diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.c | 1106 |
1 files changed, 1106 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..41a2c00 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/test/handshake_helper.c @@ -0,0 +1,1106 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> +#include <openssl/ssl.h> + +#include "handshake_helper.h" +#include "testutil.h" + +HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new() +{ + HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); + TEST_check(ret != NULL); + return ret; +} + +void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result) +{ + if (result == NULL) + return; + OPENSSL_free(result->client_npn_negotiated); + OPENSSL_free(result->server_npn_negotiated); + OPENSSL_free(result->client_alpn_negotiated); + OPENSSL_free(result->server_alpn_negotiated); + OPENSSL_free(result); +} + +/* + * Since there appears to be no way to extract the sent/received alert + * from the SSL object directly, we use the info callback and stash + * the result in ex_data. + */ +typedef struct handshake_ex_data_st { + int alert_sent; + int num_fatal_alerts_sent; + int alert_received; + int session_ticket_do_not_call; + ssl_servername_t servername; +} HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA; + +typedef struct ctx_data_st { + unsigned char *npn_protocols; + size_t npn_protocols_len; + unsigned char *alpn_protocols; + size_t alpn_protocols_len; +} CTX_DATA; + +/* |ctx_data| itself is stack-allocated. */ +static void ctx_data_free_data(CTX_DATA *ctx_data) +{ + OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->npn_protocols); + ctx_data->npn_protocols = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->alpn_protocols); + ctx_data->alpn_protocols = NULL; +} + +static int ex_data_idx; + +static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret) +{ + if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { + HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data = + (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx)); + if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) { + ex_data->alert_sent = ret; + if (strcmp(SSL_alert_type_string(ret), "F") == 0 + || strcmp(SSL_alert_desc_string(ret), "CN") == 0) + ex_data->num_fatal_alerts_sent++; + } else { + ex_data->alert_received = ret; + } + } +} + +/* Select the appropriate server CTX. + * Returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if a match was found. + * If |ignore| is 1, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK on mismatch. + * Otherwise, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL on mismatch. + * An empty SNI extension also returns SSL_TSLEXT_ERR_NOACK. + */ +static int select_server_ctx(SSL *s, void *arg, int ignore) +{ + const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); + HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data = + (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx)); + + if (servername == NULL) { + ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1; + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + } + + if (strcmp(servername, "server2") == 0) { + SSL_CTX *new_ctx = (SSL_CTX*)arg; + SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, new_ctx); + /* + * Copy over all the SSL_CTX options - reasonable behavior + * allows testing of cases where the options between two + * contexts differ/conflict + */ + SSL_clear_options(s, 0xFFFFFFFFL); + SSL_set_options(s, SSL_CTX_get_options(new_ctx)); + + ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2; + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } else if (strcmp(servername, "server1") == 0) { + ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1; + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } else if (ignore) { + ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1; + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + } else { + /* Don't set an explicit alert, to test library defaults. */ + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } +} + +/* + * (RFC 6066): + * If the server understood the ClientHello extension but + * does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two + * actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level + * unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake. + * + * This behaviour is up to the application to configure; we test both + * configurations to ensure the state machine propagates the result + * correctly. + */ +static int servername_ignore_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) +{ + return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 1); +} + +static int servername_reject_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) +{ + return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0); +} + +static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val = 0xff; +static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val = 0xfe; + +static int server_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) +{ + unsigned char *resp; + + resp = OPENSSL_malloc(1); + if (resp == NULL) + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + /* + * For the purposes of testing we just send back a dummy OCSP response + */ + *resp = *(unsigned char *)arg; + if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, resp, 1)) + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; +} + +static int client_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) +{ + const unsigned char *resp; + int len; + + len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &resp); + if (len != 1 || *resp != dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION); + return 0; +} + +static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { + return 1; +} + +static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv, + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, + unsigned char *iv, + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) +{ + HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data = + (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx)); + ex_data->session_ticket_do_not_call = 1; + return 0; +} + +/* Parse the comma-separated list into TLS format. */ +static void parse_protos(const char *protos, unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen) +{ + size_t len, i, prefix; + + len = strlen(protos); + + /* Should never have reuse. */ + TEST_check(*out == NULL); + + /* Test values are small, so we omit length limit checks. */ + *out = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); + TEST_check(*out != NULL); + *outlen = len + 1; + + /* + * foo => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o' + * foo,bar => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o', '3', 'b', 'a', 'r' + */ + memcpy(*out + 1, protos, len); + + prefix = 0; + i = prefix + 1; + while (i <= len) { + if ((*out)[i] == ',') { + TEST_check(i - 1 - prefix > 0); + (*out)[prefix] = i - 1 - prefix; + prefix = i; + } + i++; + } + TEST_check(len - prefix > 0); + (*out)[prefix] = len - prefix; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +/* + * The client SHOULD select the first protocol advertised by the server that it + * also supports. In the event that the client doesn't support any of server's + * protocols, or the server doesn't advertise any, it SHOULD select the first + * protocol that it supports. + */ +static int client_npn_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, + void *arg) +{ + CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg); + int ret; + + ret = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, + ctx_data->npn_protocols, + ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); + /* Accept both OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED and OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP. */ + TEST_check(ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED || ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; +} + +static int server_npn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, + unsigned int *len, void *arg) +{ + CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg); + *data = ctx_data->npn_protocols; + *len = ctx_data->npn_protocols_len; + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; +} +#endif + +/* + * The server SHOULD select the most highly preferred protocol that it supports + * and that is also advertised by the client. In the event that the server + * supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL + * respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert. + */ +static int server_alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, + unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, + unsigned int inlen, void *arg) +{ + CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg); + int ret; + + /* SSL_select_next_proto isn't const-correct... */ + unsigned char *tmp_out; + + /* + * The result points either to |in| or to |ctx_data->alpn_protocols|. + * The callback is allowed to point to |in| or to a long-lived buffer, + * so we can return directly without storing a copy. + */ + ret = SSL_select_next_proto(&tmp_out, outlen, + ctx_data->alpn_protocols, + ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len, in, inlen); + + *out = tmp_out; + /* Unlike NPN, we don't tolerate a mismatch. */ + return ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK + : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; +} + +/* + * Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly + * in the server/client CONF. + */ +static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, + SSL_CTX *client_ctx, + const SSL_TEST_CTX *test, + const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, + CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data, + CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data, + CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data) +{ + unsigned char *ticket_keys; + size_t ticket_key_len; + + TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server_ctx, + test->max_fragment_size) == 1); + if (server2_ctx != NULL) { + TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server2_ctx, + test->max_fragment_size) == 1); + } + TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(client_ctx, + test->max_fragment_size) == 1); + + switch (extra->client.verify_callback) { + case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL: + SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_cb, + NULL); + break; + case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL: + SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_cb, + NULL); + break; + default: + break; + } + + /* link the two contexts for SNI purposes */ + switch (extra->server.servername_callback) { + case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH: + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_ignore_cb); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx); + break; + case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH: + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_reject_cb); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx); + break; + default: + break; + } + + if (extra->server.cert_status != SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE) { + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ctx, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(client_ctx, NULL); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, + ((extra->server.cert_status == SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE) + ? &dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val : &dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val)); + } + + /* + * The initial_ctx/session_ctx always handles the encrypt/decrypt of the + * session ticket. This ticket_key callback is assigned to the second + * session (assigned via SNI), and should never be invoked + */ + if (server2_ctx != NULL) + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx, + do_not_call_session_ticket_cb); + + if (extra->server.broken_session_ticket) { + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb); + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + if (extra->server.npn_protocols != NULL) { + parse_protos(extra->server.npn_protocols, + &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols, + &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); + SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server_ctx, server_npn_cb, + server_ctx_data); + } + if (extra->server2.npn_protocols != NULL) { + parse_protos(extra->server2.npn_protocols, + &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols, + &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); + TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL); + SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server2_ctx, server_npn_cb, + server2_ctx_data); + } + if (extra->client.npn_protocols != NULL) { + parse_protos(extra->client.npn_protocols, + &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols, + &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); + SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(client_ctx, client_npn_cb, + client_ctx_data); + } +#endif + if (extra->server.alpn_protocols != NULL) { + parse_protos(extra->server.alpn_protocols, + &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols, + &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len); + SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server_ctx_data); + } + if (extra->server2.alpn_protocols != NULL) { + TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL); + parse_protos(extra->server2.alpn_protocols, + &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols, + &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len); + SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server2_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server2_ctx_data); + } + if (extra->client.alpn_protocols != NULL) { + unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL; + size_t alpn_protos_len; + parse_protos(extra->client.alpn_protocols, + &alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len); + /* Reversed return value convention... */ + TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(client_ctx, alpn_protos, + alpn_protos_len) == 0); + OPENSSL_free(alpn_protos); + } + + /* + * Use fixed session ticket keys so that we can decrypt a ticket created with + * one CTX in another CTX. Don't address server2 for the moment. + */ + ticket_key_len = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, NULL, 0); + ticket_keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ticket_key_len); + TEST_check(ticket_keys != NULL); + TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, ticket_keys, + ticket_key_len) == 1); + OPENSSL_free(ticket_keys); + + /* The default log list includes EC keys, so CT can't work without EC. */ +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) + TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(client_ctx)); + switch (extra->client.ct_validation) { + case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE: + TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE)); + break; + case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT: + TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT)); + break; + case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE: + break; + } +#endif +} + +/* Configure per-SSL callbacks and other properties. */ +static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client, + const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra) +{ + if (extra->client.servername != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE) + SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client, + ssl_servername_name(extra->client.servername)); +} + +/* The status for each connection phase. */ +typedef enum { + PEER_SUCCESS, + PEER_RETRY, + PEER_ERROR +} peer_status_t; + +/* An SSL object and associated read-write buffers. */ +typedef struct peer_st { + SSL *ssl; + /* Buffer lengths are int to match the SSL read/write API. */ + unsigned char *write_buf; + int write_buf_len; + unsigned char *read_buf; + int read_buf_len; + int bytes_to_write; + int bytes_to_read; + peer_status_t status; +} PEER; + +static void create_peer(PEER *peer, SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + static const int peer_buffer_size = 64 * 1024; + + peer->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + TEST_check(peer->ssl != NULL); + peer->write_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size); + TEST_check(peer->write_buf != NULL); + peer->read_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size); + TEST_check(peer->read_buf != NULL); + peer->write_buf_len = peer->read_buf_len = peer_buffer_size; +} + +static void peer_free_data(PEER *peer) +{ + SSL_free(peer->ssl); + OPENSSL_free(peer->write_buf); + OPENSSL_free(peer->read_buf); +} + +/* + * Note that we could do the handshake transparently under an SSL_write, + * but separating the steps is more helpful for debugging test failures. + */ +static void do_handshake_step(PEER *peer) +{ + int ret; + + if (peer->status != PEER_RETRY) { + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + return; + } + + ret = SSL_do_handshake(peer->ssl); + + if (ret == 1) { + peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; + } else if (ret == 0) { + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + } else { + int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); + /* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */ + if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + } +} + +/*- + * Send/receive some application data. The read-write sequence is + * Peer A: (R) W - first read will yield no data + * Peer B: R W + * ... + * Peer A: R W + * Peer B: R W + * Peer A: R + */ +static void do_app_data_step(PEER *peer) +{ + int ret = 1, write_bytes; + + TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); + + /* We read everything available... */ + while (ret > 0 && peer->bytes_to_read) { + ret = SSL_read(peer->ssl, peer->read_buf, peer->read_buf_len); + if (ret > 0) { + TEST_check(ret <= peer->bytes_to_read); + peer->bytes_to_read -= ret; + } else if (ret == 0) { + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + return; + } else { + int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); + if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + return; + } /* Else continue with write. */ + } + } + + /* ... but we only write one write-buffer-full of data. */ + write_bytes = peer->bytes_to_write < peer->write_buf_len ? peer->bytes_to_write : + peer->write_buf_len; + if (write_bytes) { + ret = SSL_write(peer->ssl, peer->write_buf, write_bytes); + if (ret > 0) { + /* SSL_write will only succeed with a complete write. */ + TEST_check(ret == write_bytes); + peer->bytes_to_write -= ret; + } else { + /* + * We should perhaps check for SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ/WRITE here + * but this doesn't yet occur with current app data sizes. + */ + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + return; + } + } + + /* + * We could simply finish when there was nothing to read, and we have + * nothing left to write. But keeping track of the expected number of bytes + * to read gives us somewhat better guarantees that all data sent is in fact + * received. + */ + if (!peer->bytes_to_write && !peer->bytes_to_read) { + peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; + } +} + +static void do_reneg_setup_step(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, PEER *peer) +{ + int ret; + char buf; + + if (peer->status == PEER_SUCCESS) { + /* + * We are a client that succeeded this step previously, but the server + * wanted to retry. Probably there is a no_renegotiation warning alert + * waiting for us. Attempt to continue the handshake. + */ + peer->status = PEER_RETRY; + do_handshake_step(peer); + return; + } + + TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); + TEST_check(test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER + || test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT); + + /* Check if we are the peer that is going to initiate */ + if ((test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER + && SSL_is_server(peer->ssl)) + || (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT + && !SSL_is_server(peer->ssl))) { + /* + * If we already asked for a renegotiation then fall through to the + * SSL_read() below. + */ + if (!SSL_renegotiate_pending(peer->ssl)) { + /* + * If we are the client we will always attempt to resume the + * session. The server may or may not resume dependant on the + * setting of SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION + */ + if (SSL_is_server(peer->ssl)) { + ret = SSL_renegotiate(peer->ssl); + } else { + if (test_ctx->extra.client.reneg_ciphers != NULL) { + if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(peer->ssl, + test_ctx->extra.client.reneg_ciphers)) { + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + return; + } + ret = SSL_renegotiate(peer->ssl); + } else { + ret = SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(peer->ssl); + } + } + if (!ret) { + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + return; + } + do_handshake_step(peer); + /* + * If status is PEER_RETRY it means we're waiting on the peer to + * continue the handshake. As far as setting up the renegotiation is + * concerned that is a success. The next step will continue the + * handshake to its conclusion. + * + * If status is PEER_SUCCESS then we are the server and we have + * successfully sent the HelloRequest. We need to continue to wait + * until the handshake arrives from the client. + */ + if (peer->status == PEER_RETRY) + peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; + else if (peer->status == PEER_SUCCESS) + peer->status = PEER_RETRY; + return; + } + } + + /* + * The SSL object is still expecting app data, even though it's going to + * get a handshake message. We try to read, and it should fail - after which + * we should be in a handshake + */ + ret = SSL_read(peer->ssl, &buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret >= 0) { + /* + * We're not actually expecting data - we're expecting a reneg to + * start + */ + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + return; + } else { + int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); + if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + return; + } + /* If we're no in init yet then we're not done with setup yet */ + if (!SSL_in_init(peer->ssl)) + return; + } + + peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; +} + + +/* + * RFC 5246 says: + * + * Note that as of TLS 1.1, + * failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a + * session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform + * with widespread implementation practice. + * + * However, + * (a) OpenSSL requires that a connection be shutdown for all protocol versions. + * (b) We test lower versions, too. + * So we just implement shutdown. We do a full bidirectional shutdown so that we + * can compare sent and received close_notify alerts and get some test coverage + * for SSL_shutdown as a bonus. + */ +static void do_shutdown_step(PEER *peer) +{ + int ret; + + TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); + ret = SSL_shutdown(peer->ssl); + + if (ret == 1) { + peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; + } else if (ret < 0) { /* On 0, we retry. */ + int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); + /* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */ + if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) + peer->status = PEER_ERROR; + } +} + +typedef enum { + HANDSHAKE, + RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA, + RENEG_SETUP, + RENEG_HANDSHAKE, + APPLICATION_DATA, + SHUTDOWN, + CONNECTION_DONE +} connect_phase_t; + +static connect_phase_t next_phase(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, + connect_phase_t phase) +{ + switch (phase) { + case HANDSHAKE: + if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER + || test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT) + return RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA; + return APPLICATION_DATA; + case RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA: + return RENEG_SETUP; + case RENEG_SETUP: + return RENEG_HANDSHAKE; + case RENEG_HANDSHAKE: + return APPLICATION_DATA; + case APPLICATION_DATA: + return SHUTDOWN; + case SHUTDOWN: + return CONNECTION_DONE; + default: + TEST_check(0); /* Should never call next_phase when done. */ + } +} + +static void do_connect_step(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, PEER *peer, + connect_phase_t phase) +{ + switch (phase) { + case HANDSHAKE: + do_handshake_step(peer); + break; + case RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA: + do_app_data_step(peer); + break; + case RENEG_SETUP: + do_reneg_setup_step(test_ctx, peer); + break; + case RENEG_HANDSHAKE: + do_handshake_step(peer); + break; + case APPLICATION_DATA: + do_app_data_step(peer); + break; + case SHUTDOWN: + do_shutdown_step(peer); + break; + default: + TEST_check(0); + } +} + +typedef enum { + /* Both parties succeeded. */ + HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS, + /* Client errored. */ + CLIENT_ERROR, + /* Server errored. */ + SERVER_ERROR, + /* Peers are in inconsistent state. */ + INTERNAL_ERROR, + /* One or both peers not done. */ + HANDSHAKE_RETRY +} handshake_status_t; + +/* + * Determine the handshake outcome. + * last_status: the status of the peer to have acted last. + * previous_status: the status of the peer that didn't act last. + * client_spoke_last: 1 if the client went last. + */ +static handshake_status_t handshake_status(peer_status_t last_status, + peer_status_t previous_status, + int client_spoke_last) +{ + switch (last_status) { + case PEER_SUCCESS: + switch (previous_status) { + case PEER_SUCCESS: + /* Both succeeded. */ + return HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS; + case PEER_RETRY: + /* Let the first peer finish. */ + return HANDSHAKE_RETRY; + case PEER_ERROR: + /* + * Second peer succeeded despite the fact that the first peer + * already errored. This shouldn't happen. + */ + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + break; + + case PEER_RETRY: + return HANDSHAKE_RETRY; + + case PEER_ERROR: + switch (previous_status) { + case PEER_SUCCESS: + /* + * First peer succeeded but second peer errored. + * TODO(emilia): we should be able to continue here (with some + * application data?) to ensure the first peer receives the + * alert / close_notify. + * (No tests currently exercise this branch.) + */ + return client_spoke_last ? CLIENT_ERROR : SERVER_ERROR; + case PEER_RETRY: + /* We errored; let the peer finish. */ + return HANDSHAKE_RETRY; + case PEER_ERROR: + /* Both peers errored. Return the one that errored first. */ + return client_spoke_last ? SERVER_ERROR : CLIENT_ERROR; + } + } + /* Control should never reach here. */ + return INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +/* Convert unsigned char buf's that shouldn't contain any NUL-bytes to char. */ +static char *dup_str(const unsigned char *in, size_t len) +{ + char *ret; + + if(len == 0) + return NULL; + + /* Assert that the string does not contain NUL-bytes. */ + TEST_check(OPENSSL_strnlen((const char*)(in), len) == len); + ret = OPENSSL_strndup((const char*)(in), len); + TEST_check(ret != NULL); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Note that |extra| points to the correct client/server configuration + * within |test_ctx|. When configuring the handshake, general mode settings + * are taken from |test_ctx|, and client/server-specific settings should be + * taken from |extra|. + * + * The configuration code should never reach into |test_ctx->extra| or + * |test_ctx->resume_extra| directly. + * + * (We could refactor test mode settings into a substructure. This would result + * in cleaner argument passing but would complicate the test configuration + * parsing.) + */ +static HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake_internal( + SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx, + const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, + SSL_SESSION *session_in, SSL_SESSION **session_out) +{ + PEER server, client; + BIO *client_to_server, *server_to_client; + HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA server_ex_data, client_ex_data; + CTX_DATA client_ctx_data, server_ctx_data, server2_ctx_data; + HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new(); + int client_turn = 1, client_turn_count = 0; + connect_phase_t phase = HANDSHAKE; + handshake_status_t status = HANDSHAKE_RETRY; + const unsigned char* tick = NULL; + size_t tick_len = 0; + SSL_SESSION* sess = NULL; + const unsigned char *proto = NULL; + /* API dictates unsigned int rather than size_t. */ + unsigned int proto_len = 0; + EVP_PKEY *tmp_key; + + memset(&server_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server_ctx_data)); + memset(&server2_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server2_ctx_data)); + memset(&client_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(client_ctx_data)); + memset(&server, 0, sizeof(server)); + memset(&client, 0, sizeof(client)); + + configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, test_ctx, extra, + &server_ctx_data, &server2_ctx_data, &client_ctx_data); + + /* Setup SSL and buffers; additional configuration happens below. */ + create_peer(&server, server_ctx); + create_peer(&client, client_ctx); + + server.bytes_to_write = client.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size; + client.bytes_to_write = server.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size; + + configure_handshake_ssl(server.ssl, client.ssl, extra); + if (session_in != NULL) { + /* In case we're testing resumption without tickets. */ + TEST_check(SSL_CTX_add_session(server_ctx, session_in)); + TEST_check(SSL_set_session(client.ssl, session_in)); + } + + memset(&server_ex_data, 0, sizeof(server_ex_data)); + memset(&client_ex_data, 0, sizeof(client_ex_data)); + + ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + + TEST_check(client_to_server != NULL); + TEST_check(server_to_client != NULL); + + /* Non-blocking bio. */ + BIO_set_nbio(client_to_server, 1); + BIO_set_nbio(server_to_client, 1); + + SSL_set_connect_state(client.ssl); + SSL_set_accept_state(server.ssl); + + /* The bios are now owned by the SSL object. */ + SSL_set_bio(client.ssl, server_to_client, client_to_server); + TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0); + TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0); + SSL_set_bio(server.ssl, client_to_server, server_to_client); + + ex_data_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "ex data", NULL, NULL, NULL); + TEST_check(ex_data_idx >= 0); + + TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(server.ssl, ex_data_idx, &server_ex_data) == 1); + TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(client.ssl, ex_data_idx, &client_ex_data) == 1); + + SSL_set_info_callback(server.ssl, &info_cb); + SSL_set_info_callback(client.ssl, &info_cb); + + client.status = server.status = PEER_RETRY; + + /* + * Half-duplex handshake loop. + * Client and server speak to each other synchronously in the same process. + * We use non-blocking BIOs, so whenever one peer blocks for read, it + * returns PEER_RETRY to indicate that it's the other peer's turn to write. + * The handshake succeeds once both peers have succeeded. If one peer + * errors out, we also let the other peer retry (and presumably fail). + */ + for(;;) { + if (client_turn) { + do_connect_step(test_ctx, &client, phase); + status = handshake_status(client.status, server.status, + 1 /* client went last */); + } else { + do_connect_step(test_ctx, &server, phase); + status = handshake_status(server.status, client.status, + 0 /* server went last */); + } + + switch (status) { + case HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS: + client_turn_count = 0; + phase = next_phase(test_ctx, phase); + if (phase == CONNECTION_DONE) { + ret->result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS; + goto err; + } else { + client.status = server.status = PEER_RETRY; + /* + * For now, client starts each phase. Since each phase is + * started separately, we can later control this more + * precisely, for example, to test client-initiated and + * server-initiated shutdown. + */ + client_turn = 1; + break; + } + case CLIENT_ERROR: + ret->result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL; + goto err; + case SERVER_ERROR: + ret->result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL; + goto err; + case INTERNAL_ERROR: + ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + case HANDSHAKE_RETRY: + if (client_turn_count++ >= 2000) { + /* + * At this point, there's been so many PEER_RETRY in a row + * that it's likely both sides are stuck waiting for a read. + * It's time to give up. + */ + ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + } + + /* Continue. */ + client_turn ^= 1; + break; + } + } + err: + ret->server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent; + ret->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent = server_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent; + ret->server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received; + ret->client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent; + ret->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent = client_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent; + ret->client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received; + ret->server_protocol = SSL_version(server.ssl); + ret->client_protocol = SSL_version(client.ssl); + ret->servername = server_ex_data.servername; + if ((sess = SSL_get0_session(client.ssl)) != NULL) + SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &tick_len); + if (tick == NULL || tick_len == 0) + ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO; + else + ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES; + ret->session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); + ret->client_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); + + SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); + ret->server_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); +#endif + + SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); + ret->client_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); + + SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); + ret->server_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); + + ret->client_resumed = SSL_session_reused(client.ssl); + ret->server_resumed = SSL_session_reused(server.ssl); + + if (session_out != NULL) + *session_out = SSL_get1_session(client.ssl); + + if (SSL_get_server_tmp_key(client.ssl, &tmp_key)) { + int nid = EVP_PKEY_id(tmp_key); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (nid == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmp_key); + nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)); + } +#endif + EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_key); + ret->tmp_key_type = nid; + } + + ctx_data_free_data(&server_ctx_data); + ctx_data_free_data(&server2_ctx_data); + ctx_data_free_data(&client_ctx_data); + + peer_free_data(&server); + peer_free_data(&client); + return ret; +} + +HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, + SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx, + SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx, + const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) +{ + HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result; + SSL_SESSION *session = NULL; + + result = do_handshake_internal(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, + test_ctx, &test_ctx->extra, + NULL, &session); + if (test_ctx->handshake_mode != SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME) + goto end; + + if (result->result != SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) { + result->result = SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED; + goto end; + } + + HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result); + /* We don't support SNI on second handshake yet, so server2_ctx is NULL. */ + result = do_handshake_internal(resume_server_ctx, NULL, resume_client_ctx, + test_ctx, &test_ctx->resume_extra, + session, NULL); + end: + SSL_SESSION_free(session); + return result; +} |