From a789f654a0f370720b2c6b7856b9971dcc1d5eb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hartmut Goebel Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 23:43:18 +0100 Subject: gnu: Add libvnc. * gnu/packages/vnc.scm (libvnc): New variable. gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch, gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2019-15681.patch: New files. * gnu/local.mk: Add them. --- gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+) create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch') diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..146243670a --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 09e8fc02f59f16e2583b34fe1a270c238bd9ffec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= +Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 10:40:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Limit lenght to INT_MAX bytes in + rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() + +This ammends 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707 fix for a heap +out-of-bound write access in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() when +reading a transfered file content in a server. The former fix did not +work on platforms with a 32-bit int type (expected by rfbReadExact()). + +CVE-2018-15127 + + +--- + libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c +index 7af84906..f2edbeea 100644 +--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c ++++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c +@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ + #include + /* strftime() */ + #include ++/* INT_MAX */ ++#include + + #ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS + #include "rfbssl.h" +@@ -1472,8 +1474,11 @@ char *rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(rfbClientPtr cl, uint32_t length) + 0XFFFFFFFF, i.e. SIZE_MAX for 32-bit systems. On 64-bit systems, a length of 0XFFFFFFFF + will safely be allocated since this check will never trigger and malloc() can digest length+1 + without problems as length is a uint32_t. ++ We also later pass length to rfbReadExact() that expects a signed int type and ++ that might wrap on platforms with a 32-bit int type if length is bigger ++ than 0X7FFFFFFF. + */ +- if(length == SIZE_MAX) { ++ if(length == SIZE_MAX || length > INT_MAX) { + rfbErr("rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer: too big file transfer length requested: %u", (unsigned int)length); + rfbCloseClient(cl); + return NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3