diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/randfile.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/randfile.c | 364 |
1 files changed, 364 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/randfile.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dbd03ff --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rand/randfile.c @@ -0,0 +1,364 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" + +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/buffer.h> + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS +# include <unixio.h> +#endif +#include <sys/types.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO +# include <sys/stat.h> +# include <fcntl.h> +/* + * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter + * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally + * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they + * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability + * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback... + */ +# if !defined(S_ISBLK) +# if defined(_S_IFBLK) +# define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & _S_IFBLK) +# elif defined(S_IFBLK) +# define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & S_IFBLK) +# elif defined(_WIN32) +# define S_ISBLK(m) 0 /* no concept of block devices on Windows */ +# endif +# endif +# if !defined(S_ISCHR) +# if defined(_S_IFCHR) +# define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & _S_IFCHR) +# elif defined(S_IFCHR) +# define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & S_IFCHR) +# endif +# endif +#endif + +#ifdef _WIN32 +# define stat _stat +# define chmod _chmod +# define open _open +# define fdopen _fdopen +# define fstat _fstat +# define fileno _fileno +#endif + +#undef BUFSIZE +#define BUFSIZE 1024 +#define RAND_DATA 1024 + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS +/* + * Misc hacks needed for specific cases. + * + * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically) + * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what. We know that + * stdio function return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it). + * Additionally, we create a similar char pointer type for the sake of + * vms_setbuf below. + */ +# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 +# pragma pointer_size save +# pragma pointer_size 32 +typedef char *char_ptr32; +# pragma pointer_size restore +/* + * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation + * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here. + * Since we know that the FILE* really is a 32-bit pointer expanded to + * 64 bits, we also know it's safe to convert it back to a 32-bit pointer. + * As for the buffer parameter, we only use NULL here, so that passes as + * well... + */ +# define setbuf(fp,buf) (setbuf)((__FILE_ptr32)(fp), (char_ptr32)(buf)) +# endif + +/* + * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for + * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89 + */ +static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) = + (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen; +# define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0" + +# define openssl_fopen(fname,mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS) +#endif + +#define RFILE ".rnd" + +/* + * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy + * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c + */ + +int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) +{ + /*- + * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes. + * if bytes == -1, read complete file. + */ + + unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO + struct stat sb; +#endif + int i, ret = 0, n; + FILE *in = NULL; + + if (file == NULL) + return 0; + + if (bytes == 0) + return ret; + + in = openssl_fopen(file, "rb"); + if (in == NULL) + goto err; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO + /* + * struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be + * initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire + * structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from + * applications such as Valgrind. + */ + memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); + if (fstat(fileno(in), &sb) < 0) + goto err; + RAND_add(&sb, sizeof(sb), 0.0); + +# if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) + if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) { + /* + * this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number of + * bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered I/O + * because we will waste system entropy. + */ + bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */ + setbuf(in, NULL); /* don't do buffered reads */ + } +# endif +#endif + for (;;) { + if (bytes > 0) + n = (bytes < BUFSIZE) ? (int)bytes : BUFSIZE; + else + n = BUFSIZE; + i = fread(buf, 1, n, in); + if (i <= 0) + break; + + RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i); + ret += i; + if (bytes > 0) { + bytes -= n; + if (bytes <= 0) + break; + } + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE); + err: + if (in != NULL) + fclose(in); + return ret; +} + +int RAND_write_file(const char *file) +{ + unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; + int i, ret = 0, rand_err = 0; + FILE *out = NULL; + int n; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO + struct stat sb; + +# if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) +# ifdef _WIN32 + /* + * Check for |file| being a driver as "ASCII-safe" on Windows, + * because driver paths are always ASCII. + */ +# endif + i = stat(file, &sb); + if (i != -1) { + if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) { + /* + * this file is a device. we don't write back to it. we + * "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort of random + * device. Otherwise attempting to write to and chmod the device + * causes problems. + */ + return 1; + } + } +# endif +#endif + +#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \ + !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) + { +# ifndef O_BINARY +# define O_BINARY 0 +# endif + /* + * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions + * should be restrictive from the start + */ + int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600); + if (fd != -1) + out = fdopen(fd, "wb"); + } +#endif + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS + /* + * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of + * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all + * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version + * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race + * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help + * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares + * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be + * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code + * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete + * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop + * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The + * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid + * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the + * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent + * rand file in a concurrent use situation. + */ + + out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+"); +#endif + if (out == NULL) + out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb"); + if (out == NULL) + goto err; + +#if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) + chmod(file, 0600); +#endif + n = RAND_DATA; + for (;;) { + i = (n > BUFSIZE) ? BUFSIZE : n; + n -= BUFSIZE; + if (RAND_bytes(buf, i) <= 0) + rand_err = 1; + i = fwrite(buf, 1, i, out); + if (i <= 0) { + ret = 0; + break; + } + ret += i; + if (n <= 0) + break; + } + + fclose(out); + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE); + err: + return (rand_err ? -1 : ret); +} + +const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size) +{ + char *s = NULL; + int use_randfile = 1; +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ + struct stat sb; +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) + DWORD len; + WCHAR *var, *val; + + if ((var = L"RANDFILE", + len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0 + && (var = L"HOME", use_randfile = 0, + len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0 + && (var = L"USERPROFILE", + len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0) { + var = L"SYSTEMROOT", + len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0); + } + + if (len != 0) { + int sz; + + val = _alloca(len * sizeof(WCHAR)); + + if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, len) < len + && (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + s = _alloca(sz); + if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz, + NULL, NULL) == 0) + s = NULL; + } + } +#else + if (OPENSSL_issetugid() != 0) { + use_randfile = 0; + } else { + s = getenv("RANDFILE"); + if (s == NULL || *s == '\0') { + use_randfile = 0; + s = getenv("HOME"); + } + } +#endif +#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME + if (!use_randfile && s == NULL) { + s = DEFAULT_HOME; + } +#endif + if (s != NULL && *s) { + size_t len = strlen(s); + + if (use_randfile && len + 1 < size) { + if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size) + return NULL; + } else if (len + strlen(RFILE) + 2 < size) { + OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size); +#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS + OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "/", size); +#endif + OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, RFILE, size); + } + } else { + buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */ + } + +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ + /* + * given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be seen on a + * stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it fails, use /dev/arandom + * instead. this allows the user to use their own source for good random + * data, but defaults to something hopefully decent if that isn't + * available. + */ + + if (!buf[0] || stat(buf, &sb) == -1) + if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) { + return NULL; + } +#endif + return buf[0] ? buf : NULL; +} |