From aa4d426b4d3527d7e166df1a05058c9a4a0f6683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wojtek Kosior Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 00:33:56 +0200 Subject: initial/final commit --- openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | 459 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 459 insertions(+) create mode 100644 openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c') diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0105635 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,459 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include +#include +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "internal/x509_int.h" + +int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) +{ + int i; + const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; + + ai = &a->cert_info; + bi = &b->cert_info; + i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); + if (i) + return (i); + return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 +unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) +{ + unsigned long ret = 0; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + unsigned char md[16]; + char *f; + + if (ctx == NULL) + goto err; + f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) + goto err; + OPENSSL_free(f); + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate + (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, + (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) + goto err; + ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | + ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) + ) & 0xffffffffL; + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + return (ret); +} +#endif + +int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) +{ + return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer)); +} + +int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) +{ + return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject)); +} + +int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) +{ + return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer)); +} + +int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) +{ + return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); +} + +X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) +{ + return (a->cert_info.issuer); +} + +unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) +{ + return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer)); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 +unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) +{ + return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer)); +} +#endif + +X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) +{ + return (a->cert_info.subject); +} + +ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) +{ + return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; +} + +const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) +{ + return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; +} + +unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) +{ + return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject)); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 +unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) +{ + return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject)); +} +#endif + +/* + * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: + * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" + * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these + * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring + * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the + * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. + */ +int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) +{ + int rv; + /* ensure hash is valid */ + X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); + X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); + + rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (rv) + return rv; + /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ + if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { + if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) + return -1; + if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) + return 1; + return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, + a->cert_info.enc.len); + } + return rv; +} + +int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) +{ + int ret; + + /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ + + if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { + ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + return -2; + } + + if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { + ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + return -2; + } + + ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; + + if (ret) + return ret; + + return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); + +} + +unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) +{ + unsigned long ret = 0; + unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ + i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); + if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), + NULL)) + return 0; + + ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | + ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) + ) & 0xffffffffL; + return (ret); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 +/* + * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, + * this is reasonably efficient. + */ + +unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) +{ + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + unsigned long ret = 0; + unsigned char md[16]; + + if (md_ctx == NULL) + return ret; + + /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ + i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); + EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) + && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) + ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | + ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) + ) & 0xffffffffL; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + + return (ret); +} +#endif + +/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ +X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, + ASN1_INTEGER *serial) +{ + int i; + X509 x, *x509 = NULL; + + if (!sk) + return NULL; + + x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; + x.cert_info.issuer = name; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { + x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); + if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) + return (x509); + } + return (NULL); +} + +X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) +{ + X509 *x509; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { + x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); + if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) + return (x509); + } + return (NULL); +} + +EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) +{ + if (x == NULL) + return NULL; + return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); +} + +EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) +{ + if (x == NULL) + return NULL; + return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); +} + +int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) +{ + const EVP_PKEY *xk; + int ret; + + xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); + + if (xk) + ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); + else + ret = -2; + + switch (ret) { + case 1: + break; + case 0: + X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); + break; + case -1: + X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); + break; + case -2: + X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); + } + if (ret > 0) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID + * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a + * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + +static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) +{ + const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; + int curve_nid; + if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) + grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); + if (!grp) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; + curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); + /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ + if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ + /* + * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. + */ + if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; + /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ + *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; + } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ + if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; + } else + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; + + return X509_V_OK; +} + +int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, + unsigned long flags) +{ + int rv, i, sign_nid; + EVP_PKEY *pk; + unsigned long tflags = flags; + + if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) + return X509_V_OK; + + /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ + if (x == NULL) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); + i = 1; + } else + i = 0; + + pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); + + /* + * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build + * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report + * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain + * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. + */ + if (chain == NULL) + return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); + + if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { + rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; + /* Correct error depth */ + i = 0; + goto end; + } + + /* Check EE key only */ + rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); + if (rv != X509_V_OK) { + /* Correct error depth */ + i = 0; + goto end; + } + for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { + sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { + rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; + goto end; + } + pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); + rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); + if (rv != X509_V_OK) + goto end; + } + + /* Final check: root CA signature */ + rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); + end: + if (rv != X509_V_OK) { + /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ + if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM + || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) + i--; + /* + * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 + * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. + */ + if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) + rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; + if (perror_depth) + *perror_depth = i; + } + return rv; +} + +int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) +{ + int sign_nid; + if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) + return X509_V_OK; + sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); + return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); +} + +#else +int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, + unsigned long flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +#endif +/* + * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference + * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of + * each X509 structure. + */ +STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) +{ + STACK_OF(X509) *ret; + int i; + ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { + X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); + X509_up_ref(x); + } + return ret; +} -- cgit v1.2.3