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-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch215
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 215 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2d54ed03b9..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-0495:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0495
-https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/technical-advisory-return-of-the-hidden-number-problem/
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/949ff36623eafc3523a9f91784992965018ffb05
-
-From 949ff36623eafc3523a9f91784992965018ffb05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 12:10:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
-
-Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
-ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
-
-s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
-
-The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
-flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
-operations.
-
-As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
-the operation so that:
-
-s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
-
-Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
----
- CHANGES | 4 ++
- crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c | 9 ++++-
- crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
-index 0f301f86d9..a130fc9117 100644
---- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
-+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
-@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int restore_rand(void)
- return 1;
- }
-
--static int fbytes_counter = 0;
-+static int fbytes_counter = 0, use_fake = 0;
- static const char *numbers[8] = {
- "651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659",
- "6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654",
-@@ -158,6 +158,11 @@ int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
- int ret;
- BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
-
-+ if (use_fake == 0)
-+ return old_rand->bytes(buf, num);
-+
-+ use_fake = 0;
-+
- if (fbytes_counter >= 8)
- return 0;
- tmp = BN_new();
-@@ -199,11 +204,13 @@ int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in)
- /* create the key */
- if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL)
- goto x962_int_err;
-+ use_fake = 1;
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
- goto x962_int_err;
- BIO_printf(out, ".");
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
- /* create the signature */
-+ use_fake = 1;
- signature = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, key);
- if (signature == NULL)
- goto x962_int_err;
-diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
-index 16d4f59b9b..1d37551803 100644
---- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
-@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- {
- int ok = 0, i;
- BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *blind = NULL, *blindm = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *ckinv;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
-@@ -269,14 +270,25 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- }
-
- ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
-- if (!ret) {
-+ if (ret == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- s = ret->s;
-
-- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-- (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-+ if (ctx == NULL) {
-+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+ order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+ m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+ blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+ blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+ if (blindm == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-@@ -315,26 +327,70 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- }
- }
-
-- if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
-+ /*
-+ * The normal signature calculation is:
-+ *
-+ * s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
-+ *
-+ * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
-+ *
-+ * s := k^-1 * blind^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
-+ */
-+
-+ /* Generate a blinding value */
-+ do {
-+ if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(order) - 1, -1, 0))
-+ goto err;
-+ } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
-+ BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+ BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+ BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+
-+ /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod order */
-+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
-+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
-+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* blindm := blind * m mod order */
-+ if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, order, ctx)) {
-+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod order */
-+ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, order)) {
-+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod order */
-+ if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, order, ctx) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-- if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
-+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-+
-+ /* s := s * k^-1 mod order */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-+
- if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
- /*
- * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
- * generate new kinv and r values
- */
- if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
-- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN,
-- ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
-+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
-@@ -349,15 +405,11 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
- }
-- if (ctx)
-+ if (ctx != NULL) {
-+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-- if (m)
-- BN_clear_free(m);
-- if (tmp)
-- BN_clear_free(tmp);
-- if (order)
-- BN_free(order);
-- if (kinv)
-+ }
-+ if (kinv != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(kinv);
- return ret;
- }
---
-2.17.1
-
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