diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 867 |
1 files changed, 867 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a12276 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c @@ -0,0 +1,867 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include <openssl/asn1t.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/cms.h> +#include "internal/asn1_int.h" +#include "internal/evp_int.h" +#include "rsa_locl.h" + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS +static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si); +static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si); +static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); +static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); +#endif + +static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + unsigned char *penc = NULL; + int penclen; + penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc); + if (penclen <= 0) + return 0; + if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA), + V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, penc, penclen)) + return 1; + + OPENSSL_free(penc); + return 0; +} + +static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) +{ + const unsigned char *p; + int pklen; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + + if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey)) + return 0; + if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); + return 0; + } + EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); + return 1; +} + +static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) +{ + if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0 + || BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, + const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) +{ + RSA *rsa; + + if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); + return 0; + } + EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); + return 1; +} + +static int old_rsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) +{ + return i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, pder); +} + +static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + unsigned char *rk = NULL; + int rklen; + rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk); + + if (rklen <= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0, + V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen)) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) +{ + const unsigned char *p; + int pklen; + if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8)) + return 0; + return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen); +} + +static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa); +} + +static int rsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n); +} + +static int rsa_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + return RSA_security_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa); +} + +static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa); +} + +static int do_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off, int priv) +{ + char *str; + const char *s; + int ret = 0, mod_len = 0; + + if (x->n != NULL) + mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n); + + if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) + goto err; + + if (priv && x->d) { + if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) + goto err; + str = "modulus:"; + s = "publicExponent:"; + } else { + if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) + goto err; + str = "Modulus:"; + s = "Exponent:"; + } + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (priv) { + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, NULL, off)) + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + err: + return (ret); +} + +static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, + ASN1_PCTX *ctx) +{ + return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0); +} + +static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, + ASN1_PCTX *ctx) +{ + return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1); +} + +/* Given an MGF1 Algorithm ID decode to an Algorithm Identifier */ +static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg) +{ + if (alg == NULL) + return NULL; + if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) + return NULL; + return ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), + alg->parameter); +} + +static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, + X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) +{ + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; + + *pmaskHash = NULL; + + pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), + alg->parameter); + + if (!pss) + return NULL; + + *pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm); + + return pss; +} + +static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, + X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent) +{ + int rv = 0; + if (!pss) { + if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0) + return 0; + return 1; + } + if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) + goto err; + if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) + goto err; + if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0) + goto err; + + if (pss->hashAlgorithm) { + if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0) + goto err; + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0) + goto err; + + if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) + goto err; + + if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) + goto err; + + if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0) + goto err; + if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) { + if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0) + goto err; + if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0) + goto err; + if (maskHash) { + if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0) + goto err; + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0) + goto err; + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0) + goto err; + BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); + + if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) + goto err; + if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0) + goto err; + if (pss->saltLength) { + if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0) + goto err; + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0) + goto err; + BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); + + if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) + goto err; + if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0) + goto err; + if (pss->trailerField) { + if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0) + goto err; + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0) + goto err; + BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); + + rv = 1; + + err: + return rv; + +} + +static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, + const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) +{ + if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) { + int rv; + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; + X509_ALGOR *maskHash; + pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash); + rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent); + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); + X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); + if (!rv) + return 0; + } else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) + return 0; + if (sig) + return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent); + return 1; +} + +static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) +{ + X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL; + switch (op) { + + case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: + if (arg1 == 0) + PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg); + break; + + case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT: + if (arg1 == 0) + PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg); + break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS + case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: + if (arg1 == 0) + return rsa_cms_sign(arg2); + else if (arg1 == 1) + return rsa_cms_verify(arg2); + break; + + case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE: + if (arg1 == 0) + return rsa_cms_encrypt(arg2); + else if (arg1 == 1) + return rsa_cms_decrypt(arg2); + break; + + case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE: + *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS; + return 1; +#endif + + case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID: + *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256; + return 1; + + default: + return -2; + + } + + if (alg) + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0); + + return 1; + +} + +/* allocate and set algorithm ID from EVP_MD, default SHA1 */ +static int rsa_md_to_algor(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *md) +{ + if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1) + return 1; + *palg = X509_ALGOR_new(); + if (*palg == NULL) + return 0; + X509_ALGOR_set_md(*palg, md); + return 1; +} + +/* Allocate and set MGF1 algorithm ID from EVP_MD */ +static int rsa_md_to_mgf1(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) +{ + X509_ALGOR *algtmp = NULL; + ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL; + *palg = NULL; + if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) == NID_sha1) + return 1; + /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */ + if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&algtmp, mgf1md)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_item_pack(algtmp, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp)) + goto err; + *palg = X509_ALGOR_new(); + if (*palg == NULL) + goto err; + X509_ALGOR_set0(*palg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp); + stmp = NULL; + err: + ASN1_STRING_free(stmp); + X509_ALGOR_free(algtmp); + if (*palg) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/* convert algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */ +static const EVP_MD *rsa_algor_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg) +{ + const EVP_MD *md; + if (!alg) + return EVP_sha1(); + md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm); + if (md == NULL) + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); + return md; +} + +/* convert MGF1 algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */ +static const EVP_MD *rsa_mgf1_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR *maskHash) +{ + const EVP_MD *md; + if (!alg) + return EVP_sha1(); + /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */ + if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM); + return NULL; + } + if (!maskHash) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER); + return NULL; + } + md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm); + if (md == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST); + return NULL; + } + return md; +} + +/* + * Convert EVP_PKEY_CTX is PSS mode into corresponding algorithm parameter, + * suitable for setting an AlgorithmIdentifier. + */ + +static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx) +{ + const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md; + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL; + ASN1_STRING *os = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx); + int saltlen, rv = 0; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0) + goto err; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0) + goto err; + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen)) + goto err; + if (saltlen == -1) + saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd); + else if (saltlen == -2) { + saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2; + if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0) + saltlen--; + } + pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new(); + if (pss == NULL) + goto err; + if (saltlen != 20) { + pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); + if (pss->saltLength == NULL) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen)) + goto err; + } + if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd)) + goto err; + if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&pss->maskGenAlgorithm, mgf1md)) + goto err; + /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */ + if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os)) + goto err; + rv = 1; + err: + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); + if (rv) + return os; + ASN1_STRING_free(os); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * From PSS AlgorithmIdentifier set public key parameters. If pkey isn't NULL + * then the EVP_MD_CTX is setup and initialised. If it is NULL parameters are + * passed to pkctx instead. + */ + +static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx, + X509_ALGOR *sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + int rv = -1; + int saltlen; + const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL; + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; + X509_ALGOR *maskHash; + /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */ + if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE); + return -1; + } + /* Decode PSS parameters */ + pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash); + + if (pss == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(pss->maskGenAlgorithm, maskHash); + if (!mgf1md) + goto err; + md = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->hashAlgorithm); + if (!md) + goto err; + + if (pss->saltLength) { + saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength); + + /* + * Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main RSA + * routines will trap other invalid values anyway. + */ + if (saltlen < 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + } else + saltlen = 20; + + /* + * low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and + * PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway. + */ + if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER); + goto err; + } + + /* We have all parameters now set up context */ + + if (pkey) { + if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey)) + goto err; + } else { + const EVP_MD *checkmd; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &checkmd) <= 0) + goto err; + if (EVP_MD_type(md) != EVP_MD_type(checkmd)) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH); + goto err; + } + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0) + goto err; + /* Carry on */ + rv = 1; + + err: + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); + X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); + return rv; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS +static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si) +{ + int nid, nid2; + X509_ALGOR *alg; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si); + CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg); + nid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm); + if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption) + return 1; + if (nid == NID_rsassaPss) + return rsa_pss_to_ctx(NULL, pkctx, alg, NULL); + /* Workaround for some implementation that use a signature OID */ + if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, NULL, &nid2)) { + if (nid2 == NID_rsaEncryption) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* + * Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature + * is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS. + */ + +static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, + X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, + EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */ + if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE); + return -1; + } + if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey) > 0) { + /* Carry on */ + return 2; + } + return -1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS +static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si) +{ + int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; + X509_ALGOR *alg; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si); + ASN1_STRING *os = NULL; + CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg); + if (pkctx) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0) + return 0; + } + if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0); + return 1; + } + /* We don't support it */ + if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) + return 0; + os = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx); + if (!os) + return 0; + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os); + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, + X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, + ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig) +{ + int pad_mode; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx); + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0) + return 0; + if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) + return 2; + if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { + ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL; + os1 = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx); + if (!os1) + return 0; + /* Duplicate parameters if we have to */ + if (alg2) { + ASN1_STRING *os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1); + if (!os2) { + ASN1_STRING_free(os1); + return 0; + } + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), + V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2); + } + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), + V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1); + return 3; + } + return 2; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS +static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, + X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) +{ + RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *pss; + + *pmaskHash = NULL; + + pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS), + alg->parameter); + + if (!pss) + return NULL; + + *pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenFunc); + + return pss; +} + +static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) +{ + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx; + X509_ALGOR *cmsalg; + int nid; + int rv = -1; + unsigned char *label = NULL; + int labellen = 0; + const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL; + RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep; + X509_ALGOR *maskHash; + pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); + if (!pkctx) + return 0; + if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &cmsalg)) + return -1; + nid = OBJ_obj2nid(cmsalg->algorithm); + if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption) + return 1; + if (nid != NID_rsaesOaep) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE); + return -1; + } + /* Decode OAEP parameters */ + oaep = rsa_oaep_decode(cmsalg, &maskHash); + + if (oaep == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + + mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(oaep->maskGenFunc, maskHash); + if (!mgf1md) + goto err; + md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->hashFunc); + if (!md) + goto err; + + if (oaep->pSourceFunc) { + X509_ALGOR *plab = oaep->pSourceFunc; + if (OBJ_obj2nid(plab->algorithm) != NID_pSpecified) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE); + goto err; + } + if (plab->parameter->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL); + goto err; + } + + label = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data; + /* Stop label being freed when OAEP parameters are freed */ + plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data = NULL; + labellen = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->length; + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0) + goto err; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, md) <= 0) + goto err; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0) + goto err; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, label, labellen) <= 0) + goto err; + /* Carry on */ + rv = 1; + + err: + RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep); + X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); + return rv; +} + +static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) +{ + const EVP_MD *md, *mgf1md; + RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep = NULL; + ASN1_STRING *os = NULL; + X509_ALGOR *alg; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); + int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, rv = 0, labellen; + unsigned char *label; + if (CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &alg) <= 0) + return 0; + if (pkctx) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0) + return 0; + } + if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0); + return 1; + } + /* Not supported */ + if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) + return 0; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, &md) <= 0) + goto err; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0) + goto err; + labellen = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, &label); + if (labellen < 0) + goto err; + oaep = RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_new(); + if (oaep == NULL) + goto err; + if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&oaep->hashFunc, md)) + goto err; + if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&oaep->maskGenFunc, mgf1md)) + goto err; + if (labellen > 0) { + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *los; + oaep->pSourceFunc = X509_ALGOR_new(); + if (oaep->pSourceFunc == NULL) + goto err; + los = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); + if (los == NULL) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(los, label, labellen)) { + ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(los); + goto err; + } + X509_ALGOR_set0(oaep->pSourceFunc, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pSpecified), + V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, los); + } + /* create string with pss parameter encoding. */ + if (!ASN1_item_pack(oaep, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS), &os)) + goto err; + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaesOaep), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os); + os = NULL; + rv = 1; + err: + RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep); + ASN1_STRING_free(os); + return rv; +} +#endif + +const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[2] = { + { + EVP_PKEY_RSA, + EVP_PKEY_RSA, + ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL, + + "RSA", + "OpenSSL RSA method", + + rsa_pub_decode, + rsa_pub_encode, + rsa_pub_cmp, + rsa_pub_print, + + rsa_priv_decode, + rsa_priv_encode, + rsa_priv_print, + + int_rsa_size, + rsa_bits, + rsa_security_bits, + + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + + rsa_sig_print, + int_rsa_free, + rsa_pkey_ctrl, + old_rsa_priv_decode, + old_rsa_priv_encode, + rsa_item_verify, + rsa_item_sign}, + + { + EVP_PKEY_RSA2, + EVP_PKEY_RSA, + ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS} +}; 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