From aa4d426b4d3527d7e166df1a05058c9a4a0f6683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wojtek Kosior Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 00:33:56 +0200 Subject: initial/final commit --- openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509.c | 224 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 224 insertions(+) create mode 100644 openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509.c (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509.c') diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6783fd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x_x509.c @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "internal/x509_int.h" + +ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = { + ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), + ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER), + ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME), + ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY), + ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1), + ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2), + ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3) +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF) + +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF) +/* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */ + +extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache); + +static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, + void *exarg) +{ + X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval; + + switch (operation) { + + case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST: + ret->ex_flags = 0; + ret->ex_pathlen = -1; + ret->ex_pcpathlen = -1; + ret->skid = NULL; + ret->akid = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 + ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL; + ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL; +#endif + ret->aux = NULL; + ret->crldp = NULL; + if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data)) + return 0; + break; + + case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST: + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data); + X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux); + ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid); + AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid); + CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp); + policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache); + GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname); + NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 + sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free); + ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid); +#endif + break; + + } + + return 1; + +} + +ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb) = { + ASN1_EMBED(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF), + ASN1_EMBED(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), + ASN1_EMBED(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING) +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509) + +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509) + +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509) + +int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg) +{ + return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg)); +} + +void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx) +{ + return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx)); +} + +/* + * X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with + * extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate + * is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a + * reliable source such as local storage. + */ + +X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) +{ + const unsigned char *q; + X509 *ret; + int freeret = 0; + + /* Save start position */ + q = *pp; + + if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) + freeret = 1; + ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length); + /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */ + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; + /* update length */ + length -= q - *pp; + if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length)) + goto err; + *pp = q; + return ret; + err: + if (freeret) { + X509_free(ret); + if (a) + *a = NULL; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer + * length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the + * error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions. + * Here we avoid compounding the problem. + */ +static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) +{ + int length, tmplen; + unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL; + + OPENSSL_assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL); + + /* + * This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509() + * not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check + * both just in case. + */ + length = i2d_X509(a, pp); + if (length <= 0 || a == NULL) + return length; + + tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp); + if (tmplen < 0) { + if (start != NULL) + *pp = start; + return tmplen; + } + length += tmplen; + + return length; +} + +/* + * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer + * length if pp == NULL. + * + * When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since + * we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do + * the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the + * allocated buffer. + */ +int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) +{ + int length; + unsigned char *tmp; + + /* Buffer provided by caller */ + if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL) + return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp); + + /* Obtain the combined length */ + if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0) + return length; + + /* Allocate requisite combined storage */ + *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length); + if (tmp == NULL) + return -1; /* Push error onto error stack? */ + + /* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */ + length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp); + if (length <= 0) { + OPENSSL_free(*pp); + *pp = NULL; + } + return length; +} + +int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp) +{ + x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1; + return i2d_X509_CINF(&x->cert_info, pp); +} + +void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, + const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x) +{ + if (psig) + *psig = &x->signature; + if (palg) + *palg = &x->sig_alg; +} + +int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x) +{ + return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm); +} -- cgit v1.2.3