diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c | 680 |
1 files changed, 680 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29b7afc --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c @@ -0,0 +1,680 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +# include "internal/cryptlib.h" +# include <openssl/sha.h> +# include <openssl/srp.h> +# include <openssl/evp.h> +# include <openssl/buffer.h> +# include <openssl/rand.h> +# include <openssl/txt_db.h> + +# define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20 +# define MAX_LEN 2500 + +static char b64table[] = + "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./"; + +/* + * the following two conversion routines have been inspired by code from + * Stanford + */ + +/* + * Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation. + */ +static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src) +{ + char *loc; + int i, j; + int size; + + if (alen == 0 || alen > INT_MAX) + return -1; + + while (*src && (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n')) + ++src; + size = strlen(src); + if (size < 0 || size >= (int)alen) + return -1; + + i = 0; + while (i < size) { + loc = strchr(b64table, src[i]); + if (loc == (char *)0) + break; + else + a[i] = loc - b64table; + ++i; + } + /* if nothing valid to process we have a zero length response */ + if (i == 0) + return 0; + size = i; + i = size - 1; + j = size; + while (1) { + a[j] = a[i]; + if (--i < 0) + break; + a[j] |= (a[i] & 3) << 6; + --j; + a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x3c) >> 2); + if (--i < 0) + break; + a[j] |= (a[i] & 0xf) << 4; + --j; + a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x30) >> 4); + if (--i < 0) + break; + a[j] |= (a[i] << 2); + + a[--j] = 0; + if (--i < 0) + break; + } + while (j <= size && a[j] == 0) + ++j; + i = 0; + while (j <= size) + a[i++] = a[j++]; + return i; +} + +/* + * Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string. + */ +static char *t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size) +{ + int c, pos = size % 3; + unsigned char b0 = 0, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, notleading = 0; + char *olddst = dst; + + switch (pos) { + case 1: + b2 = src[0]; + break; + case 2: + b1 = src[0]; + b2 = src[1]; + break; + } + + while (1) { + c = (b0 & 0xfc) >> 2; + if (notleading || c != 0) { + *dst++ = b64table[c]; + notleading = 1; + } + c = ((b0 & 3) << 4) | ((b1 & 0xf0) >> 4); + if (notleading || c != 0) { + *dst++ = b64table[c]; + notleading = 1; + } + c = ((b1 & 0xf) << 2) | ((b2 & 0xc0) >> 6); + if (notleading || c != 0) { + *dst++ = b64table[c]; + notleading = 1; + } + c = b2 & 0x3f; + if (notleading || c != 0) { + *dst++ = b64table[c]; + notleading = 1; + } + if (pos >= size) + break; + else { + b0 = src[pos++]; + b1 = src[pos++]; + b2 = src[pos++]; + } + } + + *dst++ = '\0'; + return olddst; +} + +void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd) +{ + if (user_pwd == NULL) + return; + BN_free(user_pwd->s); + BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v); + OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id); + OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info); + OPENSSL_free(user_pwd); +} + +static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void) +{ + SRP_user_pwd *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; + ret->N = NULL; + ret->g = NULL; + ret->s = NULL; + ret->v = NULL; + ret->id = NULL; + ret->info = NULL; + return ret; +} + +static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g, + const BIGNUM *N) +{ + vinfo->N = N; + vinfo->g = g; +} + +static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id, + const char *info) +{ + if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = OPENSSL_strdup(id))) + return 0; + return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info))); +} + +static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s, + const char *v) +{ + unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; + int len; + + vinfo->v = NULL; + vinfo->s = NULL; + + len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), v); + if (len < 0) + return 0; + if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL))) + return 0; + len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), s); + if (len < 0) + goto err; + vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); + if (vinfo->s == NULL) + goto err; + return 1; + err: + BN_free(vinfo->v); + vinfo->v = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v) +{ + vinfo->v = v; + vinfo->s = s; + return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL); +} + +static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src) +{ + SRP_user_pwd *ret; + + if (src == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((ret = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + + SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(ret, src->g, src->N); + if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(ret, src->id, src->info) + || !SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(ret, BN_dup(src->s), BN_dup(src->v))) { + SRP_user_pwd_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key) +{ + SRP_VBASE *vb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vb)); + + if (vb == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) == NULL + || (vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(vb); + return NULL; + } + vb->default_g = NULL; + vb->default_N = NULL; + vb->seed_key = NULL; + if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = OPENSSL_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) { + sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd); + sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache); + OPENSSL_free(vb); + return NULL; + } + return vb; +} + +void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb) +{ + if (!vb) + return; + sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free); + sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache); + OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key); + OPENSSL_free(vb); +} + +static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch) +{ + unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; + int len; + SRP_gN_cache *newgN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newgN)); + + if (newgN == NULL) + return NULL; + + len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ch); + if (len < 0) + goto err; + + if ((newgN->b64_bn = OPENSSL_strdup(ch)) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL))) + return newgN; + + OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn); + err: + OPENSSL_free(newgN); + return NULL; +} + +static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache) +{ + if (gN_cache == NULL) + return; + OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn); + BN_free(gN_cache->bn); + OPENSSL_free(gN_cache); +} + +static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab) +{ + int i; + + SRP_gN *gN; + if (gN_tab != NULL) + for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++) { + gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i); + if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id, id) == 0)) + return gN; + } + + return SRP_get_default_gN(id); +} + +static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch) +{ + int i; + if (gN_cache == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* search if we have already one... */ + for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) { + SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i); + if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn, ch) == 0) + return cache->bn; + } + { /* it is the first time that we find it */ + SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch); + if (newgN) { + if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache, newgN, 0) > 0) + return newgN->bn; + SRP_gN_free(newgN); + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * this function parses verifier file. Format is: + * string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0 + * string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index) + */ + +int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file) +{ + int error_code; + STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null(); + char *last_index = NULL; + int i; + char **pp; + + SRP_gN *gN = NULL; + SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL; + + TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL; + BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); + + error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE; + + if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0) + goto err; + + error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE; + + if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL) + goto err; + + error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY; + + if (vb->seed_key) { + last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) { + pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i); + if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) { + /* + * we add this couple in the internal Stack + */ + + if ((gN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gN))) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((gN->id = OPENSSL_strdup(pp[DB_srpid])) == NULL + || (gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier])) + == NULL + || (gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt])) + == NULL + || sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0) + goto err; + + gN = NULL; + + if (vb->seed_key != NULL) { + last_index = pp[DB_srpid]; + } + } else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) { + /* it is a user .... */ + const SRP_gN *lgN; + + if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) { + error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY; + if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N); + if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids + (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo])) + goto err; + + error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB; + if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv + (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier])) + goto err; + + if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0) + goto err; + user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */ + } + } + } + + if (last_index != NULL) { + /* this means that we want to simulate a default user */ + + if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) { + error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB; + goto err; + } + vb->default_g = gN->g; + vb->default_N = gN->N; + gN = NULL; + } + error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR; + + err: + /* + * there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application + * terminates most likely + */ + + if (gN != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(gN->id); + OPENSSL_free(gN); + } + + SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd); + + TXT_DB_free(tmpdb); + BIO_free_all(in); + + sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab); + + return error_code; + +} + +static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) +{ + int i; + SRP_user_pwd *user; + + if (vb == NULL) + return NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) { + user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i); + if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0) + return user; + } + + return NULL; +} + + #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L +/* + * DEPRECATED: use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. + * This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. + * Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller. + * In other words, caller must not free the result. + */ +SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) +{ + return find_user(vb, username); +} +#endif + +/* + * Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller. + * In other words, caller must free the result once done. + */ +SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) +{ + SRP_user_pwd *user; + unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt = NULL; + + if (vb == NULL) + return NULL; + + if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL) + return srp_user_pwd_dup(user); + + if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) || + (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL)) + return NULL; + +/* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */ + + if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + + SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user, vb->default_g, vb->default_N); + + if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL)) + goto err; + + if (RAND_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0) + goto err; + ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (ctxt == NULL + || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key)) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, username, strlen(username)) + || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, digs, NULL)) + goto err; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt); + ctxt = NULL; + if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user, + BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL), + BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL))) + return user; + + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt); + SRP_user_pwd_free(user); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64) + */ +char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, + char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g) +{ + int len; + char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL; + const BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL; + BIGNUM *N_bn_alloc = NULL, *g_bn_alloc = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL; + unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; + unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN]; + char *defgNid = NULL; + int vfsize = 0; + + if ((user == NULL) || + (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL)) + goto err; + + if (N) { + if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0) + goto err; + N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); + N_bn = N_bn_alloc; + if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0) + goto err; + g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); + g_bn = g_bn_alloc; + defgNid = "*"; + } else { + SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL); + if (gN == NULL) + goto err; + N_bn = gN->N; + g_bn = gN->g; + defgNid = gN->id; + } + + if (*salt == NULL) { + if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) + goto err; + + s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); + } else { + if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)) <= 0) + goto err; + s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL); + } + + if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn)) + goto err; + + BN_bn2bin(v, tmp); + vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2; + if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL)) + goto err; + t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v)); + + if (*salt == NULL) { + char *tmp_salt; + + if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) { + goto err; + } + t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN); + *salt = tmp_salt; + } + + *verifier = vf; + vf = NULL; + result = defgNid; + + err: + BN_free(N_bn_alloc); + BN_free(g_bn_alloc); + OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize); + BN_clear_free(s); + BN_clear_free(v); + return result; +} + +/* + * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL + * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point + * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not + * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a + * random salt. + * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier + * BIGNUMS. + */ +int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, + BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N, + const BIGNUM *g) +{ + int result = 0; + BIGNUM *x = NULL; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN]; + BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL; + + if ((user == NULL) || + (pass == NULL) || + (salt == NULL) || + (verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) + goto err; + + if (*salt == NULL) { + if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) + goto err; + + salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); + } else { + salttmp = *salt; + } + + x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass); + + *verifier = BN_new(); + if (*verifier == NULL) + goto err; + + if (!BN_mod_exp(*verifier, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) { + BN_clear_free(*verifier); + goto err; + } + + result = 1; + *salt = salttmp; + + err: + if (salt != NULL && *salt != salttmp) + BN_clear_free(salttmp); + BN_clear_free(x); + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + return result; +} + +#endif |