /* Exit and notify application to read again */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + return (-1); + } +#endif + /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ + else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* + * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again + * reading. + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + BIO *bio; + s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + + /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + } + + if (dest_maxlen > 0) { + /* + * XDTLS: In a pathological case, the Client Hello may be + * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes + */ + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) { +#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE + /* + * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while + * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this + * non-existing alert... + */ + FIX ME; +#endif + s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + /* now move 'n' bytes: */ + for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) { + dest[k] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]; + SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1); + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1); + } + *dest_len = dest_maxlen; + } + } + + /*- + * s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + * s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. + * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) + */ + + /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ + if ((!s->server) && + (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && + (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && + (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0; + + if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || + (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || + (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages + */ + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment, 4, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && + !s->s3->renegotiate) { + s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; + s->new_session = 1; + ssl3_renegotiate(s); + if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, + * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with + * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may + * cause nasty problems in the blocking world + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + } + } + } else { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + } + /* + * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try + * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for + */ + goto start; + } + + /* + * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't + * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. + */ + if (s->server + && SSL_is_init_finished(s) + && s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + && s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO + && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0 + && ((!s->s3->send_connection_binding + && (s->options + & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0) + || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)) { + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0; + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto start; + } + + if (s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) { + int alert_level = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[0]; + int alert_descr = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[1]; + + s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len = 0; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, + s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment, 2, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + if (cb != NULL) { + j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; + cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); + } + + if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { + s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; + + s->rlayer.alert_count++; + if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + goto f_err; + } + + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* + * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data + * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so + * that nothing gets discarded. + */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && + BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + s->d1->shutdown_received = 1; + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + return -1; + } +#endif + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return (0); + } +#if 0 + /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ + /* now check if it's a missing record */ + if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { + unsigned short seq; + unsigned int frag_off; + unsigned char *p = &(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[2]); + + n2s(p, seq); + n2l3(p, frag_off); + + dtls1_retransmit_message(s, + dtls1_get_queue_priority + (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off, + &found); + if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) { + /* + * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); + */ + /* + * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert + * ourselves + */ + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, + DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); + } + } +#endif + } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { + char tmp[16]; + + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); + BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + return (0); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + goto start; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a + * shutdown */ + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + return (0); + } + + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* + * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages + * are still missing, so just drop it. + */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + /* + * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) + */ + if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && + !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; + + /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ + dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + /* + * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client + * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. + */ + if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) + return -1; + + dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + s->renegotiate = 1; + s->new_session = 1; + } + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, but we + * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry + * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty + * problems in the blocking world + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (-1); + } + } + goto start; + } + + switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { + default: + /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ + if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); + goto start; + } + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + case SSL3_RT_ALERT: + case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: + /* + * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but + * that should not happen when type != rr->type + */ + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: + /* + * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have + * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() + * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read + * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet + * started), we will indulge it. + */ + if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && + (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && + ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { + s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; + return (-1); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + goto f_err; + } + } + /* not reached */ + + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return (-1); +} + + /* + * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake + * is started. + */ +static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, + int len) +{ + + if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) + && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) + /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ + { + unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment; + unsigned char *dst = buf; + unsigned int k, n; + + /* peek == 0 */ + n = 0; + while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { + *dst++ = *src++; + len--; + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len--; + n++; + } + /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ + for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; k++) + s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; + return n; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if + * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. + */ +int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) +{ + int i; + + OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); + return i; +} + +int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) +{ + unsigned char *p, *pseq; + int i, mac_size, clear = 0; + int prefix_len = 0; + int eivlen; + SSL3_RECORD wr; + SSL3_BUFFER *wb; + SSL_SESSION *sess; + + wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; + + /* + * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This + * will happen with non blocking IO + */ + if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) { + OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ + return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); + } + + /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ + if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + if (i <= 0) + return (i); + /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ + } + + if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) + return 0; + + if (len > s->max_send_fragment) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + sess = s->session; + + if ((sess == NULL) || + (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) + clear = 1; + + if (clear) + mac_size = 0; + else { + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); + if (mac_size < 0) + goto err; + } + + p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len; + + /* write the header */ + + *(p++) = type & 0xff; + SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); + /* + * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we + * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0 + * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. + */ + if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION && + s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; + *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; + } else { + *(p++) = s->version >> 8; + *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; + } + + /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ + pseq = p; + p += 10; + + /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ + if (s->enc_write_ctx) { + int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { + eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); + if (eivlen <= 1) + eivlen = 0; + } + /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ + else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) + eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) + eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + else + eivlen = 0; + } else + eivlen = 0; + + /* lets setup the record stuff. */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr, (int)len); + SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr, (unsigned char *)buf); + + /* + * we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data + */ + + /* first we compress */ + if (s->compress != NULL) { + if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } else { + memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr), + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)); + SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr); + } + + /* + * we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from + * wr.input. Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the + * wb->buf + */ + + if (mac_size != 0) { + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr, + &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]), + 1) < 0) + goto err; + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size); + } + + /* this is true regardless of mac size */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p); + SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr); + + if (eivlen) + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, eivlen); + + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, &wr, 1, 1) < 1) + goto err; + + /* record length after mac and block padding */ + /* + * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! + * SSL_in_init(s))) + */ + + /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ + + s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq); + + /* XDTLS: ?? */ + /* + * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); + */ + + memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6); + pseq += 6; + s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr), pseq); + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* + * we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is + * wr->length long + */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */ + SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); + + ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0])); + + if (create_empty_fragment) { + /* + * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write + * out anything here + */ + return wr.length; + } + + /* now let's set up wb */ + SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)); + SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0); + + /* + * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write + * retries later + */ + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len; + s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; + s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; + s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len; + + /* we now just need to write the buffer */ + return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); + err: + return -1; +} + +DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, + unsigned int *is_next_epoch) +{ + + *is_next_epoch = 0; + + /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ + if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) + return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap; + + /* + * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we + * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last + * epoch + */ + else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) && + s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch && + (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { + *is_next_epoch = 1; + return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap; + } + + return NULL; +} + +void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) +{ + unsigned char *seq; + unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence); + + if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { + seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence; + s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++; + memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, + sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap)); + memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap)); + + /* + * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous + * epoch + */ + dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); + } else { + seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence; + memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq, + sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence)); + s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++; + } + + memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes); +} -- cgit v1.2.3