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-rw-r--r--openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h232
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diff --git a/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h b/openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h
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+/*
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*- CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's DN
+ * issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuers public key (excluding the tag & length fields)
+ * serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
+ */
+struct ocsp_cert_id_st {
+ X509_ALGOR hashAlgorithm;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING issuerNameHash;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING issuerKeyHash;
+ ASN1_INTEGER serialNumber;
+};
+
+/*- Request ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * reqCert CertID,
+ * singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_one_request_st {
+ OCSP_CERTID *reqCert;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *singleRequestExtensions;
+};
+
+/*- TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ * requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
+ * requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
+ * requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_req_info_st {
+ ASN1_INTEGER *version;
+ GENERAL_NAME *requestorName;
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_ONEREQ) *requestList;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *requestExtensions;
+};
+
+/*- Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * signature BIT STRING,
+ * certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_signature_st {
+ X509_ALGOR signatureAlgorithm;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+};
+
+/*- OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * tbsRequest TBSRequest,
+ * optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_request_st {
+ OCSP_REQINFO tbsRequest;
+ OCSP_SIGNATURE *optionalSignature; /* OPTIONAL */
+};
+
+/*- OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
+ * successful (0), --Response has valid confirmations
+ * malformedRequest (1), --Illegal confirmation request
+ * internalError (2), --Internal error in issuer
+ * tryLater (3), --Try again later
+ * --(4) is not used
+ * sigRequired (5), --Must sign the request
+ * unauthorized (6) --Request unauthorized
+ * }
+ */
+
+/*- ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * response OCTET STRING }
+ */
+struct ocsp_resp_bytes_st {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *responseType;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *response;
+};
+
+/*- OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
+ * responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_response_st {
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED *responseStatus;
+ OCSP_RESPBYTES *responseBytes;
+};
+
+/*- ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
+ * byName [1] Name,
+ * byKey [2] KeyHash }
+ */
+struct ocsp_responder_id_st {
+ int type;
+ union {
+ X509_NAME *byName;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *byKey;
+ } value;
+};
+
+/*- KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING --SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
+ * --(excluding the tag and length fields)
+ */
+
+/*- RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
+ * revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_revoked_info_st {
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *revocationTime;
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED *revocationReason;
+};
+
+/*- CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
+ * good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
+ * revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
+ * unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
+ */
+struct ocsp_cert_status_st {
+ int type;
+ union {
+ ASN1_NULL *good;
+ OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *revoked;
+ ASN1_NULL *unknown;
+ } value;
+};
+
+/*- SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * certID CertID,
+ * certStatus CertStatus,
+ * thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
+ * nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
+ * singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_single_response_st {
+ OCSP_CERTID *certId;
+ OCSP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisUpdate;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextUpdate;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *singleExtensions;
+};
+
+/*- ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ * responderID ResponderID,
+ * producedAt GeneralizedTime,
+ * responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
+ * responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_response_data_st {
+ ASN1_INTEGER *version;
+ OCSP_RESPID responderId;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *producedAt;
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *responses;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *responseExtensions;
+};
+
+/*- BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * tbsResponseData ResponseData,
+ * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * signature BIT STRING,
+ * certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
+ */
+ /*
+ * Note 1: The value for "signature" is specified in the OCSP rfc2560 as
+ * follows: "The value for the signature SHALL be computed on the hash of
+ * the DER encoding ResponseData." This means that you must hash the
+ * DER-encoded tbsResponseData, and then run it through a crypto-signing
+ * function, which will (at least w/RSA) do a hash-'n'-private-encrypt
+ * operation. This seems a bit odd, but that's the spec. Also note that
+ * the data structures do not leave anywhere to independently specify the
+ * algorithm used for the initial hash. So, we look at the
+ * signature-specification algorithm, and try to do something intelligent.
+ * -- Kathy Weinhold, CertCo
+ */
+ /*
+ * Note 2: It seems that the mentioned passage from RFC 2560 (section
+ * 4.2.1) is open for interpretation. I've done tests against another
+ * responder, and found that it doesn't do the double hashing that the RFC
+ * seems to say one should. Therefore, all relevant functions take a flag
+ * saying which variant should be used. -- Richard Levitte, OpenSSL team
+ * and CeloCom
+ */
+struct ocsp_basic_response_st {
+ OCSP_RESPDATA tbsResponseData;
+ X509_ALGOR signatureAlgorithm;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
+ * crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_crl_id_st {
+ ASN1_IA5STRING *crlUrl;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *crlNum;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *crlTime;
+};
+
+/*-
+ * ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * issuer Name,
+ * locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax OPTIONAL }
+ */
+struct ocsp_service_locator_st {
+ X509_NAME *issuer;
+ STACK_OF(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) *locator;
+};
+
+# define OCSP_REQUEST_sign(o,pkey,md) \
+ ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQINFO),\
+ &(o)->optionalSignature->signatureAlgorithm,NULL,\
+ (o)->optionalSignature->signature,&(o)->tbsRequest,pkey,md)
+
+# define OCSP_BASICRESP_sign(o,pkey,md,d) \
+ ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),&(o)->signatureAlgorithm,\
+ NULL,(o)->signature,&(o)->tbsResponseData,pkey,md)
+
+# define OCSP_REQUEST_verify(a,r) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQINFO),\
+ &(a)->optionalSignature->signatureAlgorithm,\
+ (a)->optionalSignature->signature,&(a)->tbsRequest,r)
+
+# define OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(a,r,d) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),\
+ &(a)->signatureAlgorithm,(a)->signature,&(a)->tbsResponseData,r)
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