From: sms Subject: Fix CVE-2014-8141: out-of-bounds read issues in getZip64Data() Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/773722 --- a/fileio.c +++ b/fileio.c @@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ #endif static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] = "warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n"; +static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldCorrupt[] = + "warning: extra field (type: 0x%04x) corrupt. Continuing...\n"; #ifdef WINDLL static ZCONST char Far DiskFullQuery[] = @@ -2295,7 +2297,12 @@ if (readbuf(__G__ (char *)G.extra_field, length) == 0) return PK_EOF; /* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */ - getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length); + if (getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length) != PK_COOL) + { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, + LoadFarString( ExtraFieldCorrupt), EF_PKSZ64)); + error = PK_WARN; + } #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT G.unipath_filename = NULL; if (G.UzO.U_flag < 2) { --- a/process.c +++ b/process.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. @@ -1901,48 +1901,82 @@ and a 4-byte version of disk start number. Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever, but it means that this procedure is only called in one place. + + 2014-12-05 SMS. + Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling + makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with + simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend + on our variable sizes.) Error handling is crude, but we should now + stay within the buffer. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +#define Z64FLGS 0xffff +#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL) return PK_COOL; Trace((stderr,"\ngetZip64Data: scanning extra field of length %u\n", ef_len)); - while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) { + while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) + { eb_id = makeword(EB_ID + ef_buf); eb_len = makeword(EB_LEN + ef_buf); - if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { - /* discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ + if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) + { + /* Extra block length exceeds remaining extra field length. */ Trace((stderr, "getZip64Data: block length %u > rest ef_size %u\n", eb_len, ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)); break; } - if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) { - + if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) + { int offset = EB_HEADSIZE; - if (G.crec.ucsize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.ucsize == 0xffffffff){ - G.lrec.ucsize = G.crec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); - offset += sizeof(G.crec.ucsize); + if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL)) + { + if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) + return PK_ERR; + + G.crec.ucsize = G.lrec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); + offset += 8; } - if (G.crec.csize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.csize == 0xffffffff){ - G.csize = G.lrec.csize = G.crec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); - offset += sizeof(G.crec.csize); + + if ((G.crec.csize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.csize == Z64FLGL)) + { + if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) + return PK_ERR; + + G.csize = G.crec.csize = G.lrec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); + offset += 8; } - if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == 0xffffffff){ + + if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == Z64FLGL) + { + if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) + return PK_ERR; + G.crec.relative_offset_local_header = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); - offset += sizeof(G.crec.relative_offset_local_header); + offset += 8; } - if (G.crec.disk_number_start == 0xffff){ + + if (G.crec.disk_number_start == Z64FLGS) + { + if (offset+ 4 > ef_len) + return PK_ERR; + G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf); - offset += sizeof(G.crec.disk_number_start); + offse