From 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Weimer Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements patch from: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=patch;h=6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 --- ChangeLog | 7 ++++++ elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c index 2269dbe..86ae20c 100644 --- a/elf/rtld.c +++ b/elf/rtld.c @@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard) #endif +/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker, + particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active. */ +#ifdef NAME_MAX +# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX +#else +# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255 +#endif +#ifdef PATH_MAX +# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX +#else +# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024 +#endif + +/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain + directories and is not overly long. Reject empty names + unconditionally. */ +static bool +dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p) +{ + if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure)) + { + /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1 + programs, and also skip overlong names. */ + size_t len = strlen (p); + if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL) + return false; + } + return *p != '\0'; +} /* List of auditing DSOs. */ static struct audit_list @@ -718,6 +747,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro; /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed. */ static int version_info attribute_relro; +/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries + separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the + executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list. + (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are + ignored since it is insecure.) Return the number of preloads + performed. */ +unsigned int +handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map) +{ + unsigned int npreloads = 0; + const char *p = preloadlist; + char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT]; + + while (*p != '\0') + { + /* Split preload list at space/colon. */ + size_t len = strcspn (p, " :"); + if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname)) + { + memcpy (fname, p, len); + fname[len] = '\0'; + } + else + fname[0] = '\0'; + + /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */ + p += len; + if (*p != '\0') + ++p; + + if (dso_2020-06-25daemon: Correctly handle EMLINK corner case when deduplicating....Ludovic Courtès ibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL)) { - /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries - separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the - executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope - list. If the binary is running setuid all elements - containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure. */ - char *list = strdupa (preloadlist); - char *p; - HP_TIMING_NOW (start); - - /* Prevent optimizing strsep. Speed is not important here. */ - while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL) - if (p[0] != '\0' - && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1) - || strchr (p, '/') == NULL)) - npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD"); - + npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map); HP_TIMING_NOW (stop); HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop); HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff); -- 2.9.3